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ABSTRACT 
The “Open Door” policies of China have brought many changes to Chinese society 
and its economy, such as foreign investment, and an influx of and an exponential 
growth in the mobility of skilled professionals. China’s cultural history is long, broad 
and profound. Confucian culture is deeply embedded in Chinese culture, in which 
guanxi is an important component. When culture changed, the meaning of guanxi 
also changed, especially through the transformation and restructuring of societies and 
politics. This thesis explains the ensuing impact of the political and cultural changes 
on auditor independence and corporate governance after the implementation of 
Chinese economic reforms.  
 
After the implementation of Chinese economic reforms, China adopted and 
transplanted many international regulations and policies that were devoted to 
technical performance and also to conforming with established institutional practices. 
Auditors and companies embed institutional practices, interactions and responses to 
external disturbances in their cultural environment. This thesis focuses on how 
Chinese auditors and companies respond to institutional changes under cultural 
pressures by observing three case studies.  
 
This thesis will make a unique contribution particularly to the existing literature in 
the areas of the neo-Durkheimian theory, and auditor independence and corporate 
governance in context of Chinese culture. This thesis also provides an opportunity to 
understand auditor and corporate practices in Chinese institutional and cultural 
environments, and also improves the understanding of potential risks existing in the 
process of adopting new international regulations in China.  
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
The accounting profession is struggling to regain public trust after high profile 
corporate scandals, such as Toshiba in 2015 and Enron in 2001 accounting scandals, 
which indicate problems with the quality of accounting financial reporting on a 
global scale. In China, there are also continuing instances of unexpected corporate 
failures and scandals, such as Yin Guang Xia and Green Land. This leads to the 
disrepute of and consequent loss of faith in the accounting profession. In 2001, 
former Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji gave three national accounting institutes in 
Beijing, Shanghai, and Xiamen personally inscribed plaques with the motto: to keep 
good faith and integrity, abide by the code of professional ethics, adhere to 
accounting standards, and to never falsify an account. 
 
China, a country with the world’s largest population and the second largest economy, 
has undergone rapid changes and reforms since the late 1970s. With the 
implementation of the Open Door policy and the process of transforming planned 
economies to be more market oriented, there has been a rapid growth in the number 
of multinational corporations establishing subsidiary companies in China. Australia 
signed a free trade agreement with China on 17 November 2014. China is Australia’s 
largest trading partner. This China-Australia free trade agreement will unlock 
significant opportunities for Australia. Auditing is relied upon in such relationships, 
because it is important for assurance of financial reporting integrity, being an activity 
of verification and evaluation of financial statements.  
 
This thesis explains the ensuing impact of the political and cultural change on auditor 
independence and corporate governance after the implementation of Chinese 
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economic reforms. Thus, the research problem of the thesis is the international 
auditing practices and transplanted corporate governance systems in China. This 
problem has two aspects, referring to the functioning in the Chinese context, and the 
risks identified in the case studies. 
 
In this introductory chapter, section one will discuss the research site. Section two 
will introduce the three selected cases. Section three will introduce the theoretical 
framework, followed by a discussion of the contribution of this study in section four. 
The organization of the thesis will be detailed in section five. 
 
1.1 The research site 
Three case studies were selected from China because of the unique development and 
institutional environment of that country. With the process of transforming planned 
economies to be more market oriented and China entering the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), there has been an exponential growth in the number of 
multinational corporations establishing subsidiary companies in China. Comparing 
the economic development of Chinese coastal and interior provinces, the policy of 
Chinese transition to a market-based economy was initially implemented in the 
coastal provinces (Demurger, 2001). As a result, both large amounts of foreign 
investment, and western culture entered China together. 
 
Chinese culture is not only deeply rooted, but has also significantly influenced East 
Asian countries, such as Japan, Korea, Malaysia, and Singapore. However, with the 
implementation of the open-door policy and a dramatic growth of international trade, 
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Chinese traditional culture has been shaken. This study can improve the 
understanding of individual behavioural changes in this unique environment. 
 
1.2 The theoretical framework 
Auditing is recognized as involving both social and cultural activities. It is important 
to investigate behaviours in the context of culture because culture can shape the way 
people think. While culture is attributed to socially constructed processes, 
government policies and political practices influence the social construction.  
 
New institutional theory suggests that for organizations to succeed in society they 
must achieve and maintain legitimacy in their environment (Chiang and Northcott, 
2012). Organizations maintain legitimacy in order to seek a position in the society. 
During the process of economic reform in China, the auditing profession increased 
their institutional legitimacy. New institutional theory assumes that institutional 
isomorphism is forced by three institutional pressures, namely coercive, mimetic, and 
normative isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995). However, 
because the policy of transition to a market-based economy was initially 
implemented in the coastal provinces of China, particularly in Special Economic 
Zones, regions opened up to the world gradually from coastal to interior regions. So, 
the auditing profession in different regions seeks their institutional legitimacy. In this 
process, culture may impact individuals’ behaviours and thoughts in different ways 
when individuals adopt similar policies and practices in different regions.  
 
Anthropologist Mary Douglas firstly proposed the grid-group method in 1970 to 
explain such a social and cultural phenomenon. The grid-group dimensions 
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categorise cultures into four different social environments and is based on two 
dimensions: the grid dimension and the group dimension. The grid dimension refers 
to the degree of social regulation that individuals are subject to in selecting social 
roles, while the group dimension concerns the degree of loyalty that an individual 
has to other group members (Linsley et al., 2015, p. 4). Individuals and organizations 
interpret their social context based on their own values and beliefs because culture 
exerts a strong impact over cognition. Although political events and institutions 
significantly influence individuals’ behaviours, individuals interpret and accept these 
institutional constraints as a process. Institutions enact rules and regulations and ask 
individuals to follow them, which cultivate individuals’ thought style. This is culture 
in this group of people. When people in a group share the same attitudes, customs, 
and beliefs, individuals tend to act in ways that reinforce those institutions. However, 
if individuals’ thought style has been changed, institutions may become 
disorganized. And also if institutions have been changed, the new institutions may 
cultivate new thought styles.  
 
Due to globalization of the world economy and the proliferation of multinational 
corporations, national economies have become increasingly interdependent. An 
increasing number of countries such as China are converging to internationally 
acceptable auditing practices. Neo-Durkheimian theory emphasizes the impact of 
informal institutions of culture which limits individuals’ opinions and cognition to 
adapt institutional changes (6, 2015).  
 
Confucian society does not encourage individuals to be outstanding or to be 
straightforward in expressing their own opinions against others’, because these 
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behaviours are seen as stealing the limelight and showing off. Individuals in 
Confucian societies prefer to avoid conflict, a trait which is attributed to the 
influences of the Confucian value of harmony. Harmony enhancement focuses on 
building and promoting relationships, and while conflict avoidance maintains the 
relationship, at the same time it limits independence. Independence is concerned with 
autonomy and the capability to exercise control. However, people live in a 
community and are heavily influenced by their social and cultural environment. This 
thesis uses neo-Durkheimian theory through the grid-group approach to analyse 
cultural aspects of international auditing convergence and the adoption of corporate 
governance practices, with particular reference to how they function in the context of 
Chinese auditing and corporations.  
 
1.3 The three selected cases 
The Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission commenced implementation of the 
regulation of the Public Condemnation System (公开谴责制度) in 1999. The number 
of listed A share companies conducting fraud was first disclosed in 2000 with 146 
company frauds.  This number rose sharply after 2006 (see Table 1 and Figure 1).  
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Table 1: The number of Chinese listed companies conducting frauds (Lu and Chang, 2017) 
Year The number of listed companies conducting frauds 
2000 146 
2001 228 
2002 177 
2003 158 
2004 167 
2005 130 
2006 147 
2007 225 
2008 261 
2009 311 
2010 327 
2011 469 
2012 538 
 
Figure 1: The number of Chinese A share listed companies conducting fraud (Lu and Chang, 2017) 
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The introduction of international accounting and auditing standards from 2006 
coincides with a marked increase in detected fraud.  The three cases occur during this 
period, and are selected to find potential reasons of listed companies continuously 
conducting fraud after the Chinese institutional environment changed.  All cases 
received wide publicity, and are a matter of public record.  
 
1.3.1 Yin Guang Xia 
Guang Xia (Yinchuan) Industry Co., Ltd. limited by shares (Yin Guang Xia) was 
listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange on 17
th
 June 1994. It was the first publicly 
listed company in the Ningxia (Hui) Autonomous Region, in which the major 
industries are plant cultivation, daily chemical products, and wine production and 
sales. The scandal of Yin Guang Xia occurred during the period between 1999 and 
2000. In 1999, China completed its enterprise reform
1
. Before the corporate 
reformation, Yin Guang Xia was a well-known and important state-owned enterprise. 
After corporate restructuring, Yin Guang Xia became a company limited by shares. It 
had a board of directors, a board of supervisors, and managers. In addition, this 
restructuring occurred when Chinese CPA firms started to disaffiliate from their 
government sponsoring body in 1997. 
 
1.3.2 Green Land 
Yunnan Green Land Biological Technology Co., Ltd. by shares (Green Land) (云南
绿大地生物科技股份有限公司) became the first listed company in the horticultural 
industry in 2007 and its stock traded on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Yunnan 
Hekou Green Land Industry Co., Ltd. with limited liability (云南河口绿大地实业有
                                                 
1
 Chinese enterprise reform in May 1984 was initiated to expand SOE’s autonomy in production 
planning and profit retention (Kang and Kim, 2012). 
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限公司) was founded in 1996, and was the predecessor of Green Land. Green Land 
conducted fraudulent accounting operations for the initial public offering (IPO) 
process and after it was listed, from 2004 to March 2010, when the China Security 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) started to investigate fraud operations in Green 
Land.  
 
In 2006, the Chinese CPA Implementation Standards (CCISs) (中国注册会计师执
业准则 ) were issued by the Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(CICPA) and approved by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and executed in 1
st
 
January 2007. 
 
1.3.3 Amoi Electronics 
The profit fraud in Amoi Electronics Co., Ltd. limited by shares (Amoi Electronics) 
happened in the period between 2006 and 2007. Amoi Electronics, a renowned 
mobile phone company, was approved by the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission for public offering on April 24, 1997. On 4th June 1997, the company’s 
stock traded on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. It is likely that Amoi Electronics 
conducted accounting fraud to avoid the risk of being delisted.  
 
 
1.4 Contributions of this thesis 
With the gradual process of Chinese economic reforms, institutional environments 
have been changed and individuals and organizations have to adjust and adapt for 
their long-term survival and sustainability. In the process of adaption, the way 
individuals and organizations interpret and accept institutional change is limited by 
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cultural impacts. The contribution of this thesis is to develop an understanding of 
China’s auditor independence through the lens of neo-Durkheimian theory. Neo-
Durkheimian theory guides analyses of the political and cultural influences on 
auditing and corporate governance. This thesis uses case study methodology to 
research auditing and corporate governance to enable a contextual understanding of 
Chinese regulatory environments.  
 
Neo-Durkheimian theory emphasizes the impact of informal institutions of culture 
(Tansey, 2004, p.18). It classifies culture into four different solidarities, to 
understand individuals’ problems, options, and choices within their experienced 
institutional changes. Institutions enact rules and regulations they ask individuals to 
follow. This cultivates individuals’ thought style, which relates to the culture of this 
group of people. People share the same attitudes, customs, and beliefs in the group, 
which lead individuals to act in ways that reinforce the institutions (6, 2015). 
However, if individuals’ thought style has been changed, institutions may become 
disorganized. If institutions have been changed, the new institutions may cultivate a 
new thought style (6, 2015). 
 
1.5 Organization of this thesis 
This thesis comprises eleven chapters. This section outlines the remaining nine 
chapters. Chapter two provides an overview of auditor independence in the context 
of Chinese corporate culture. Chapter three discusses the philosophical meaning of 
independence and different views of accountability in the context of different 
cultures, and introduces neo-Durkheimian institutional theory. Chapter four 
introduces institutional theory, and the background to guanxi in regional cultural 
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contexts. Chapter five develops the neo-Durkheimian theory and analyses 
individuals’ behaviours in context of Chinese culture. Chapter six provides an 
overview of the Chinese auditing system, and a discussion of the challenges it brings 
to auditor independence and audit culture. Chapters seven to nine explore 
consecutively the three case studies, namely, Yin Guang Xia (chapter 7), Green Land 
(chapter 8), and Amoi Electronics (chapter 9), to specifically analyse how auditors 
and companies interpreted and adapted to the Chinese institutional changes with the 
limitation of cultural impacts. Chapter ten describes the development of Chinese 
auditing standards and discusses the external supervision system of Chinese listed 
companies. Chapter eleven, building upon the previous chapters, concludes the 
thesis.  
 
After the implementation of Chinese economic reforms, China adopted and 
transplanted many international regulations and policies regarding technical aspects, 
to ensure their performance conformed with established international institutional 
practices. Auditors and companies embed institutional practices, interactions and 
responses to external disturbances in their cultural environment. This thesis focuses 
on how Chinese auditors and companies responded to institutional changes under 
cultural pressures by observing three selected case studies. Thus, the research 
problem of the thesis is the international auditing practices and transplanted 
corporate governance systems in China. This problem has two aspects, referring to 
the functioning in the Chinese context, and the risks identified in the case studies.  
 
This thesis will make a unique contribution to the existing literature in the areas of 
neo-Durkheimian theory, and auditor independence and corporate governance in 
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context of Chinese culture. This thesis also provides an opportunity to understand 
auditor and corporate practices in Chinese institutional and cultural environments, 
and also improve the understanding of potential risks existing from the process of 
adopting international accounting regulations. 
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
Auditor independence has been viewed as necessary for an effective capital market 
as it has the capacity to improve the integrity of the financial statements and increase 
the overall quality of the information available to the market. Auditors are expected 
to play an important role in adding credibility to financial statements. However, in 
the recent past, a string of financial scandals and high profile corporate frauds has 
shocked the public and tarnished the reputation of the auditing profession.  
 
The development of corporate governance in China lags behind the west because it is 
a new issue in China and it has taken many years to develop in other cultural settings. 
Issues and deficiencies in corporate governance have prompted regulatory reform in 
China, such as Guidelines for Introducing Independent Directors to the Board of 
Directors of Listed Companies in 2001 and Code for Governance of Securities in 
2002. However, internal control in Chinese corporations is still a serious problem, 
which has been a factor in a number of frauds (Sun and Ren, 2017; Cao et al, 2015; 
Song, 2011).  
 
In the absence of efficient legal environments and corporate governance regimes, 
auditors serve an important function. This thesis draws upon past research papers on 
auditor independence and Chinese corporate culture to support the research. 
 
2.2 Auditor independence 
Auditor independence has been researched for many years. Brooker and Statuton 
(1966) stated that auditors represented a person or a group of people which had some 
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interest in the matter to be accounted for (p.173). They considered two situations in 
which auditors might lose their independence, which was whether auditors had been 
a participator in a transaction or had an interest in the result of a transaction as an 
indirect party, and whether auditors had been influenced by considerations such as 
losing audit clients and incurring financial loss.  
 
The quality of audit service is defined by DeAngelo (1981) as the probability that (1) 
the auditor will uncover a breach and (2) report the breach. “The conditional 
probability of reporting a discovered breach is a measure of an auditor’s 
independence from a given client” (DeAngelo, 1981, p. 186).  
 
There are four main threats to auditor independence that are client importance 
(financial bonding to the client), non-audit services, auditor tenure, and a client’s 
affiliation with CPA firms. 
 
2.2.1 Client importance 
DeAngelo (1981) suggested that clients’ importance created  auditors’ incentives to 
compromise their independence.  
 
Li (2009) investigated the effect of client importance on auditor independence. Client 
importance was measured as the client’s proportion of audit fees and non-audit fees, 
and auditor independence was measured as the auditor’s propensity to issue a going-
concern opinion (unqualified audit opinion). The result showed that more important 
clients were more likely to receive a going-concern opinion in the post-Sarbanes-
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Oxley Act period, which suggests that auditor independence was compromised for 
significant clients. 
 
2.2.2 Non-audit service 
During the twentieth century, auditors in public accounting firms extended the range 
of their services into areas such as taxation, IT consultancies and management 
consulting services, which gave auditors more possibilities to develop interests in 
audited companies and perhaps become more dependent. Greenwood et al. (2002) 
used case studies to examine the role of professional associations (the Canadian 
Institute of Chartered Accountants and the Institute of Chartered Accountants of 
Alberta) when public accounting firms changed their primary accountancy services 
to multidisciplinary services, such as financial advisory, management consulting, and 
legal services. As Greenwood stated, from 1977 to 1997, public accounting firms 
expanded their primary accounting services to incorporate more extensive business 
advisory services. For example, the 1997 business card of KPMG indicated that the 
KPMG firm defined itself as a business advisory company rather than an accounting 
firm (Greenwood et al., 2002, p.65). 
 
Zeff (2003) interpreted the events and developments in the evolution of the 
American accounting profession during the 20th century. In the 1970s, American 
public accounting firms provided management advisory services. However, in 1979, 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in America issued Accounting 
Series Release (ASR) No. 264 “Scope of Services by Independent Accountants” 
(Olson, 1982, p218, cited in Zeff, 2003, p204): 
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“The growing array of non-audit services offered by some independent public 
accountants and the growing importance of management advisory services to 
the revenues, profits and competitive position of accounting firms are a cause 
for legitimate concern as to the impact of these activities on auditor 
independence, objectivity, and professionalism.” 
After the release of ASR No. 264, diversification of services in public accounting 
firms continued to expand. However, the Public Oversight Board (Zeff, 2003) 
concluded that “at this time no rules should be imposed to prohibit specific services 
on the grounds that they are or may be incompatible with the profession of public 
accounting, might impair the image of the profession, or do not involve accounting 
or auditing related skills” (p. 205). 
 
Wyatt (2004) also observed the accounting profession’s evolution over the past 50 
years. Consulting services started at the beginning of the 1960s and increased 
exponentially in the 1980s and 1990s, including services to improve client 
companies’ internal controls and even extended to devising business strategies. The 
growing consulting services had become an important part of revenue in public 
accounting firms. Accounting firm partners increased the firm revenue in order to 
enjoy the profit increases. According to Wyatt’s perspective (2004, p.49), “it is easy 
to see the greed factor at work. At the time, however, the changing focus on revenue 
and profit growth was viewed as merely adapting to the changing times. The focus 
on professionalism diminished, and the focus on revenue growth and increased 
profitability sharpened.” Wyatt (2004) also claimed that the growth of consulting 
services had significantly influenced the internal culture of accounting firms.  
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Gendron et al. (2006) investigated the relationship between changes in the condition 
of work and professional ethics. That is because public accounting firms in Canada 
are becoming increasingly large and multidisciplinary (Gendron et al., 2006). 
Specifically it was argued “advisory services have become an increasingly prominent 
activity within public accounting firms, thereby strengthening the influence of 
commercialisation in these organizations” (Zeff, 2003 as cited in Gendron et al., 
2006). To study the influence of the expansion of multidisciplinary services, 
Gendron et al. used an online survey to explore whether the work context would 
influence the independence commitment. More than 7000 questionnaires were sent to 
Chartered Accountants (CAs) in four provinces in Canada. The results showed that 
accountants who had worked outside large public accounting firms had a higher 
independence commitment than accountants who worked in large public accounting 
firms. This phenomenon is even more significant in Big 4 accounting firms. The 
researchers concluded that changes in the level of multidisciplinary services had 
influenced professional independence among accountants. 
 
Extending the range of services in public accounting firms may cause high 
competition in the audit services market. In this highly competitive market, auditors 
may compromise independence to keep audit clients.  
 
2.2.3 Auditor tenure 
Gul et al (2007) found that the association between non-audit fees and auditor 
independence depended on auditor tenure, and that high non-audit fees negatively 
impacted auditor independence when audit tenure was short and client firm size was 
small.  
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Firth et al (2012) examined the effect of auditor rotation on auditor quality in China’s 
different institutional conditions. The results showed that firms with mandatory 
auditor partner rotations are associated with a significantly higher likelihood of a 
modified audit opinion in less developed regions. However, the significance level of 
voluntary audit firm rotation is much weaker than mandatory partner rotation.  
 
Law et al (2013) investigated the impacts of guanxi between auditors and CFOs on 
auditor independence in Hong Kong. The results showed that independence was 
severely influenced by guanxi, especially when the duration of guanxi with audited 
clients reached five years or more. 
 
2.2.4 Client’s affiliation with CPA firms 
Yang et al (2003) examined independent audit services in China after the 
commencement of the open market policy. They found in many cases audited clients 
committed illegal acts such as the forgery of accounts to mask true financial 
positions, evade tax, embezzle state revenue, and appropriate state assets. The 
auditors involved in these cases were found to have intentionally helped clients to 
falsify accounts, or provide false certificates of capital contribution verification and 
unqualified audit reports. The reason that auditors intentionally helped clients to 
conduct frauds was argued to be guanxi between managers and auditors.  
 
Liu et al (2011) examined the influence of guanxi on audit quality. The study 
classified two types of guanxi which appeared to have a link to auditor independence 
in China, namely, firm-level connections derived from state ownership, and personal 
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connections developed through management’s affiliations with auditors. The results 
showed that state-ownership and management connections with auditors increased 
the probability of receiving unqualified audit opinions, and firm-level and personal 
connections with auditors were more important to non-state-owned enterprises than 
to SOEs.  
 
Fan et al (2012) investigated the effect of guanxi on the judgement of Chinese 
auditors. The study classified guanxi with two dimensions, namely, favour-seeking 
guanxi and rent-seeking guanxi, based on Su and Littlefield’s (2003) classification of 
guanxi orientations. Favour-seeking guanxi is “culturally rooted, signifying social 
contracts and interpersonal exchanges of resources in a collectivistic society” (Su et 
al, 2003, p.310), in which exchanges and reciprocal relations facilitate harmonious 
relationships in societies. In contrast, rent-seeking guanxi is recognised as 
“institutional norms signifying social collusion based on power exchanges in a 
hybrid Chinese socialist market economy” (Su et al, 2003, p. 310). Fan et al (2012) 
found Chinese auditors’ favour-seeking guanxi was positively associated with ethical 
judgments but the rent-seeking guanxi negatively influenced ethical judgments.  
 
Du et al (2015) investigated Chinese auditors’ awareness of earnings management 
induced by the delisting rule and whether guanxi between managers and auditors 
could influence auditors’ opinion. The results showed that guanxi undermined 
auditors’ ability to correct earnings management. Especially, when auditors had close 
guanxi with managers, auditors might be less likely to recommend adjustments.  
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2.3 Chinese corporate culture 
Xin and Pearce (1996) interviewed Chinese executives to examine whether guanxi 
(connections) was an important element in the development of companies. The 
results showed that guanxi was considered by private-company executives as 
reparation for the lack of official government support. Moreover, private-company 
executives made more extensive use of gift giving to build trust relationships with 
government officials to improve their guanxi and gain favours.   
 
Park and Luo (2001) investigated the effect of guanxi on organizational performance 
in China. They used a survey instrument to examine 128 firms in China. The results 
showed that guanxi impacted organisational performance, as evidenced by sales 
growth. The results indicated that non-state-owned firms perform much better than 
state-owned firms. The results were consistent with earlier findings of Xin and 
Pearce (1996) that private-company executives relied more on guanxi than 
executives in state-owned or collective-hybrid companies. 
 
2.4 Discussion 
Although these previous studies have found the effect of guanxi on auditor 
independence, they did not give reasons for a lack of independence in the Chinese 
audit profession. With the convergence to the international auditing standards and the 
adoption of corporate governance, Chinese auditing and corporate governance 
operate in a very different environment from those experienced in western countries. 
Auditing is increasingly viewed as a social science, which is shaped by institutional 
contexts. Institutional theorists view economic activity as a social phenomenon 
related to social institutions (Wu and Patel, 2013). Institutional theory suggested that 
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organizations succeed in society, which must conform to ensure their legitimacy in 
the environment (Al-Twaijry et al., 2003; Maingot, 2006). The key category of the 
institutional theory is legitimacy. Chiang and Northcott (2012) generalised 
legitimacy is that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within 
some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions (p.345).  
 
However, institutionalism has been criticized because it does not give much attention 
to the micro processes of institutionalization (Zucker, 1991; Meyerson, 1994; Scott, 
1995; Roberts and Greenwood, 1997). Zucker (1991) argued that there were variable 
organization’s interpretations of and responses to a similar institutional environment. 
Thus, she claimed that there is a need to consider “clever strategic responses to 
external constraints” (p. 105) when using institutional theory versus resource 
dependence. Irvine (1999) believed that “macroeconomic behaviour depends on the 
behaviour of the underlying micro units which make up the economy” (p. 95). 
Meyerson (1994) stated that individuals’ behaviours and interpretations are 
embedded in institutional systems (p. 650). Scott (1995) called for scholars to pay 
attention to the micro processes of institutionalization within an institutional context, 
which is a dynamic process of adapting new institutional environments, rather than a 
static adoption. 
 
Auditor independence has been viewed as a moral-ethical issue in the 20
th
 century, 
and is recognized as one of the central values of auditors (Gendron et al., 2006). 
Auditors’ ethical values are increasingly viewed as being influenced of institutional 
contexts. In reality, a person is a social person whose behaviours are shaped by their 
institutional context. That is why people accept similar ethical standards but they 
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make different decisions when they in different contexts. Many empirical studies 
have found the interrelation between an auditor’s ethics and factors or characteristics, 
such as culture, education, job level, and organizational characteristics. The 
interrelation partly explains the significance of the topic in this study. 
 
In addition, culture plays an important part in identifying ethical standards. Schein 
(1989) states that culture defines a group of people with the same basic subconscious 
beliefs. Cohen et al. (1992) explain that understanding cultural differences can 
improve the understanding of differences in ethical values, because culture shapes a 
group of people’s general values and norms of behaviours. For example, guanxi is 
recognised as connections and relationships among people. In China, guanxi as 
informal relationships is a personal asset and also liability because one may request 
favours and also repay favours (Hwang et al., 2008). However, compared to similar 
western relationships, the main difference with guanxi is the notion of obligation, as 
western countries generally operate a code which could be described as ‘enlightened 
self-interest’ which carries less fixed notions of favours being returned than does the 
idea of obligation under guanxi. 
 
Thus, this thesis argues that a process of individuals’ adapting new institutional 
environments is a dynamic process rather than a static adoption, and culture may 
influence this process. 
 
2.5 Summary 
According to previous studies, the Chinese audit services market has become a 
highly competitive market as the range of services in public accounting firms has 
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expanded. Guanxi as an important component of Chinese culture exists in Chinese 
business activities, which positively impacts organisational performance and 
negatively influences auditor independence.  
 
However, with the opening of the Chinese economy and the range of new regulations 
promulgated under the new economic order, this thesis examines some cases of how 
Chinese auditors adapt to the new institutional environment as they cope with 
cultural impacts. This thesis observes Chinese auditor independence and corporate 
fraud activities in three cases by using Mary Douglas’s grid-group approach to 
explore potential risks in Chinese auditor independence and corporate governance.   
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CHAPTER 3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
3.1 What is independence? 
A dictionary definition of independence refers to “the freedom from outside control, 
the absence of influence by others, and the capability of thinking and acting for 
oneself” (Padoa-Schioppa, 2000, p.26).  
 
Independence can be viewed in different ways. For example, Angrawal (1975) 
explained independence from a broad ethical point of view that “a man can be held to 
be independent only when his higher or rational self, or his ideal personality, 
determines his actions” (p. 110, cited from Reiter and Williams, 2005, p. 9). 
However, Coffee (2014) said independence is “synonymous with freedom 
understood as the absence of arbitrary power, whereas dependence indicates slavery” 
(p. 908). 
 
In this study, independence refers to individual behaviour. Willis (1965) defined 
independent behaviour as:  
“Pure independent behaviour occurs whenever the individual perceives relevant normative 
expectations, but gives zero weight to these perceived expectations in formulating his decision. 
This does not mean that he does not ‘weight’ the expectations in the sense of evaluating their 
importance and appropriateness, but rather that the outcome of this process of evaluation leads 
him to reject them as guides to his behaviour. The independent person is one capable of 
resisting social pressures, rather than one who is unaware of them or who merely ignores them. 
He ‘sticks to his guns’, so to speak.” (p. 379) 
 
Independence is concerned with “autonomy and being able to exercise control” 
(Northway, 2015, p. 203). Northway (2015) explained that individuals may need 
support to perform tasks, but they are able to maintain independence through 
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exerting control over such provided support. Thus, the concept of ‘autonomy’ is 
important for independent behaviour.  
 
3.2 Where does the concept of ‘autonomy’ come from? 
The concept of autonomy rests on the treatment of the subject by philosophers, 
particularly by ancient Greek philosophers (Gelderen and Jansen, 2006; Olsen, 
2009). Autonomy is derived from the two words: “self (autos) and rule or law 
(nomos)” (Gelderen and Jansen, 2006, p. 25). In the eighteenth century, autonomy 
was an important theme for political philosophers, and referred to the relationship 
between the state and the individual (Gelderen and Jansen, 2006). Gelderen and 
Jansen (2006) stated that “according to the large majority of (western) political 
philosophers, the state should not interfere with the autonomy of the individual 
(providing ‘negative freedom’), and, according to some, the state should even 
enlarge the autonomy of the individual (providing ‘positive freedom’, for example by 
providing education and jobs)” (p. 25). Although there are differences in the 
understanding of autonomy in the details, autonomy is generally understood as “the 
ability to direct one’s own life and to make one’s own decisions” (MacDonald, 2002, 
cited from Varjus et al., 2011, p. 201). 
 
3.3 What is the philosophical meaning of ‘autonomy’? 
Garnett (2014) proposed a theory that rejected the dominant understanding of 
autonomy as rule by the self (Weimer, 2014), instead understanding it as resistance 
to rule by others. Garnett (2014) claimed that “autonomy is resistance to subjection 
to foreign wills” (p. 145). Garnett (2014) emphasized resistance of rule by others 
including two conditions:  
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“A reasonable resistance condition, according to which I am not subject to your will if I can be 
reasonably expected to resist your influence; 
A conformity of wills condition, according to which I am not subject to your will if I would 
endorse your intention to influence me were I to know of it” (Garnett, 2015, p. 156) 
 
However, the conformity of wills condition has been criticised by Weimer (2014). 
Garnett (2015) defended the basic idea of the conformity of wills condition as “if you 
intend to get me to do something, then (other things equal) your intention is foreign 
to me, but your intention can be rendered relevantly non-foreign to me by virtue of 
its conformity or alignment with my own will” (p. 156). Garnett (2015) gave an 
example that Betty hid Jane’s car keys because Jane was drunk. Although Betty’s 
will was relevantly foreign to Jane at that time, Jane was not an autonomous agent. 
The conformity of wills requirement can be read as: 
“attitudes that are literally and shallowly yours are relevantly foreign to me, unless they 
conform with attitudes that are literally and shallowly mine. Their conformity with anything 
else – anything external to me (in the shallow sense of ‘me’) – does not render them non-
foreign to me (again, in the shallow sense of ‘me’)” (Garnett, 2015, p. 157). 
 
Autonomous agents need be more rational than non-autonomous agents, which is the 
virtue of autonomous agents (Garnett, 2015). If a person is irrational or insane, how 
could this person be autonomous? The rule of an irrational person is by irrational 
rules. Autonomy should be seen as a virtue. Therefore, Garnett (2014) provided the 
two conditions (a reasonable resistance condition and a conformity of wills 
condition) to explain resistance of rule by others as reasonable. 
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3.4 Interpretation of ‘autonomy’ in the context of culture 
Garnett (2014) gave two conditions (a reasonable resistance condition and a 
conformity of wills condition) to consider reasonable resistance to foreign wills. 
However, this reasonable resistance may have different interpretations in how much 
is reasonable in different cultures.  
 
Many underlying themes of Confucian philosophy, characterised in popular sayings, 
discourage autonomy. In Confucian philosophy, there is an old saying that ‘two 
heads are always better than one’ (in Chinese: 三人行必有我师). A modest manner 
is seen as a virtue. People should be modest in listening to other people’s opinions. 
This does not mean that we must take another’s ideas nor does it encourage people to 
express their own opinions. That is because ‘the bird out of the group will be shot’ 
(in Chinese: 枪打出头鸟). Confucian society does not encourage individuals to be 
outstanding or to be straightforward in expressing their own opinions against others’, 
because these behaviours are seen as taking the limelight and showing off. Confucian 
philosophy emphasises the doctrine of the mean. Therefore, in Confucian societies, 
individuals may take on more of others’ perspectives in order to avoid conflicts. 
 
Individuals in Confucian societies prefer conflict avoidance and this is attributed to 
the influences of the Confucian value of harmony. Leung (1997) proposed that 
harmony has two distinct motives: disintegration avoidance and harmony 
enhancement (cited in Lim, 2009, p. 403):  
“Disintegration avoidance refers to avoiding actions that will strain a relationship and lead to 
its weakening and dissolving. 
Harmony enhancement refers to engaging in behaviours presumed to strengthen the 
relationships among the interactants.” 
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Harmony enhancement focuses on building and promoting relationships, while 
disintegration avoidance is to maintain relationships. Both motives are trying to build 
a harmonious environment. Hwang (2012) stated that the Confucian focus is on 
“relationalism as a societal status hierarchy, where the role relationships between 
people provide the behavioural rules by which individuals are expected to abide” 
(cited in Lee, 2015, p. 6). Therefore, no matter what relationships between superior 
and inferior or peers are, individuals are trying to keep them harmonious.  
 
In other words, harmonious relationships limit independence. Lim (2009) stated that 
“Confucianism emphasizes the value of harmony. When one is conflicting with 
someone else within his or her social network, the first thing one has to learn is 
‘forbearance’… (this leads to) giving up one’s personal goal for a prior consideration 
of maintaining a harmonious relationship” (p. 403). When a person makes an 
independent decision which may conflict with other foreign wills, in a Confucian 
society the person may avoid the conflict or at least, try to avoid the conflict in order 
to keep a harmonious relationship and reduce the likelihood of revenge. Thus, a 
person may not resist foreign wills to maintain their independence.  
 
The Confucian culture was in a dominant position in Chinese culture. However, 
since the ‘new’ China was founded in 1949, this position has significantly changed. 
During the Maoist period (1949 – 1976), traditional cultures, such as Confucianism, 
were abandoned. Confucian ethics were denounced as feudalistic and decaying. 
“From 1949 to 1976 the practice of Maoist socialism relied on the socialist state’s 
monopoly of political power via the Leninist Chinese Communist Party and the 
Communist ideology on the one hand and its monopoly of economic power through 
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the planned economy and its collective redistributive system on the other” (Yan, 
2010, p. 491). The two dominant forces eliminated the market-based economy and 
all individual benefits were supposed to be sacrificed in order to satisfy the State’s 
benefits. During this period, China was a highly collectivist society and also a 
‘harmonious’ society, but the harmony differed to that of Confucianism.  
 
Firstly, individuals try to build and maintain Confucian style harmonious 
relationships in order to gain reciprocal benefits, while in the Maoist period, a new 
relationship, called comradeship, was created to guide the relations between 
individuals. This comradeship was derived from the Chinese Communist Party in the 
Second World War. The idea of comradeship was to create another ‘harmonious’ 
relationship in which individuals felt equal. For example, everyone calls each other 
comrade, no matter who is superior or inferior.  
 
Secondly, Maoist morality emphasised not only comradeship (between individuals), 
but also the relationship between individuals and the state. It specified that 
individuals should be self-sacrificing in order to achieve a ‘harmonious’ state or even 
a higher level, named a Communist utopia (Yan, 2010). Thus, “the individual almost 
entirely had lost her/his freedom and autonomy as she/he could not even choose 
where to work or to reside, much less to which social or political group she/he would 
belong” (Yan, 2010, p. 492). Therefore, although both Confucian culture and Maoist 
morality were aiming to create harmonious relationships, they were different in how 
they built relationships and gained benefits from relationships. During the Maoist 
period, the relationship was created by institutional and political power. Individuals 
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found it hard to gain benefits from such a relationship, or would take very high risks 
to gain benefits, because all benefits belonged to the State.  
 
Many current western scholars knew of China as a collectivist society, partly from 
Hofstede’s study in 1980. The data collected by Hofstede was derived from the 
1960s and 1970s. Indeed, during that period, China was Maoist and highly 
collectivist. However, after Chairman Mao died, from the late 1970s, China started to 
open its door to the world and transformed its planned economy to be more market 
oriented. Subsequently, a number of multinational corporations have established 
subsidiaries in China. With more western companies entering China, western 
cultures have been brought into China. However, western cultures came into coastal 
regions earlier because of the open door policy. In 1980, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, 
and Xiamen were set up as special economic zones. In 1988, Hainan province was 
set up as a special economic zone. During the period between 1990 and 1992, many 
other cities were set up as special economic zones, such as Shanghai, Tianjin, Beihai, 
Zhanjiang, Guangzhou, Fuzhou, Ningbo, Nantong, Lianyungang, Qingdao, Weihai, 
Yantai, Dalian, and Qinhuangdao (Leong, 2013).  
 
Due to opening the cities at different times, Chinese cultures tended to mix with 
western cultures firstly from south to north and from coastal to interior regions. Thus, 
individuals adapted western cultural attributes, such as individualism, in different 
Chinese regions at different times.  
 
The idea of the ‘self’ is described differently in Western and East Asian cultures. The 
narrative of the self in Western culture is of the autonomous individual (Fishbane, 
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2001, p. 273). Fishbane (2001) stated that “the mature autonomous self is 
characterized by independence and separation individuation” (p. 273). However, in 
psychology, the ‘self’ has two constructions: “an independent self, which perceives 
itself as separate from others, and an interdependent self, which sees itself as 
connected with others” (Littlewood, 1999, p. 79). Littlewood (1999) gave detailed 
features of two selves, as shown in Table 2. According to Littlewood, views of the 
self can be different according to cultures. Hence there are different understandings 
of autonomous self in the context of different cultures.  
  
 
31 
 
Table 2: Independent and interdependent conceptions of the self 
(Based on Markus and Kitayama, 1991, cited in Littlewood, 1999, p. 80) 
 
The independent self The interdependent self 
The independent self is more likely to: The interdependent self is more likely to: 
 
* Be disposed to express individual, 
unpredictable views 
* Pay attention to the group when forming 
opinions and attitudes 
* Prefer horizontal, equal relationships * Feel comfortable in vertical, unequal 
relationships 
* Be willing to enter into confrontation and 
competition 
* Emphasize harmony and cooperation in the 
group 
* Be willing to express open criticism * Attach importance to preserving ‘face’ (their 
own and others’) 
* Attach importance to individual goals and 
‘self-actualization’ 
* Attach importance to supporting group goals 
and expectations 
 
Western cultures support this conception more 
than East Asian cultures 
East Asian cultures support this conception more 
than Western cultures 
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To sum up, China should not be regarded as simply a Confucian society. China 
should be thought as a country which is rooted in the Confucian culture, because its 
culture has been also developed by the influence of its institutional and political 
power. In addition, culture is viewed as “the ‘social glue’ holding people together 
through their identification with one particular social group over another, and where 
its members obey a prescribed set of acceptable behavioural codes” (Lee, 2015, p. 1). 
So individuals’ interpretations of independence might differ across China’s different 
regional cultures.  
 
3.5 Issues concerning the development of institution and culture 
Legitimacy and institutions arising from rules made by government can be easily 
changed, while culture as a prescribed set of acceptable behavioural codes, cannot be 
changed easily. If culture changes but institutions lag behind, people start to reform 
and change the institutions. For example, in the early years of Chinese economic 
reform, people accepted many western democratic beliefs, but the Chinese 
government did not immediately change the collective institutions. In the student 
strikes of 1989, students sought democracy but finally the government used political 
power to put a stop to this mind change. Thus, culture in this case had to adapt to the 
institutions of government.  
 
If the culture lags behind institutions, new policies and institutions may not be 
‘perfectly’ implemented. An example is when an independent director is introduced 
into a Chinese company after Chinese economic reform. In 2001, the Chinese 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) issued the Guidelines for Introducing 
Independent Directors to the Board of Directors of Listed Companies to provide 
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practical rules for independent directors (Zhou, 2011). This institution of corporate 
governance was borrowed from the US and the UK, where the dispersed ownership 
of shares of large corporations created an agency problem for the managerial board 
(Zhou, 2011) and society. However, this new institution firstly appeared in China in 
the 1990s. Before the enterprise reforms in the early 1980s, most Chinese companies 
were state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that were administered by either the central 
government or local governments. Even in the early stage of Chinese enterprise 
reform in the 1990s, the government still held the majority shareholdings in SOEs 
(Yang et al., 2001; Yang et al., 2003). People in China did not even understand the 
meaning of an independent director. The board of directors in Chinese listed 
companies is strongly controlled by majority shareholders (Zhou, 2011). In fact, 
independent directors in China are also called ‘vase directors’ because they have lost 
their genuine function as ‘monitors’ of the board (Zhou, 2011). In another example, 
Nie et al. (2013) observed the difficulty of determining fair value in China because 
“many assets did not exist in a ‘vibrant’ market” (p.286). They also argued that “the 
technical complexities involved in valuation in an emerging market economy could 
increase the difficulty of determining fair value and the lack of research and practice 
regarding fair value in China was an impediment to Chinese accountants in the 
implementation of fair value” (Nie et al., 2013, p.286).  
 
Therefore, although foreign cultures and the institutional models can be transplanted 
to China, the Chinese economy has developed so quickly since the economic reform. 
Ideas from new institutions may not have filtered through to local culture. Hence, 
ideas of legitimacy that guide behaviour that would ensure the institutions are 
properly implemented may not be in place yet. In addition, the way that open door 
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policy was introduced meant people came in contact with foreign cultures and beliefs 
in a different way in different regions and that is limiting the development of 
regional cultures
2
, and also means that many new institutional models are 
implemented in different ways in different regions.   
 
3.6 Neo-Durkheimian institutional theory  
Anthropologist Mary Douglas first proposed the famous grid-group method in her 
research work Natural Symbols in 1970 to explain social and cultural phenomena. 
The grid-group dimensions split cultures in to four different social environments. 
The grid dimension refers to the degree of social regulation that individuals are 
subject to when selecting social roles, while the group dimension concerns the degree 
of loyalty that an individual has to other group members (Linsley et al., 2015, p. 4). 
The four social environments are shown in Figure 2.  
  
                                                 
2
 Here the limitation of the development of regional cultures refers to the fact that individuals’ 
interpretations of independence might be different.  
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Figure 2: Grid-group Diagram  
(Douglas, 2003, p. 1354) 
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Linsley et al (2015) introduced the four solidarities in detail. The individualistic 
solidarity is described as a weak grid-weak group form of society. Individuals are at 
liberty to collaborate with other individuals in the society. Their own interests are 
more important than the group’s interests. The second form of society is hierarchical 
solidarity which is a strong grid-strong group form. In this form of society it is 
important that rules are adhered to and that tradition and authority are respected. 
Social rules are demarcated and statutes are clearly defined within internal 
boundaries, while the external boundary defines who is inside and who is outside the 
group. Egalitarian solidarity is a weak grid-strong group form of society which 
shares features with individualistic and hierarchical solidarities. There are no internal 
boundaries as social rules, while the external boundaries even more important than in 
the hierarchical solidarity. The last form of society is isolate solidarity which is the 
strong grid-weak group from. This implies little leeway in choosing one’s social role 
and this places restriction on isolates. The weak group aspect means individuals do 
not feel they belong to any group.  
 
Linsley et al. (2015) also acknowledged that all four solidarities could be present in 
any society and no society would comprise only one. Linsley et al. (2015) argued 
that “within any society cultural dialogues will continually occur as the different 
solidarities promote their world view and look to win new recruits. The interaction 
that the four solidarities have with one another, and the incessant debates they have, 
are also important as they reconfirm to the members of each solidarity what it stands 
for” (p. 6). 
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However, although Linsley et al. (2015) acknowledged that the four solidarities 
could be present in the same society and continually re-structure within that society, 
they did not describe how the four solidarities are changed by institutions or political 
power in the society. This study takes Linsley et al’s (2015) framework further, 
explaining how the four solidarities and institutional powers interact in social 
transactions. These can be described by vivid metaphor. The institutional powers or 
political power can be likened to a piece of dye and local culture as a bathtub full of 
water. Individual people are molecules or basic constituents of the ‘water’. The 
interaction of local culture and institutions is like when the dye drops into the water. 
The dye will change the colour of the water immediately surrounding the droplet of 
the dye and then disperse into other areas of the bathtub. However, the direction and 
degree of the colour change will depend on the direction and speed of the water flow.  
 
For example, traditional Chinese cultures such as Confucian culture appeared in the 
Shandong province. However, from 1891 until 1914 Qingdao (a city in Shandong 
province) had been a German colony. During this period, Qingdao, also known as 
Tsingtao, was starting to take shape with the completion of a series of projects such 
as wharves, the Tsingtao-Jinan Railway line, the Tsingtao Railway Station and 
locomotive work. German culture had been forcibly embedded in Qingdao local 
culture by political power. In addition, following the implementation of the Open 
door policy, Qingdao was set up as a special economic zone between 1990 and 1992. 
As a result, the development of commerce and trade was emphasised much earlier in 
Qingdao than in Jinan, which is a city belonging to the same province of Shandong. 
The political power and institutional power changed the Qingdao local culture. 
Qingdao companies are more likely to be private companies while Jinan has more 
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state-owned enterprises. Haier Group of Qingdao is world famous for consumer 
electronics and home appliances. Tsingtao Brewery Co., Ltd is another famous 
company in Qingdao. Neither of them are state-owned enterprises. In contrast, 
people may only know Shandong Luneng Group Co., Ltd in Jinan, which focuses on 
energy and minerals business and operates as a subsidiary of State Grid Corporation 
of China, a large state-owned enterprise. Moreover, due to population mobility 
around Qingdao, the whole Jiaodong Peninsula economy has been more quickly 
developed after the implementation of the open door policy than interior cities in 
Shandong province. Dezhou and Zaozhuang (interior cities in the Shandong 
province) are still undeveloped and keep a more traditional culture, compared to 
cities in Jiaodong Peninsula.  
 
Therefore, China should not be regarded as a solely traditional Confucian society. 
Chinese culture can be described as comprising the four solidarities of the grid-group 
method. These are evident in different regions, with differing institutional powers. In 
addition, Chinese culture should be viewed as being in a dynamic state rather than a 
static state. The direction of institutional policy and population mobility alters 
regional cultures. Thus, individuals’ interpretations of professional independence in 
different regions are changing as regional cultures also change.  
 
3.7 ‘Autonomy’ in professions 
The interpretation of ‘autonomy’ varies in the context of different cultures. However, 
in different countries with different cultures, when independence is described as an 
attribute of profession, such as medicine, law, and auditing; autonomy is always 
emphasised.  
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“Professionals are distinguished from other occupational workers by the control they 
wield over the technical and formal content of their work” (Timmermans, 2005, p. 
493). Professionalism can be defined as “possessing professional status, methods, 
character, and standards (Morris, 1981)” (cited from Bell, 1990). Professional 
process involves competence in one’s field and attaining certain recognition from 
people within the particular field a person has entered (Bell, 1990). Standards are the 
heart of true professionalism, which involve legal and ethical restraints, and originate 
from the laws of the land and stated codes of professional societies (Bell, 1990).  
“Certain situations may arise during the practice of a business that would pass the tests of 
legality, and possibly even written ethical standards, but might still tend to make one feel 
uneasy. This type of situation tests whether a person is truly a professional in the highest sense 
because an appeal is made to the individual in which basically all external judgements would 
approve of the action in question” (Bell, 1990, p. 189).  
Professionals are held to “a higher level of public trust than basic laws require” (Bell, 
1990, p. 189). Thus, it is important for professionals to behave in an ethical manner 
and apply their judgment independently.  
 
In the context of globalisation, an increasing number of emerging economies, such as 
China, India, Bangladesh, and South Africa, are moving towards internationally 
acceptable professional ethical standards in industries such as medicine and auditing. 
These professional ethical standards mainly emphasize professional autonomy and 
independence. However, there could be different interpretations of the concepts of 
professional autonomy or independence in the standards, in the context of different 
cultures. 
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Weiss-Gal and Welbourne (2008) defined professional autonomy as “the right of 
workers to make work-related decisions on the basis of their professional knowledge 
and values, without being subject to the directives of those outside the profession or 
to constraints that are inconsistent with that knowledge and those values” (p. 284). 
They found that the degree of professional autonomy depended upon the field of 
practice, the worker’s position and skills, and the sector within which they were 
employed (Weiss-Gal and Welbourne, 2008). For example:  
“In India, most social workers have little professional autonomy, but those in medical and 
psychiatric settings may be able to negotiate greater professional autonomy for themselves. In 
the UK, social workers employed in the voluntary sector often enjoy greater professional 
autonomy than those employed in the government sector. In South Africa, where there are 
government-created systems to establish professional status in social work and related 
professions, greater autonomy is enjoyed by social workers in areas where they are viewed as 
experts, such as in social welfare issues.” (Weiss-Gal and Welbourne, 2008, p. 285) 
 
3.8 The relationship between independence and accountability 
However, despite the fact that independence emphasises individuals’ attitudes it can 
never be absolute independence, because human beings are also social human beings 
who are heavily influenced by their social and cultural environment. Professions, 
such as auditing and medicine, are recognized as a social entity which involves both 
social and cultural activities. Therefore, it is difficult to avoid other influences and 
keep objective opinions. In fact, an absolutely objective opinion does not exist. When 
an opinion is expressed, it is already mixed with personal opinion.  
 
Moreover, “‘too much’ accountability – at least in some forms – may reduce 
independence.  ‘Too much’ independence – at least in some forms – may reduce 
accountability” (Barr, 2015, p. 119). That is because the accountable self is mediated 
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by a set of social norms, which depend on being accountable to ‘whom’. Being too 
accountable for one’s interests could reduce objective expression. In contrast, 
providing too much independence may give individuals or organizations too much 
power and may result in them exercising their own preferred decisions in the end. 
Therefore, it is important to find the equilibrium between independence and 
accountability.  
 
3.9 What is accountability? 
Accountability can be generally defined as “the duty to give account for one’s 
actions to some other person or body” (Scott, 2000). Normanton gave a more 
expansive definition: 
“a liability to reveal, to explain, and to justify what one does; how one discharges 
responsibilities, financial or other, whose several origins may be political, constitutional, 
hierarchical or contractual.” (Scott, 2000, p. 40) 
Traditionally, the concept of accountability was narrowly used in regard to public 
lawyers and political situations (Scott, 2000). After the Second World War, forms of 
accountability have been changed (Scott, 2000) and more public agencies are 
required to be accountable.  
 
To understand accountability in any one situation it is helpful to ask two questions: 
to whom is a person accountable; and for what?  Scott (2000) found three broad 
classes within each category.  
“Accountability may be rendered to a higher authority (‘upwards accountability’), to a broadly 
parallel institution (‘horizontal accountability’), or to lower level institutions and groups (such 
as consumers) (‘downwards accountability’). The range of values for which accountability is 
rendered can be placed in three categories: economic values (including financial probity and 
value for money); social and procedural value (such as fairness, equality, and legality); 
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continuity/security values (such as social cohesion, universal service, and safety).” (Scott, 
2000, p. 42) 
 
Scott (2000) outlined nine correlations between accountability and values (Table 3), 
which clearly described the performance of different levels of accountability 
considering different perspectives of value.  
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Table 3: Examples of linkages between values and accountability 
Scott (2000, p.43) 
 
          For what? 
 
To whom? 
Economic values 
Social/procedural 
values 
Continuity/security 
values 
‘Upwards’ 
accountability 
Of departments to 
treasury for 
expenditure 
Of administrative 
decision-makers to 
courts/tribunals 
Of utility companies to 
regulators 
‘Horizontal’ 
accountability 
Of public bodies to 
external and internal 
audit for probity and 
value for money 
Review of decisions by 
grievance-handlers 
Third-party 
accreditation of safety 
standards 
‘Downwards’ 
accountability 
Of utility companies 
to financial markets 
Of public/privatized 
service providers to 
users 
Consultation 
requirements are: 
universal service 
requirements 
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Messner (2009) explained “accountability is a morally significant practice, since to 
demand an account from someone is to ask this person to enact discursively the 
responsibility for her behaviour” (p.920). Financial audit
3
 plays an important role in 
serving the public interest by reinforcing trust and confidence in financial reports and 
increasing the accountability of managers. Auditing becomes an important 
component of most modernist conceptions of accountability since it legitimates the 
information on which formal, financial accountability rests (Power, 1997, cited 
Gendron et al., 2001). Messner (2009) suggested that it should be important to 
consider both the content and the practice of accountability when it comes to 
understanding the ethical dimension of accountability, because ethical questions may 
not “emerge with respect to the ‘what’ of accountability, but also with regards to the 
‘how’” (p. 920). 
 
Auditor independence is recognized as one of the core values of modern auditors. 
Carey and Doherty (1966) defined the meaning of auditor independence: 
“First, in the sense of not being subordinate, it means honesty, integrity, objectivity and 
responsibility. Second, in the narrow sense in which it is used in connection with auditing and 
expression of opinions on financial statements, independence means avoidance of any 
relationship which would be likely, even subconsciously, to impair the CPA’s objectivity as 
auditor. Third, it means avoidance of relationships which to a reasonable observer would 
suggest a conflict of interest.” (cited from Vanasco, 1996, p.4).  
 
According to the above definition, the accountability of auditors requires “honesty, 
integrity, objectivity and responsibility”, and this accountability is kept by avoiding 
                                                 
3
 Audit can be divided into two parts which are internal audit and external audit including government 
audit and financial audit.  
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any relationship which would be likely, even subconsciously, to impair the auditors’ 
objectivity.  
 
However, Messner (2009) suggested that “the demands for accountability may 
become so great as to be ethically problematic for the person or organization that is 
expected to give an account”, because “strong and emotive expression refers to a 
form of accountability that, in the name of ethics, forces the accountable self to 
account for something which is very difficult or even impossible to justify and 
which, in this respect, does ‘violence’ to the accountable self” (p. 918). Therefore, 
auditor independence demands auditors’ accountability which may also result in 
ethical problems. This is because a person is a social person. If only legislations 
force auditors to account for independence, auditors will trade off their benefits and 
the risk of penalization in context of social and cultural environments which may 
result in ethical issues. 
 
In addition, Messner (2009) proposed that “the accountable self is mediated by a set 
of social norms that structure the scene of the address” (p. 933), which means “if the 
accountable self has several alternatives of how to give an account, then the act of 
accountability will clearly be less ethically demanding than in the case of there being 
only one available regime of truth” (p. 931). For example, public auditors not only 
need to be accountable to survive but also need to conform to legitimate demands 
(auditing standards) to take accountability to the public. As such, if these two groups 
of accountabilities have to be met at the same time, auditors need to balance or trade 
them off while also considering their costs and risks. More specifically, if the auditor 
observes that a client’s company does not engage in financial fraud, the best choice 
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for the auditor is to not work with the client’s company to engage in any type of 
fraud. However, if the auditor recognizes that a client’s company engages in 
financial fraud, the auditor can comply with the client’s demands to accept possibly 
inappropriate accounting practices and risk penalties from the auditor authority if 
financial fraud is discovered. The alternative choice is to refuse to accept these 
practices and risk losing the client. Therefore, which action is taken depends on the 
trade-off of benefits.  
 
This study agrees that “too much accountability can become an ethically problematic 
burden for the accountable self” (Messner, 2009, p. 919). Auditor independence is 
recognized as auditors’ accountability as an ethical practice. Even though auditor 
independence has been regulated through standards promulgated in codes of ethics 
and/ or government regulation, such as the Code of Ethics for Professional 
Accountants in the International Federation of Accountants, a question arises as to 
why instances of auditor independence failure are continuing. Moreover, with the 
growth number of countries adopting or converging to the international auditing 
standards
4
, further questions arise as to why instances of auditor independence 
failure appear to be different in different countries, whether the adopted auditing 
standards take a role as expected, and whether auditors indeed follow auditing 
standards. Auditing may not be as we believe it to be.  
 
                                                 
4
 There are 106 countries using the clarified the International Standards on Auditing (ISA), or 
committed to using them until 2015 (IFAC, 2015).  
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3.10 Different views of accountability in context of different cultures 
From an individual perspective, according to a particular role’s social requirements, 
people need to be accountable for their conduct in that role, and no one is isolated 
from their community. Ames (2011) stated that: 
“We are all born and reared in a specific cultural community, each with its language, values, 
religious orientation, customs, traditions, and concomitant ideas of what it is to be a human 
being. Each of us has specific, hopes, fears, joys, sorrows, values, and views which are 
inextricably linked to our definitions of who and what we are, and these definitions have been 
overwhelmingly influenced by the cultural community of which we are part” (p. xv, cited from 
Bell, 2012, p. 604) 
 
In our community, we need to play a role which means “either a persona, such as a 
character in a novel or play, or a type of person acting out a certain set of behaviours 
consistently, either actively or passively as the context requires” (Wen, 2012, p. 627).  
Thus, “living or playing one’s role means living up to the role’s social requirements” 
(Wen, 2012, p. 627).  
 
To account for one’s actions is also viewed as the core sense of accountability 
(Mulgan, 2000). Mulgan (2000) explained that  
“the account is given to some other person or body outside the person or body being held 
accountable; it involves social interaction and exchange, in that one side, that calling for the 
account, seeks answers and rectification while the other side, that being held accountable, 
responds and accepts sanctions; it implies rights of authority, in that those calling for an 
account are asserting rights of superior authority over those who are accountable, including the 
rights to demand answers and to impose sanctions” (p. 555). 
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Messner (2009) explained that “the accountable self is limited in its accountability, in 
so far as the scene of the address is mediated by a set of norms that are not of the 
self’s own making” (p. 930).  
“The accountable self is mediated by a set of social norms that structure the scene of the 
address. The subject becomes an accountable subject only when submitting to a regime of truth 
that cannot be questioned if one wants to give an account. Extending accountability into 
different regimes of truth can result in an ethical burden for the subject if several of these 
accountabilities have to be met at the same time, without knowing how they should be 
balanced or trade-off.” (Messner, 2009, p. 933) 
 
Different cultures may deal with conflicts between various demands in different 
ways. In other words, when multiple demands for accountability occur at the same 
time, the attitudes of compromising the primary accountability at the cost of others 
may be different in different cultures.  
 
In Chinese traditional culture, harmony (in Chinese: 和) is a defining or core value. 
According to Davies (2012), “harmony is the right ordering of things according to 
originary principles of relation” (p. 576). A Chinese old saying is: ‘reconciliation 
benefits both and leads to harmony; harmony is most precious’. It can see that 
Chinese traditional culture encourages people to compromise with others in order to 
maintain harmony when conflicts of interest occur.  
 
However, modern Chinese society has become more commercialised. The pursuit of 
self-interest may become the dominating force in relationships with others. For 
example, a company should consider its accountability to shareholders and in regard 
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to social and environmental sustainability. However, companies compromising with 
the accountability of social and environmental sustainability are rarely found.  
 
Companies as well as individuals are well aware of the risk of penalization because 
rules of man have dominated China’s long history. ‘The law is no more important 
than human being itself’ states a Chinese saying. In other words, anything can be 
negotiated, depending on your relationships.  
 
From another perspective, in Chinese society, people have the sense of ‘face-giving’ 
and ‘face-saving’. When a company is found to lack accountability of social and 
environmental sustainability and to be facing penalization, it will use its relationship 
with higher offices and ask them to give ‘face’. If the offices give ‘face’ to the 
company; then the company must repay this favour and sometimes increase the value 
of this favour. Guanxi is strengthened or maintained via this exchange of favours.  
 
Therefore, in summary, the accountable self is limited by the complexity of 
relationships in China.  
 
3.11 Discussion 
To sum up, independence is concerned with autonomy and the capability to exercise 
control. In other words, there is no such thing as pure independence, because people 
live in a community and are heavily influenced by their social and cultural 
environment. Garnett (2014) proposed an understanding of autonomy as resistance of 
rule by others, this study supposes the interpretation of reasonable resistance of rule 
by others may vary according to culture. 
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People living in a community need be accountable for their conduct. However, when 
multiple demands for accountability occur at the same time, the attitudes of 
compromising the primary accountability to others are different in different cultures. 
In other words, the accountable self has different degrees of limitation in different 
cultures. For example, the accountable self is limited by the complexity of 
relationships in China.  
 
Therefore, people seek equilibrium between independence and accountability. In the 
same country or the same institution but different culture, people’s attitude to the 
equilibrium between independence and accountability may be different. That is 
because compulsion is the attribute of law and regulation in the institution that is a 
visible hand, while culture is not mandatory but also shapes people’s behaviour, and 
is an invisible hand. 
 
In the context of culture and institutions, a question is how to balance the equilibrium 
between independence and accountability? To what degree do people understand the 
concepts of independence and accountability regarding standards – substantially or 
superficially? The process of understanding independence and accountability in 
regard to standards and regulations is a process that requires finding equilibrium 
between cultural understanding and global understanding. Specifically, this study 
examines how Chinese auditors interpret independence from the Chinese auditing 
standards and their local cultural life, against the backdrop of a transition from a 
planned economy to a market economy and the convergence with global markets. 
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CHAPTER 4 INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
4.1 Introduction 
Due to globalization of the world economy and multinational corporations 
proliferating, national economies have become increasingly interdependent. An 
increasing number of countries, such as China, are converging to internationally 
acceptable auditing regulations. This study describes whether international auditing 
practices can function properly to improve Chinese auditing quality. The purpose of 
this study is to set out a framework that can be used in understanding the process and 
outcome of converging to international audit practices from an institutional 
perspective.  
 
Moreover, because the implementation of the ‘open’ door policy started in Special 
Economic Zones and then diffused across the nation, the embeddedness of the old 
structure may create different levels of resistance in adopting international auditing 
practice in different regions.  
 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section two discusses influences on institutions. 
Section three describes the Chinese culture pressures. Section four examines 
individuals’ different practices under both institutional and culture pressures by loose 
coupling theory. The final section presents a conclusion. 
 
4.2 Institutional theory consideration 
Institutional theory suggests that for organizations to succeed in society they must 
achieve and maintain legitimacy in the environment (Chiang and Northcott, 2012). 
The key aspect of the institutional theory is legitimacy. Suchman (1995) generalised 
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“legitimacy is that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within 
some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (cited in 
Chiang and Northcott, 2012, p.345).  
 
Organizations maintain legitimacy in order to seek a position in the society. Not only 
do local professional auditing entities look for legitimacy from national professional 
auditing bodies, but national professional auditing bodies also seek legitimacy from 
international auditing bodies.  
 
As such, Chinese auditing practices increasingly adopt international standards after 
Chinese economic reform. The Chinese Certified Public Accountant (CPA) Law was 
established in 1993 (Yang et al., 2001) and the Chinese Independent Auditing 
Standards (CIASs) (中国独立审计准则) came into effect in 1996. Until 2003, the 
CIASs comprised one basic standard, 28 specific standards, 10 practice 
pronouncements, and five other standards. In 2006, the Chinese CPA Implementation 
Standards (CCISs) (中国注册会计师执业准则) were issued by the Chinese Institute 
of Certified Public Accountant (CICPA) and approved by the Ministry of Finance 
(MOF), which were based on revised content of the CIASs, in order to converge with 
the International Standards on Auditing (ISA), which were effected in 2007. The 
CCISs were also called the ‘new’ Chinese Auditing Standards which contained 48 
standards. In 2010, the CICPA proposed to revise the CCISs and issued the Chinese 
Auditing Standards (CAS) (中国注册会计师审计准则 ) in order to further 
accommodate the ISA. The new CAS came into effect in 2012, and contained 38 
standards. 
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During the process of economic reform, the auditing profession increased their 
institutional legitimacy. New institutional theory refers to ‘institutional isomorphism’ 
and assumes it is forced by three institutional pressures, namely, coercive, mimetic, 
and normative isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995). However, 
due to variations in the implementation of Chinese ‘open’ door policy, regions 
became open to the world gradually from the coast to the interior. Thus, the auditing 
profession in interior regions seeks their institutional legitimacy, in which 
organizations are motivated to adopt similar policies and practices. 
  
4.2.1 Coercive isomorphism 
Coercive isomorphism is when external pressures force organizations to adopt 
structures, techniques or behaviours, moving towards homogeneity with other 
organizations. For example, direct political influence on organizations is exercised 
through legislation and regulation. The auditing standards setting and 
implementation is a political process in China (Lin and Chan, 2000; Yang et al., 
2001). For example, as mentioned before, the Law of the People’s Republic of China 
for Certified Public Accountants was assigned by the Ministry of Finance (MOF). 
One of functions of MOF is being responsible for supervising national accounting 
practices, formulating accounting regulations, and guiding and supervising the 
business of accounting firms (Ministry of Finance, 2017).  
 
Another example is where Chinese CPAs Law requires auditors to perform the 
following services: 
“to audit enterprise’s financial statements, to verify the enterprise’s capital contribution, to 
engage in the audit work of the enterprise’ merger, demerger and liquidation, and to provide 
professional services specified by the law and regulations” (Lin and Chan, 2000, p. 561). 
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However, the State Administration for Industry and Commerce of People’s Republic 
China (SAIC) announced the reform program of the registration system – the 
registered capital
5
 on 19
th
 February 2014, which officially changed the rules of 
corporate annual financial report auditing and capital verification auditing services 
from 1
st
 March 2014 (The State Administration for Industry and Commerce of 
People’s Republic of China, 2014). According to SAIC, this regulation changed 
companies’ annual financial auditing system to an annual reporting system in which 
industrial and commercial annual audits are not enforceable, nor are capital 
verification auditing services. The coercion effectively makes organizations accept 
the need for legitimacy, but may not make every organization operate efficiently. 
This leads to the symbolic but not instrumental acceptance of legitimacy.  
 
4.2.2 Normative isomorphism 
Normative isomorphism is associated with the professions. It means “the collective 
struggle of members of an occupation to define the conditions and methods of their 
work had led to a similarity with their counterparts in other organizations, which 
occur through university courses, professional networks, and by the development of a 
pool of people with a similar orientation” (Irvine, 1999, p. 78).  
 
From a global viewpoint, the international institutions and organizations, such as 
World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB), the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB), the 
Institute of Internal Auditors (IAA), and international public accounting firms, 
                                                 
5
  The reform program of the registration system – the registered capital (注册资本登记制度改革方
案) 
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facilitates the diffusion of new practices and information exchange across the 
nations. For example, the IAASB is responsible for the development of the 
International Standards on Auditing (IASs) which are helpful to formulate a common 
body of knowledge for the global auditing profession. There are 106 countries either 
using the clarified International Standards on Auditing (ISA), or committed to using 
them in 2015 (IFAC, 2015).  
 
From a Chinese domestic viewpoint, universities facilitate the diffusion of new 
accountancy knowledge across the nation. In Chinese accounting reform, 
accountancy education lags behind. In 1977, China resumed the college entrance 
examination and since the late 1970s Chinese economic reforms have created high 
demand for accounting workers (Chen et al., 1997).  
“By the mid-1980s, most tertiary education institutions offered professional accounting 
courses. In 1993, there were 421 universities and colleges offering professional accounting 
courses with 41,400 new students enrolled each year. Adult professional accounting training 
courses which offer part-time accounting students were also offered by 459 tertiary institutions 
with 140,000 students enrolled each year. About 1,000 colleges at the secondary level offered 
accounting courses to 127,800 students each year.” (Chen et al., 1997, p. 149).  
 
Due to the rapid expansion of higher education from 1999, by 2009 the number of 
accountants was over one percent of the national population (Sheng and Zhai, 2009). 
However, the quality of the accounting professionals is low. In 1995, less than 10% 
of accountants had received accounting education at the tertiary level; 70% of them 
had never received any formal accounting training (Lu, 1995; cited in Chen et al., 
1997, p.149). According to Sheng and Zhai (2009), in 2005 less than 10% 
accountants had the qualities required of accounting positions in foreign companies. 
Chen et al. (1997) stated that  
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“too much emphasis has been placed on financial accounting, and course design is still largely 
based on rules-based accounting system. Also, in the rush to offer accounting courses, some 
education institutions have enrolled many more students than their faculties can properly 
accommodate, resulting in marked variations in the quality of accounting education across the 
country” (p. 150). 
 
Chinese accounting education also has been substantially changed in recent decades. 
“Under a centrally controlled planned economy, the primary objective of accounting 
education was to train a massive number of accounting personnel who could perform 
simple bookkeeping functions according to the highly restrictive accounting 
regulations or rules formulated by the government authorities” (Lin et al., 2005, 
p.152). Accounting students were taught in a very rigid process according to the 
national uniform chart of accounts and prescribed forms of accounting statements 
(Lin et al., 2005, p. 151). According to Tang (1997), Chinese accounting standards 
adopted the rule-based accounting approach and most accounting textbooks were 
outdated. According to Benston et al. (2006), 
“Rules-based standards often provide a roadmap to avoidance of the accounting objectives 
inherent in the standards. Internal inconsistencies, exceptions and bright-line tests reward those 
willing to engineer their way around the intent of the standards. This can result in financial 
reporting that is not representationally faithful to the underlying economic substance of 
transactions and events. In a rules-based system, financial reporting may well come to be seen 
as an act of compliance rather than an act of communications” (p.169). 
 
As a result, Chinese accounting education fell behind western accounting education. 
Lin et al. (2005) stated that many Chinese accountants did not receive regular 
accounting training in that time. Most people believe that anyone can be an 
accountant because they think accountants are just responsible for recording 
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numerical data. Thus, for a long time, Chinese accounting education was very narrow 
with no professional skills development (Tang, 1997). 
 
Since Chinese economic reform, universities have paid more attention to building a 
new curriculum of Chinese accounting education. Since 1992, Chinese accounting 
reform changed Chinese accounting standards from rules-based standards to 
principles-based standards. (Pan et al., 2003). On 15th Feb 2006, the Ministry of 
Finance announced the new Chinese Accounting Standards (Qu and Zhang, 2010). 
The most prominent feature of the new Chinese Accounting standards is the adoption 
of principles based accounting standards, which are convergent towards the 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs). According to Carmona and 
Trombetta (2008), 
“Principles-based standards refer to fundamental understandings that inform transactions and 
economic events. Principles-based systems issue generic accounting standards. As opposed to 
rules-based systems, accounting standards of the principles persuasion do not address every 
controversial issue at hand but keep considerable ambiguity about such major processes as 
record keeping and measurement” (p.456). 
 
A principles-based approach means that understanding the rationale behind 
accounting principles and the exercise of professional judgment by accountants are 
central to the practice of principles-based accounting standards (Patel et al., 2010). 
“As China moves to principles-based accounting standards, Chinese academics assert 
that the practitioners must improve their professional ability to apply judgment in the 
implementation of the new standards” (Nie et al., 2013, p. 287). Currently the 
accounting courses in most Chinese universities are similar: Fundamental 
Accounting, Intermediate Accounting, Advanced Accounting, Analysis of Financial 
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Statements, Accounting Theory, and Auditing Theory (Nie et al., 2013). However, 
teaching materials and teaching abilities differ across universities. Some top ranked 
universities choose bilingual education and teaching materials, selecting foreign 
language teaching materials from foreign universities. For example, Tsinghua 
University has cooperative relationships with foreign publishers and develops the 
syllabus with reference to original foreign accounting teaching materials. Such a 
bilingual accounting education can produce accounting personnel with the ability of 
international thinking and foreign language communication skills which may be 
useful given the acceleration of global economic integration and the realization of 
international convergence of accounting and auditing standards. Moreover, “many 
universities have established cooperative relationships with international professional 
bodies and new majors in international accounting and professional CPA programs 
have been developed, including the integration of ACCA
6
 and CGA
7
 exam courses 
into Chinese university accounting curricula” (Zhang et al., 2014, pp. 837-838). For 
example, in 2007, the Nanjing Audit University became the first university in China 
to cooperate with the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), an international 
professional association.  
 
4.2.2.1 Normative isomorphism in different regions: education aspect 
In China, most accounting education is carried out at universities that facilitate the 
diffusion of accountancy knowledge. However, one of the disparities in higher 
education in China is the distribution of higher education institutions (HEIs), which 
is affected by factors relating to politics, history, economics and geography. High 
school students in regions with a higher number of HEIs have better opportunities to 
                                                 
6
 ACCA: the UK’s Association of Chartered Certified Accountants 
7
 CGA: the Certified General Accountants Association of Canada 
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receive higher education, because local students do not need as high scores in the 
College Entrance Exam. When the People’s Republic of China was first established 
in 1949, the majority of the HEIs were in the Eastern regions of China. The Chinese 
government has tried to address regional imbalance through reforms such as ‘Plan 
for counterpart support to higher education in the western area’ in 2001, and also 
establishing more HEIs in the middle and western parts of China (Zhu and Luo, 
2011). However, according to Chinese university rankings in 2015, three out of the 
top10 Chinese universities are located in Beijing, and 20 out of the top 100 
universities are located in Beijing. This may be due to the central government 
locating in the north. Moreover, Tsinghua University’s alumni are given high 
prestige in the Chinese political arena. For example, Chairman Xi, ex-Chairman Hu, 
and ex-prime minister Zhu all graduated from Tsinghua University, as well as 
Politburo members such as Wu Bangguo, Wu Guanzhang, and Huang Ju. There are 
more numerous heads of central ministries and local governments from Tsinghua 
University. 
 
China started to expand its higher education system from the latter part of 1978, but 
the real surge in higher education happened after 1999 (Gu, 2012). “In 1998, there 
were only 3.14 million students enrolled by China’s higher education. However, the 
students’ enrolment increased to 20.21 million in 2008” (Gu, 2012, p. 514). Although 
the rapid expansion of higher education occurred in China after the implementation 
of the education reform policy of 1978, there is significant disparity in higher 
educational resources between different regions. Wei (2012) investigated the 
disparity of higher education in China in the allocation of higher educational 
resources. The author found that in Zhejiang, Guangdong, Jiangsu, and Tianjin the 
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per-capita fiscal expenditures are above average and the levels of per-student 
expenditure in these regions are higher than average. In Fujian, Shanxi, and Hubei 
the per-capita fiscal expenditures are below average, but their per-student 
expenditures are higher than average, which reflects the input into higher education 
in these regions. In several regions in China’s southwest, namely Yunnan, Gansu, 
Sichuan, Henan, and Guizhou, both per-capita fiscal input and per-student 
expenditure are below average, which indicates that local finances to a certain extent 
have inhibited input into higher education in these regions. In Xinjiang, Inner 
Mongolia, and Ningxia, all ethnic minority autonomous regions, the per-capita fiscal 
expenditures are above average but their per-student expenditures lag behind, which 
shows that there is a certain amount of room for fiscal extension in terms of input 
into higher education in these regions (Wei, 2012, pp. 34-36). Socio-economic 
conditions vary greatly in China’s regions, leading to the disparity of higher 
educational resources across different regions.  
 
Shah et al. (2005) posit that differences in education investment are another 
important determinant for the disparities in education between regions of China. The 
economic performance of an area is a crucial determinant of the level of education 
investment. For instance, when the economic growth in an area is healthy and steady, 
people are more likely to make educational investments as the perceived future 
return on their investment is greater (Shah et al., 2005). Also, people in poorer 
regions are more likely to be constrained by their financial situation and therefore are 
limited in their ability to make investments in human capital including expenditures 
on education. In China, the rural-urban income gap is large. Costs associated with 
education can be increasingly burdensome for families to bear, especially as young 
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people progress onto secondary and tertiary level education. Furthermore, the 
economic growth rate of the region can also influence the level of demand in a 
regional labour market. When the conditions of the labour market are poor and also 
the demand for human resources is low, people are likely to be discouraged from 
education and the acquisition of skills. 
 
In addition, Yang and Li (2007) investigated education inequality in 31 provinces in 
China from 1996 to 2004. They found that people in Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin 
were generally more educated while people with lower educational level were from 
Tibet, Qinghai, and Gansu. The reasons of education inequality are inequality of 
economic development and geographical environments. The 10 western provinces of 
China feature highlands, deserts, climate variability, and soil erosion. People in these 
areas are scattered and commuting is inconvenient, so it is difficult to promote 
education here. 
 
Moreover, Lu (2007) stated that since Chinese economic reform in the late 1970s, the 
population mobility from rural to urban has been a social phenomenon in China. 
However, “in 1958, the Chinese government had already officially adopted the 
family register system, ‘Hukou’ (户口), to control the movement of people among 
different residential locations, especially between urban and rural areas” (Li et al., 
2013, p. 239). Early children’s education relies on Hukou, because it is a requirement 
of school. Otherwise, migrant children must pay extra and higher fees compared to 
local children. Migrant children in coastal regions were more likely to be delayed for 
schooling. This also resulted in the increased establishment of schools for children of 
temporary migrant workers’ in many coastal cities. However, the education facilities 
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in the schools for temporary migrant workers’ children are generally poor, compared 
with local schools. According to the report of Guangzhou Daily in 14th January 2009 
(Gu, 2012), in the 1980s, “college students coming from rural areas still accounted 
for 30% or more, while the current ratios of urban and rural students are 82.3% and 
17.7%, respectively” (p. 515).  
 
In summary, there exists disparity of access to education across regions in China, 
with implications for accounting knowledge and skills that may influence 
professional judgments required in the new Chinese accounting and auditing 
standards. Moreover, due to both old and new generations of accountants currently 
existing in China, the disparity of accounting education may cause more obvious 
differences in accounting and auditing professional judgments across regions. 
 
4.2.3 Mimetic isomorphism 
Mimetic isomorphism is when an organization faces uncertainty models itself after 
other organizations that are perceived to be more legitimate and successful 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, cited in Irvine 1999, p.77).  In other words, an 
organization may adopt structures and processes used by similar organizations, even 
if it may be not what is best to do.  
 
Irvine (1999) argued that there is a strong sense of identity and culture when an 
organization responds to mimetic pressures. However, Irvine did not acknowledge 
the effect of culture, because culture is a complementary element which may 
facilitate or impede mimetic isomorphism. Thus, the study argued that mimetic 
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isomorphism might be influenced by peer pressure which encourages individuals or 
organizations to change their attitudes, values or behaviours to conform to groups.  
 
To sum up so far, the institutional theory offers a lens to understand how norms and 
practices of organizations and professions are shaped by three institutional elements 
which can increase homogeneity among organizations. When an increasing number 
of organizations adopt similar policies or procedures, these policies and procedures 
become norms that can be seen as legitimate (Scott, 1995, cited in Chiang and 
Northcott, 2012). The central idea of institutional theory is that organizations seek 
legitimacy when adopting institutional practices, so the norms are reinforced.  
 
4.3 Culture pressure 
Culture may facilitate institutional isomorphism or may negatively influence the 
process of isomorphism. For example, China is a relationship society where social 
network success determines the success of individuals. People use guanxi as an 
expression of relationships. Confucian culture is deeply embedded in Chinese culture 
with a history of more than 5000 years. Guanxi is an important component in 
Confucian culture. Chinese society has been built around family clans (Hwang and 
Staley, 2005). Guanxi builds on the concept of the clan by widening the circle of 
influence to include distant relatives, friends and finally unrelated individuals 
(Hwang et al., 2008). Informal relationships and exchange of favours dominate all 
business and social activities in China and are strongly influenced by the Chinese 
culture. Guanxi can help people to reap benefits (Hwang and Staley, 2005). 
However, guanxi is contrary to the spirit of auditor independence, which can be 
defined as “the individual auditor considers auditor independence as a key attribute 
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of the profession, and believes that regulatory standards of auditor independence 
(issued by the profession and/or external regulatory agencies) should be rigorously 
binding and enforced in the auditing domain” (Gendron et al., 2006, p. 170). 
Moreover, Chinese culture varies from regions to regions. Thus, the effect of culture 
on the process of isomorphism also varies.  
 
4.3.1 Dialects with Guanxi 
Whorf (1950) suggested that “each language embodies and perpetuates a particular 
world view” (citied in Brown and Lenneberg, 1954, p.454). It is argued that “the 
speakers of a language are partners to an agreement to see and think of the world in a 
certain way” (Brown and Lenneberg, 1954, p. 454). Language can be used to 
describe various aspects of culture or it can mirror a culture. 
 
Confucian culture puts great emphasis on family clans. In the Chinese language, 
there are more words to express the relationship between relatives, compared to the 
English language. These words are much more clear and easier for Chinese people to 
use in their lives. For example, ‘uncle’ has several words expressing the relationship 
of relatives in the Chinese language, such as ‘叔’ (father’s younger brother), ‘伯’ 
(father’s older brother), ‘舅舅’ (mother’s brother), ‘姨父’ (mother sister’s husband), 
and ‘姑父’ (father sister’s husband). Although these Chinese words can be expressed 
by the English language, obviously, they are much more easily expressed in the 
Chinese language. This is because the notion of kinship is more important to Chinese 
people. People use more simple expressions to make information easier to 
communicate and strengthen this notion.  
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Language is a tool for the exchange of ideas. It also can reflect and shape the way of 
thinking. There is an interaction between language and thinking. Every dialect has its 
own specific characteristic which is closely related to the local culture and people’s 
thinking. In China, the first emperor of the Qin Dynasty unified the country and the 
Chinese language, but dialects were passed down through history.  
 
In China, there are seven major Han (汉 ) dialects – Guanhua (Mandarin, or 
Putonghua), Wu (spoken around Shanghai), Xiang (Hunan), Gan (Jiangxi), Kejia 
(Hakka), Yue, and Min (Fujian and Taiwan), and additionally ethnic minority 
languages such as Zhuang, Tibetan, and Uygur (Wong and Xiao, 2010). Each Han 
dialect embodies a set of sub-dialects. For example, Cantonese is part of Yue dialect 
in the Guangdong area. The Shandong dialect is part of Mandarin and Jinan and 
Qingdao dialects are sub-dialects of Shandong dialect.  Even though Han dialects 
share a unified writing form, there are still many differences grammatically, 
lexically, phonologically, and phonetically (Ma et al., 2010). Even people from two 
adjacent cities may use different dialects and may have difficulties in speaking to 
each other.  
 
Mandarin Chinese was officially adopted as the common speech at the beginning of 
1956 (China, 1996, cited in Guo, 2004, p.45), and defined as having “Beijing speech 
as its pronunciation, the northern Chinese dialect as its base dialect, and modern 
Chinese literary classics written in vernacular Chinese as its grammatical norm” 
(China, 1996, cited Guo, 2004, p.46). Mandarin is the officially recognized standard 
Chinese language, which is used in education, media, and formal settings. It 
facilitates communication between different dialect regions of China. However, 
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dialects have not been weakened by the emergence of Mandarin as the national 
language (Erbaugh, 1995). People in Shanghai and Guangdong still use their local 
dialects as their first languages (Miao and Li, 2006). Although central government 
popularized Mandarin across China, the government has shown a benign attitude 
toward local dialects, for example, local TV programmes may be broadcast in 
dialects (Gong et al., 2011). 
 
Erbaugh (1995) argued that “many Chinese take pride in speaking more than one 
dialect, viewing it as a sign of intelligence” (p. 82). In fact, local dialects may 
become a great channel to build guanxi. For example, in Foshan, a major city in 
Guangdong province, most people are locals or from Guangdong who speak Yue 
dialect and therefore Mandarin-speaking outsiders are marginalized. However, 
Shenzhen is another city in the same province where most people are Mandarin 
speaking immigrants from different regions of China and it may be much easier to 
build guanxi here than in Foshan. Another example is Hong Kong, where most 
people are from Guangdong and speak Cantonese. Customers who speak Cantonese 
usually receive superior service than those who speak Mandarin.  
 
Tong et al. (1999) examined the relationship between social identity and intergroup 
relations in Hong Kong. Due to the process of the handover of Hong Kong to the 
People’s Republic of China in 1997, there are growing numbers of immigrants and 
visitors from mainland China to Hong Kong. “The language differences together 
with many other differences in the sociocultural background and life-style between 
Hong Kong people and Mainland Chinese have increased the salience of the group 
boundary between Hong Kong people and Mainland Chinese” (Tong et al., 1999, p. 
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282). That is because in the Hong Kong context, new Chinese immigrants and 
visitors bring mainland Chinese culture into Hong Kong. Hong Kong people speak 
Cantonese and English, while new immigrants and visitors speak Mandarin. The 
communication accommodation theory posits that “in intercultural contacts, 
individuals may seek to promote social approval and intergroup communication 
efficiency or increase the distinctiveness of their own group” (Tong et al., 1999, p. 
282). Tong et al. (1999) found that as reflected in both assessments of intergroup 
attitudes and attitudes toward language learning, Hong Kong people were less 
inclined to accept mainland people. Hong Kong people preferred to use Cantonese 
(the in-group language) to communicate with mainland Chinese. This may be 
because “people expect in-group members to maintain a distinctive group identity by 
maintaining the use of in-group language in intergroup communication” (Tong et al., 
1999, p. 293).   
 
Armstrong and Yee (2001) stated that “the popularity of the Chinese dialects can be 
demonstrated through their heavy and almost indispensable usage in both business 
and informal conversations among many Chinese businesspeople. This is especially 
the case with reference to older Chinese businesspeople, who may be more proficient 
and comfortable in using their own Chinese dialects.” (p. 69). The same dialect 
would strike a chord for people with the same culture. Sharing the same language 
would also influence the level of trust (Armstrong and Yee, 2001). Ma et al. (2010) 
claimed that “even outside their native dialect regions, people from the same dialect 
region always like to speak their own dialect to each other to show the special close 
relationship between them” (p. 351). Gong et al. (2011) also identified dialect as a 
basis for establishing personal relationships. People’s frequency of speaking in their 
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local dialect could influence their decision to stay with their organization. Xie (2011) 
stated that “local people use the dialect not only to communicate among themselves 
but also to proclaim their identity as natives of the city, distinguishing themselves 
from the growing number of migrant workers” (p. 20). 
 
4.3.2 Historical activities influence regional culture 
Chinese business behaviour characteristics have been observed to have strong 
differences between the various regions of the mainland. One of the most important 
themes is the striking contrast between the North and the South (Schlevogt, 2001). 
“Several centuries ago, Marco Polo mentioned these differences, comparing Cathay 
(North) to Manzi (South, especially, Canton), which were two almost separate 
worlds” (Schlevogt, 2001, p.520). Traditional Chinese culture such as Confucian 
culture appears in the North (Shandong province), and emphasizes respect for 
seniority, politeness, loyalty, collective orientation and trust, reinforcing centralizing 
tendencies (Schlevogt, 2001).  
 
Schlevogt (2001) argued that “the north lacks a well-developed and sophisticated 
commercial history” (p. 524). However, Shanxi Merchants (Chinese: 晋商  Jin 
Shang, in the North) very famous in Chinese history, were prominent businessmen 
from the Song to the Qing dynasty. The Shanxi Merchants built a close relationship 
with the government and were responsible for creating the first banking institutions 
in China.  
“Due to their shrewdness and abilities in handing financial matters, they became successful in 
business and, down through generations, exchange shops they started had moved into dozens 
of cities all over the country. Usually, one such shop owned a dozen to 100 branches and some 
of these even had branches in Japan, Europe and South-eastern Asia. So it is said that China’s 
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financial industry in modern time was started by these Shanxi Merchants. These exchange 
shops had controlled the financial market for more than 200 years during the Qing Dynasty and 
even Emperor Dowager Cixi once borrowed money from them” (i-Leica, 2013).  
 
Schlevogt (2001) claimed that in the north, business closely links with government 
and companies are heavily controlled by the government. Commercial activities are 
considered political activities. Hechuan Zhang, who was the president of Guangdong 
Midea Group Co., Ltd, stated that compared to the South, in the North a high 
proportion of enterprises are either state-owned  or the state holds most shares 
(Jinhengzixun, 2006). That is why the first special economic zone was Guangdong 
far away from northern political centre of Beijing. With less political control, there is 
a higher prevalence of commercial activities in the market in Guangdong. 
 
Compared with the North, the South has a more developed commercial tradition 
(Schlevogt, 2001). There are excellent river connections such as the deltas of the 
Yangtze River and Chu Chiang, and many sea access points, by which merchants are 
able to engage in more domestic and international trade than in the North. Schlevogt 
(2001) argued that traditional culture is less emphasized in the South, perhaps 
because of history and international influence. However, this study does not agree 
with this opinion, because it can also observe that traditional culture was highly 
emphasized in the South. For example, Hui Merchants (Chinese: 徽商) were one of 
the most famous merchant groups with a very strong cultural foundation in China’s 
history during the Ming and Qing dynasties (1368-1911). “Hui Merchants were 
deeply influenced by Confucianism. Guided by Confucian philosophy, they valued 
honesty and morality in their business dealings. They made profits based on the Yi 
rules (Yi in Confucianism means duty or righteous behaviour), and paid strict 
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attention to learning new things and accumulating experience” (China today, 2010). 
Hui Merchants were also closely attached to bureaucracy. 
“The history of Hui Merchants covers about 600 years, but for 300 years they dominated the 
region. They occupy a significant place in the history of Chinese commerce. In the Southern 
Song Dynasty, as the capital was moved from Kaifeng to Lin’an (now Hangzhou in Zhejiang 
province), the political and economic centre shifted to the south. This stimulated the economy 
of neighbouring areas to develop, and then the Central Plains culture was introduced to the 
South. Huizhou was situated in an important place between Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces. It 
was significant to the economy of south-eastern China as a communication hub between the 
south and the north. As a result of Huizhou’s particular geographical condition and the need of 
economic development, landowners began to take up business” (Huangshan tour, 2008). 
 
In the ‘new’ China, since the late 1970s Chinese open door reform, with the process 
of transforming planned economies to be more market oriented and transforming 
state-owned enterprises into stock companies, a number of multinational 
corporations have established subsidiaries in China. This phenomenon has facilitated 
population mobility from rural to urban regions as more people look for a job in the 
city. Due to the unequal development of the economy, China is divided into coastal 
and interior regions. The coastal regions, partially south-eastern coastal regions, have 
been seen as more modernised than interior regions because that is where Chinese 
reform started. Chinese modernisation is associated with industrialisation, advanced 
technology, higher standards of living, and the influx of western management ideas 
and techniques (Redfern and Crawford, 2010).  
 
However, simply dividing China into coastal and interior regions as a means to 
define a particular area’s level of economic development may be not adequate 
because of the impact of history. For example, “there is no disagreement about 
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overall trends in the Qing economy, in which a generally prosperous eighteenth 
century gave way to a period of growing economic difficulty after 1800, during 
which China was slow to grasp new opportunities radiating from the British 
industrial revolution” (Brandt et al., 2014, p. 61). China had become a laggard by the 
nineteenth century (Brandt et al., 2014). After the Opium War (1839-1842), “British 
arms forced the Qing to accept the Treaty of Nanking (1842), which ceded Hong 
Kong to the British, forced the Qing to accept a regime of virtual free trade, and 
initiated the ‘treaty port’ system by opening five Chinese ports to British merchants 
(Brandt et al., 2014, p. 81)”, which included Guangzhou, Fuzhou, Xiamen, Ningbo, 
and Shanghai ports. Subsequently, similar forced agreements expanded to include 
dozens of treaty ports where foreign residents were protected by extraterritoriality at 
the expense of Chinese sovereignty (Brandt et al., 2014, p. 81). Although this is a 
humiliating modern Chinese history, western cultures were able to deeply influence 
Chinese regional culture. For example, Qingdao was a German colony from 1891 
until 1914. During this period, Tsingtao (Qingdao) was starting to take shape with 
the completion of a series of projects such as wharves, the Tsingtao-Jinan Railway 
line, Tsingtao Railway Station and locomotive works. “In the year of 1910, the 
Germans drew up for the second time the city planning of Tsingtao. As a result, the 
former urban area was extended for four times highlighted by the emphasis on the 
development of commerce and trade” (Qingdao, 2015). Haier Group of Qingdao is a 
famous worldwide business for consumer electronics and home appliances. Tsingtao 
Brewery co., Ltd is another famous company in Qingdao. Neither are state-owned 
enterprises. In contrast, people may know only Shandong Luneng Group Co., Ltd in 
Jinan, which focuses on energy and minerals businesses and operates as a subsidiary 
of the State Grid Corporation of China, which is a large state-owned enterprise. 
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Therefore, no matter how China is divided, whether it is into the North and the South 
or the coastal and interior regions, the reason for different regional culture is the 
process of historical activities which includes the interactions of foreign cultures and 
political activities. Apparently, since the open door policy, there is a new division 
between the coastal and interior regions. This is because they were opened up at 
different times
8
 and historically experienced the influence of foreign cultures in 
different ways. Most economic zones were set up in coastal regions. Therefore, it is 
not accurate to simply divide into the coastal and interior regions for comparison. 
This study believes a more accurate way to divide Chinese regions through the 
definition of special economic cities and non-special economic cities.  
 
4.3.3 Culture influences the education in different regions 
China with a cultural history steeped in Confucianism has a long history of 
preference for sons (Wang et al., 2013). “Confucian principles underpinned a highly 
patriarchal society. Women’s status was symbolized by the appalling practice of 
foot-binding…girls married early and had very limited educational opportunity” 
(Wang et al., 2013, p. 87). According to China Daily (2014), in 2014, Chinese 
families have a preference for sons and sons would often have better educational 
opportunities; according to the 2005 census, the ratio of boys to girls was 1.21 males 
to one female. In the 2013 census showed that the sex ratio at birth had improved, 
but “the narrowing of the gap does not necessarily mean that girls are valued more 
highly” (China Daily, 2014). 
                                                 
8
 In 1980, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, and Xiamen were set up as special economic zones. In 1988, 
Hainan province was set up as a special economic zone. During the period between 1990 and 1992, 
many other cities were set up as special economic zones, such as Shanghai, Tianjin, Beihai, Zhanjiang, 
Guangzhou, Fuzhou, Ningbo, Nantong, Lianyungang, Qingdao, Weihai, Yantai, Dalian, and 
Qinhuangdao (Leong, 2013). 
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Lu (2007) argued that there were no gender differences in migrant children’s 
education, but the author might have neglected the effect of the Chinese one-child 
policy. Lee (2012) investigated the effect of the one-child policy on gender equality 
in education in China. The study found that “no difference in years of schooling 
between only child boys and only child girls, where the gap between boys and girls 
inside multiple-child households remained significant” (p.41). For example, a 
migrant child must pay ‘educational endorsement fees’ if they want to enrol at local 
schools (Lu, 2007). However, these fees are a heavy burden for low-income migrant 
families (Meng and Zhang, 2001). If they have two children and one is a boy, the boy 
always gets the first chance of an education unless he does not want to go to school.  
 
Moreover, according to the Chinese Ministry of Finance, in 2005 China’s 12 million 
professional accountants included 6.7 million women (Keeffe, 2010). Females 
accounted for 56% of the total number of all accounting personnel. However, most 
female accountants work in basic accounting jobs such as bookkeepers and cashiers.  
 
In the Chinese labour market, although the government encourages gender equality, 
Chinese women still have a lower status (Huang, 2001). “Women are considered 
inferior to men in the patriarchal family” (Huang, 2001, p. 258). Therefore, women 
are less educated than men, especially in rural areas (Huang, 2001). This is because 
of the Confucian norm that women should not have too much education (nvzi wucia 
bianshi de, in Chinese: 女子无才便是德) (Huang, 2001). 
“Most Chinese parents, especially those in the rural areas, consider it unwise to invest in the 
education of their daughters because they will marry out and join their husbands’ families. 
With limited resources, sons, the main supporters of aging parents, are more likely to have 
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opportunities for higher education whereas daughters often have to quit school to help family 
production (Huang, 2001, pp. 258-259)” 
 
In summary, Chinese culture may negatively influence institutional isomorphism. It 
does not mean that the effect of culture prevents the process of isomorphism. This 
study argues that the impact of culture may divert isomorphism from expected end 
points. Thus, culture should be classified within the same level as institutions. In 
social transformation, there is an interaction between culture and institutions.  
 
4.4 Loose coupling 
Under the two pressures from culture and institutions, individuals may practice in a 
variety of ways while maintaining the standards and legitimate structures. Ortan and 
Weick (1990) refer to this phenomenon as ‘loose coupling’, and explains it is “a 
divergence of legitimacy-seeking activities and technical activities” (cited in Chiang 
and Northcott, 2012, p. 347).  
 
In the process of Chinese auditing standards’ convergence with international auditing 
standards, there is a question of whether the new Chinese Auditing Standards are 
implemented as expected, and exactly how auditors interpret and implement these 
new standards. Loose coupling is a concept that is helpful to understand the practices 
of auditors in this process, and situate responses of accepting, resisting, or adapting 
the new standards in China. Wu and Patel (2013) acknowledge that loose coupling 
encompasses both resistance and adaptability to institutional change and the latter 
accommodation of the change. “The organizational implications of the new values 
and meanings may be imperfectly understood or deliberately misinterpreted, which 
allow diversions to occur from expected goals” (Wu and Patel, 2013, p.207). This 
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change could start as superficial change and then become more and more significant 
over time. For example, Chinese CPA firms started to reform when they were 
affiliated firms to the government and then later became independent firms.  
 
The Chinese financial auditing service was really started in early 1983. At that time, 
CPA firms included accounting firms and auditing firms that were established and 
sponsored by government bodies or government controlled institution (Yang et al., 
2001). In June 1995, the two professional bodies, the Chinese Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants (CICPA) and the Chinese Association of Certified Public 
Auditors (CACAP), emerged as a new professional body named CICPA, under the 
direct control of the MOF (Lin and Chan, 2000).  
 
From 1997, Chinese accounting firms started to disaffiliate from their sponsoring 
bodies in order to converge to the global auditing system. However, the CICPA is 
still essentially governed and regulated by the MOF, because it allows dual 
appointment of senior directors in the CICPA who also have government positions. 
In addition, many leaders in the CICPA and provincial institutes of Certified Public 
Accountants had governmental working experience due to historical reasons. Due to 
the effect of Chinese culture, guanxi may still exist between leaders and government. 
Therefore, it is difficult to maintain auditing independence under the influence of the 
government. Another example of the influence of government on public accounting 
firms is that the establishment of a public accounting firm must be reported and 
approved by the provincial department of finance, but not the provincial institute of 
Certified Public Accountants (Ministry of Finance of the People’s Republic of China, 
2015a). As such, the institute of Certified Public Accountants seems to help the 
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government supervise public accounting firms, because many important decisions 
are made by the government. 
 
Secondly, internal audit was established and developed later in China, compared to 
the financial audit. The China Institute of Internal Audit (CIIA) joined the Institute of 
Internal Auditors (IIA) in 1987. The Chinese Internal Auditing Standards (CIASs) 
was established in 2003 and implemented from 1
st
 June 2003. The CIASs were 
revised in 2013 and implemented from 1
st
 January 2014. 
 
In fact, the independence of internal audit is not designed as a monitoring operation 
to, prevent frauds and control financial and operational risks. Some private corporate 
directors consider the corporate money is their own money, so they can use it in 
whichever way they want (Wang, 2014). The internal audit restricts their self-
business rights (Song, 2011). In the state-owned enterprises (SOEs), some directors 
think that internal audits weaken their authority. Therefore, “they either do not set up 
an internal audit department, or deprive its rights even if it exists. The staffs in 
internal audit departments are even excluded and isolated, and cannot play their roles 
as expected” (Song, 2011, p.191). Internal auditors are guided and authorized by 
directors, which significantly influences the independence of internal audit. The 
directors control the economic funds of internal auditors and exercise their personal 
control. In most Chinese corporations, there is a real separation of ownership and 
management. The directors usually participate in corporate management. Therefore, 
the internal audit cannot play an independent internal control role.  
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In summary, although the Chinese auditing system converges to the international 
auditing system in order to maintain legitimacy, loose coupling reflects the 
contradiction between institutional and culture pressures in the institutional context. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
To sum up, with the process of institutional isomorphism, the Chinese auditing 
profession has adopted international auditing standards in order to seek legitimacy in 
the global market. However, the differences of regional culture may result in Chinese 
auditors imperfectly interpreting the new Chinese Auditing Standards or deliberately 
misinterpreting them. In other words, whenever legitimation is sought, ‘loose 
coupling’ may result. But superficial changes could become more significant over 
time. Therefore, the framework of this study is described as Figure 3.  
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Figure 3 Framework for understanding the Chinese auditor independence commitment 
 
Cultural pressure Institutional pressure 
Loose Coupling 
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CHAPTER 5 AN ANALYSIS OF CHINESE CONTEXT 
5.1 Introduction 
With the process of transforming planned economies to be more market oriented and 
China entering the World Trade Organisation, there has been an exponential growth 
in the number of multinational corporations establishing subsidiary companies in 
China. The Chinese auditing practices and corporate governance are converging to 
internationally acceptable practices. This chapter uses neo-Durkheimian theory to 
analyse cultural aspects of international auditing convergence, with particular 
reference to how they function in the Chinese auditing context.  
 
Most institutional theories of organizations use cost, ideational or regulatory factors 
to explain adoption and diffusion of empirical forms of formal institutions (6, 2015, 
p.771). By contrast, neo-Durkheimian theory argues that “informal institutions are 
causally key, that generic elementary forms are more significant than empirical ones, 
and that quite rapid informal institutional change is common … each elementary 
institutional form of social organisation cultivates a distinct thought style, meaning 
the manner in which people frame decisions – measured, for example, by their stance 
towards anomalies in classification, past and future, issue linkage, risk, fallback 
options in strategy, issue linkages” (6, 2015, p.771). Simply speaking, other 
institutional theories use institutional change to explain how individuals and 
organisations adapt to either gradual or catastrophic change. However, neo-
Durkheimian theory emphasizes the impact of informal institutions of culture. The 
impact of culture limits individuals’ opinions and cognition to adapt to institutional 
changes. Although some research using institutional theories also investigates 
cultural influence (Wu and Patel, 2015), they view culture as simply part of the 
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context of an institution. However, neo-Durkheimian theory classifies culture into 
four different solidarities, to understand individuals’ problems, options, and choices 
within their experienced institutional changes.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to set out the framework of neo-Durkheimian 
institutional theory to be used in understanding the process and outcome of 
converging to international audit practices in China.  
 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section two discusses neo-Durkheimian theory. 
Section three describes Chinese culture. Section four examines individuals’ practices 
as classified under the grid-group framework of the neo-Durkheimian institutional 
theory. The final section presents a conclusion. 
 
5.2 The development of Neo-Durkheimian institutional theory 
Neo-Durkheimian institutional theory describes four solidarities. The individualistic 
solidarity is described as a weak grid – weak group form of society. Their own 
interests are more important than the group’s interests. When individuals gather 
wealth and resources they can be at liberty to collaborate with others, but they always 
put their own interests first. Thus, these kinds of relationships are easy to break. As 
such, no-one in this society expects other people’s help or assistance. To reduce the 
possibility of failure, individuals need to be self-insured. Therefore, there is no trust 
between individuals’ cooperative actions.  
 
The second form of society is hierarchical solidarity which is a strong grid – strong 
group form. In this form of society it is important that rules are adhered to, and that 
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tradition and authority are respected. Social rules are demarcated and statutes are 
clearly defined within internal boundaries, while the external boundary defines who 
is inside and who is outside the group. It can be described by a vivid movie example. 
In times of war, whether or not the war is of benefit depends on which perspective 
you take. From the individual’s point of view it could be harmful, but from the 
country’s point of view it could be beneficial. The soldier is in the army, which is a 
hierarchical solidarity with a strong grid-strong group form. The soldier has to 
participate in the war in spite of her or his own personal views or desires, because 
there are strict rules in the army and he is also accountable to the country.  
 
Egalitarian solidarity is a weak grid – strong group form of society which shares 
features with the individualistic and hierarchical solidarities. There are no internal 
boundaries in the form of social rules, but the external boundaries are even more 
important than in hierarchical solidarity. There is a good metaphor in China from the 
1950s, which is the saying ‘eating from the same big pot’ (吃大锅饭). This is a vivid 
metaphor of the egalitarian practice of everyone taking food from the same big pot. 
You could say that companies ate food from the country’s big pot and no matter 
whether there was profit or loss, wages were still paid, and within companies, 
regardless of whether labourers worked hard, it did not impact the distribution of 
their individual wages. These ideas explain why betraying socialism was the worst 
act, because it threatened the group boundary.  
 
The last form of society is the isolate solidarity which is a strong grid – weak group 
form. This implies there is little leeway in choosing one’s social role and belong to 
any group. 
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Individuals or individual organizations interpret their social context based on their 
own values and beliefs because culture exerts a strong impact over cognition 
(Tansey, 2004, p.18). Durkheim’s approach suggests that “society is the individual 
mind writ large” (Tansey, 2004, p. 19). Although political events and institutions 
significantly influence individuals’ behaviours, individuals interpret and accept these 
institutional constraints as a process. In this process, “individuals negotiating their 
way through the organizational constraints of actively interpreting, challenging, 
accepting, and recreating their social environment are limited to a style of discourse 
consistent with the constitutive premises of that environment” (Rayner, 1992, p. 90, 
cited from Tansey, 2004, p. 19). 
 
6 (2015) also stated that “institutions amplify biases, leading people to think of their 
world as being only as integrated and regulated as they themselves are socially 
integrated and regulated by their institutions. Neo-Durkheimian theory proposes a 
feedback loop, in which each elementary form of informal social organization 
cultivates thought styles, which then leads people to act in ways that reinforce that 
form” (p. 771) (Figure 4).  
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Figure 4: The structure of explanation in neo-Durkheimian institutional theory 
(6, 2015, p.772) 
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Simply speaking, institutions enact rules and regulations they ask individuals to 
follow. This cultivates individuals’ thought style, which relates to the culture of this 
group of people. People share the same attitudes, customs, and beliefs in the group, 
which lead individuals to act in ways that reinforce the institutions. However, if 
individuals’ thought style has been changed, institutions may become disorganized. 
Also if institutions have been changed, the new institutions may cultivate a new 
thought style. 
 
Moreover, Linsley et al. (2015) acknowledged that all four solidarities could be 
present in a society and no society would comprise only one of the solidarities. 
Linsley et al. (2015) argued that “within any society cultural dialogues will 
continually occur as the different solidarities promote their worldview and look to 
win new recruits. The interactions the four solidarities have with one another, and the 
incessant debates they have, are also important as they re-confirm to the members of 
each solidarity what it stands for” (p. 6). However, in reality, it may be difficult to 
observe these four typical solidarities. In contrast, more ‘moderate’ solidarities may 
be present because of social ties between individuals of different connections and 
strengths. For example, social culture is located conceptually within the hierarchical 
culture, while individuals who live in this social culture may work in a workplace 
with individualist solidarity. When individuals make decisions in their work place, 
their situation may shift to a moderate solidarity somewhere between the hierarchical 
culture and the individualist culture, where they trade off benefits and punishments 
and may also change their accountability. To expand on this, section three first 
describes the Chinese culture, then analyses how individuals’ behaviours change 
because their accountability changes in the mixed moderate solidarities.  
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5.3 The description of Chinese cultures 
Confucian culture is deeply embedded in Chinese culture. Confucianism constructed 
the “san gang wu chang” 三纲五常 which are the three cardinal guides: the ruler 
guides his subjects, the father guides his son, and the husband guides his wife. 
Confucianism identifies five constant virtues: ren 仁  (relational 
virtuosity/consummate conduct), yi 义 (commitment), li 礼 (propriety in roles and 
relations), zhi 智 (wisdom), and xin 信 (credibility). As well as the guides, there 
were strictly hierarchical rules. In addition, China is a relationship-based society 
where people use guanxi as an expression of a relationship. Guanxi is an important 
component of Confucian culture especially since Chinese society has been built 
around family clans (Hwang and Staley, 2005). Guanxi builds on the concept of the 
clan by widening the circle of influence to include distant relatives, friends and 
finally unrelated individuals (Hwang et al., 2008). Thus, in China’s feudal society, 
the hierarchical solidarity (strong grid – strong group) was present at an extended 
scale.  
 
However, during the period from 1840 to the present, China experienced distinct 
cultural transitions because of wars, significant political and institutional changes, 
and the globalisation of economic development, Chinese culture still predominately 
identifies with a hierarchical solidarity, in which there may be different levels 
between grid and group.  
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5.3.1 Fading Glory (1840-1919) 
Since the Opium War in 1840, “British arms forced the Qing to accept the Treaty of 
Nanking (1842), which ceded Hong Kong to the British, forced the Qing to accept a 
regime of virtual free trade, and initiated the ‘treaty port’ system by opening five 
Chinese ports to British merchants” (Brandt et al., 2014, p. 81). These ports included 
the Guangzhou, Fuzhou, Xiamen, Ningbo, and Shanghai ports. Subsequently, similar 
forced agreements included dozens of treaty ports where foreign residents were 
protected extraterritoriality at the expense of Chinese sovereignty (Brandt et al., 
2014, p. 81). Since 1840, Chinese traditional cultural beliefs have been totally 
questioned by Chinese elites (Wu, 2007). Reformists such as Zheng Guanyin realized 
that the influence of West resulted from the fact that “‘China being an agrarian 
country’ versus ‘foreign countries being a commercial one’ ” (Wu, 2007, p. 141). 
Zheng Guanyin had immortal words in his life “欲攘外，亟须自强；欲自强，必
先致富；欲致富，必首在振工商；欲振工商，必先讲求学校、速立宪法、尊重
道德、改良政治” (in English: The country needs to be strong and self-reliance if it 
wants to resist foreign aggression; if it wants to be self-reliant, it must first become 
rich; if it wants to be rich, it should conduct industry and commerce; if it wants to 
revive industry and commerce, it must firstly force education, set up legislature and 
respect for moral and political institutional reform). Wei Yuan proposed “to learn 
from foreign countries and then tame them” (Wu, 2007, p. 141). Moreover, Li 
Hongzhang adopted Western military beliefs and set up the Chinese North Marine 
Navy. 
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In 1888, the North Marine Navy was formally established and also promulgated the 
“North Marine Navy Statutes” (Baike, 2016; Wikipedia, 2016). Almost 70% of 
captains had studied or trained in the UK, France, Germany, or other countries 
(Baike, 2016; Wikipedia, 2016). Li Hongzhang also hired William Metcalfe Lang as 
a supervisor to train the navy (Sina, 2014).   
 
Li Hongzhang adopted Western military beliefs and implemented the Chinese North 
Marine Navy; these cultivated a new thought style. However, new institutions were 
only implemented in the army. As such, the new thought style was limited in its 
impact on the dominant Chinese culture. 
 
Confucian culture was legitimated in the ancient China and dominated in the 
economy and society (Wu, 2007). However, during this time, Chinese culture was 
questioned but it was not shaken. Wu (2007) stated that “it is impossible to shake the 
potent collective beliefs deep-rooted in the society merely by self-reflection or 
denouncement. Society will abandon its ancient beliefs only if it is assured of finding 
others” (p.141).  
 
During this period (1840-1919), western countries used military force to open 
China’s door, and in doing so they were able to deeply influence Chinese culture. 
Chinese people saw and interpreted their environmental changes, which challenged 
their old institutions. Throughout this period, the hierarchical solidarity (strong grid – 
strong group) remained.  
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5.3.2 Transitional Trauma (1919-1949) 
Until the May 4
th
 Movement (also called the New Cultural Movement), China started 
to embrace more Western beliefs, especially Chinese students and youth. The May 
4
th
 Movement also indicated a radical break with the Confucian ethical and political 
system (Wu, 2007).  The May 4
th
 movement was the first major student movement in 
modern China (Zhao, 2000, p.1599):  
“Since 1917, China’s new intellectuals and students initiated a vast modernization drive that 
aimed to strengthen the country through science and democracy. This modernization drive to a 
great extent paved the ways to the rise of the movement. The movement, however, was named 
after the May 4
th
 incident in 1919: on that day, over 3000 Beijing students marched in the 
streets in an anti-Japanese demonstration protesting the Shandong Resolution of the Versailles 
peace conference. Joined by merchants, workers, and other urban residents, anti-Japanese 
protested soon spread to many other Chinese cities. Eventually, the government of Northern 
China had to dismiss three pro-Japanese officers and to refuse to sign the Versailles peace 
treaty. Politically, it contributed to the rise of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the 
reorganization of the Nationalist Party (Guomindang). Culturally, it facilitated the rise and 
dominance of vernacular literature and mass education and the decline of Confucianism and 
traditional ethics.” (Zhao, 2000, p.1599) 
 
During this period, many critical events happened in China, such as military conflicts 
between warlords from 1927, anti-Japanese warfare from 1937 to 1945, and the civil 
war from 1946 to 1949. Chinese people wanted to learn Western science and beliefs 
in order to find a way out and save the nation. Many young people, such as Deng 
Xiaoping and Zhou Wenlai even went to Europe for study. Wu (2007) claimed that 
“science is not merely regarded as a discipline of knowledge, but as the panacea to 
solve all the problems existing in nature, society, life, politics and ethics” (p. 143). 
This transformation occurred in a troublesome period: the national institutions could 
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not be effectively implemented, and at the same time the transformation shook the 
domination of Confucian culture.  
 
Moreover, although the government published a series of laws to restrict people’s 
rights to free speech, association, and the press between 1912 and 1914, such laws 
could not extend to cities controlled by southern revolutionaries, and foreign 
concessions, where publication and association were not regulated by Chinese law 
(Zhao, 2000, p.1609). Even within the Northern political sphere, some organizations 
such as commercial organizations, worker unions, and other nongovernmental 
organizations were also out of its control, especially after Yuan Shikai’s failure to 
restore a monarchy and his death in 1916 (Zhao, 2000, p.1609).  
 
During this period, people started to challenge the ‘old’ political system because it 
did not suit the ‘new’ conditions or the pursuit of democracy. They were trying to 
establish republicanism, which is a political ideology in contrast to monarchy and 
dictatorship. Social organization had been re-established in order to create a new 
interaction order, which cultivated a republicanist thought style. The revolution 
reinforced the new thought style to buttress the new institutions.  
 
Hierarchical solidarity (strong grid – strong group) was gradually moved to a 
‘moderate egalitarian’ solidarity. The strong grid moved to a relatively weak grid. 
Due to the resistance of foreign aggression in the whole country, in China, the strong 
group was still present. In a ‘moderate egalitarian’ solidarity, the typical situation is a 
lack of control. Individuals were trying to negotiate on all points and change 
institutional ordering, but the old hierarchical cultural power was a countervailing 
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pressure that limited the continuing movement of the grid. As such, social 
regulations were questioned and a ‘moderate egalitarian’ solidarity emerged. 
 
5.3.3 Cultural Redefinition (1949-1978) 
When the People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949, China became a socialist 
society (Wu, 2007), following the socialist Soviet Union, positioning itself within the 
socialist camp and therefore rejecting capitalist ideology, (such as was present in 
European countries and America). During this period, Mao Zedong launched the 
‘Great Cultural Revolution’ criticising the then dominant Confucian culture, which 
he claimed represented decadent beliefs. In the end, there was no individualism, no 
self-assurance, and no aseity in the whole country (Wu, 2007). Wu (2007) stated that 
“highly unified under the ideological governance, all social activities and living 
experiences are manifested as political. Science and democracy has been literally 
discarded. All members of society are dreaming of joining in the Communist party 
and are proud of being Poor Peasants (Pinnong) in class origin. And the material 
beliefs of the pursuit of gains will be severely inhibited and even punished.” (p.144). 
In other words, Chinese people were ‘brain washed’ during such a short time under 
such strong political power.  
 
New institutions were established to dominate social interaction order by strong 
political power, which cultivated a new thought style. With the new thought style, 
individuals reinforced the new social organisation.  
 
During this period, people emerged from the pain of war and established a new 
country, in which people blindly admired the leaders. Meanwhile, the Chinese 
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Communist Party (CCP) established strict regulations to ensure their highest 
leadership in the whole nation. Therefore, the weak grid moved back to a strong grid. 
Hierarchical solidarity (strong grid-strong group) was again present under strong 
political power.  
 
5.3.4 Chinese Consensus (1978-present) 
Since 1978, China has introduced dramatic economic reforms. With the process of 
economic reform, the Chinese economy and society have been significantly 
restructured. This period is also called the post Maoist period. When Deng Xiaoping 
became the paramount Chinese leader in 1978 (Wu, 2007), he started the reforms and 
began to open up the country. Deng Xiaoping had one aphorism: “it does not matter 
whether the cat is white or black, so long as it catches mice” (Wu, 2007, p. 145). 
China came to put economic construction at its centre, rather than its political 
movement. With the implementation of the open-door policy in 1978, China started 
to transform its planned economy to be more market oriented. Subsequently, a 
number of multinational corporations have established subsidiaries in China. With 
more and more western companies entering China, western cultures have also been 
brought into China. For example, in Beijing, 70% of buildings are foreign-named and 
the gymnasiums and main sports facilities of the 2008 Chinese Olympic venue were 
totally designed by foreigners (Wu, 2007, p.145). The Chinese economy has been 
dramatically developed, and in 2015 its GDP ranking had bounced up to be the 
second in the world (Knoema, 2015).  
 
Although China continues to be a one party dictatorship of the Chinese Communist 
Party, albeit with some economic freedom, Chinese individuals have considerable 
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freedom to self-select. For example, Chinese individuals are no longer confining 
themselves to the revolutionary movies. Instead, they have started to explore the 
outside world from television, films, and the internet. In particular, the internet gives 
Chinese individuals more freedom to speak. For example, Zhou Jiugeng, an official 
of the Nanjing government of Jiangsu province, suddenly became famous because a 
netizen posted his very expensive brand watch and luxury car on the website in 2008 
(Ma, 2012). Such freedom could never have happened in China at any other time. 
However, the freedom is relative. For example, Facebook and YouTube cannot be 
logged into in China because videos such as those documenting student strikes in 
1989 can be viewed on these websites. For another example, the famous compere, Bi 
Fujian, was suspended when a video emerged on a website in which, at a private 
banquet, he was joking about Chairman Mao. Compared to the Maoist period, the 
strong grid has been gradually moved to a relatively weak grid because of the 
influence of institutional changes during the economic reform.  
 
In addition, guanxi is still deeply embedded in Chinese culture. Guanxi can help 
people to reap benefits. Guanxi success determines the success of individuals since 
informal relationships and exchange of favours dominate all business and social 
activities in China. However, with the transformation of planned economies to be 
more market oriented, freedom of competition is encouraged, such as the enterprise 
reform since 1980s and the accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). As 
such, the strong group has also been gradually moved to the relatively weak group 
form with the transformation of the planned economy to be more market oriented. 
Thus, hierarchical solidarity has moved to a ‘moderate hierarchical culture’. 
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5.3.5 Understanding guanxi in Chinese societies 
China is a relationship-oriented society. In the Chinese language, people use guanxi 
as an expression of relationship. Guanxi generally refers to networks of informal 
relationships and exchanges of favours that dominate all business and social 
activities (Qin, 2011). However, guanxi is derived from Confucianism. Confucianism 
divided social relationships into five categories called “Wulun” (五伦), whereby 
“Wulun” generalised the relationship between monarch and his subjects (Jun chen 君
臣), the relationship between father and son (fu zi 父子), the relationship between 
younger and older brother (xiong di 兄弟 ), the relationship between wife and 
husband (fu fu 夫妇 ), and the relationship between friends (peng you 朋友 ). 
Mencius
9
 believed that people should deal with these five relationships by following 
Zhong 忠 (loyalty), xiao 孝 (filial piety), ti 悌 (doing one’s duty as a younger 
brother), ren 忍 (endurance), and shan 善 (kindness). In other words, subjects should 
be loyal to their monarch; a son should be filial to his father because of hierarchical 
orders; in brotherhood, the younger brother should do his duty as a younger brother 
because of blood-relations; husband’s and wife’s loves are different, and they should 
put up with each other; friends should be honest to each other, and should be kind 
and caring to each other. Confucianism used family relationships to explain social 
relationships. As such, monarchs were called ‘monarch father’ (君父) and officials 
were called ‘parent governors’ (父母官). The relationship between a monarch and 
his subjects was similar to the relationship between father and son. If a monarch does 
not do his duties properly, he does not expect his subjects to be loyal nor to respect 
him, as with the relationship between father and son. In marriage, a husband should 
                                                 
9
 Mencius was a Chinese philosopher of Confucianism.  
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be the leader in the family and make decisions for the family, while a wife should 
obey her husband’s decisions. Friendship should not only be based on reciprocation 
but also honesty. Moreover, Confucianism advocated that “四海之内，皆兄弟也” that 
means within the world people are all brothers and society is like ‘a big family’.  
 
In the Han dynasty, Confucianism constructed the “san gang” (三纲) that are the 
three cardinal guides: the monarch guides his subjects, the father guides his son, and 
the husband guides his wife. To deal with these three relations, Confucianism 
identifies five constant virtues: ren 仁 (relational virtuosity/consummate conduct), yi 
义 (commitment), li 礼 (propriety in roles and relations), zhi 智 (wisdom), and xin 信 
(credibility). People normally refer to these virtues together as “san gang wu chang” 
(三纲五常) in a way that politicized Confucianism in order to maintain political 
order. “San gang wu chang” advocated that children should obey their father; a wife 
should obey her husband; if the husband died, a family should obey the eldest son. In 
fact, this was not the real doctrine of Confucius and Mencius, but a politicized 
version. This is because Confucius never said that ‘if a monarch asked his subjects to 
die, the subjects must die; if a father asked the same requirement, the son must obey 
this order’ (in Chinese: 君要臣死，臣不得不死；父要子亡，子不得不亡). In 
contrast, Confucius advocated that the ‘monarch should respect his subjects when he 
orders his subjects and his subjects should be loyal to his monarch when they do their 
duties’ (in Chinese: 君使臣以礼，臣事君以忠). Mencius also stated that ‘if a 
monarch treats his subjects as hands and feet, his subjects would treat their monarch 
as their heart; if a monarch treats his subjects as dogs and horses, his subjects would 
treat their monarch as a normal person; if a monarch treats his subjects as grass and 
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mud, his subjects would treat their monarch as the enemy’ (in Chinese: 君之视臣如
手足，则臣视君如腹心；君之视臣如犬马，则臣视君如国人；君之视臣如土芥
，则臣视君如寇仇). In fact, in the Han dynasty, Confucianism became the main 
culture used by politicians in China.  
 
Confucian philosophy played a dominant role in Chinese ancient societies to 
structure social relationships. However, as culture changed, the meaning of guanxi 
also changed, especially through the transformation and restructurization of societies 
and politics. In the early twentieth century, with the collapse of the Qing dynasty and 
expansion of western colonization in China, the Confucian culture was shaken from 
its dominant position.  
 
The May 4
th
 Movement indicated a radical break with the Confucian ethical and 
political system. The May 4
th
 Movement specifically criticized the “san gang wu 
chang” which organized Chinese feudal social relationships. The relationship 
between husband and wife, as the key point in Confucian relationships was among 
the aspects criticized. The Confucian ethical system required that a wife should be 
‘physically loyal’ to her husband in whatever situations, saying ‘starving to death is a 
small matter, while disloyalty is a big deal’ (in Chinese: 饿死事小，失节事大). For 
example, when the husband died, the wife could not remarry. If a wife was raped, she 
had to commit suicide because she brought shame and disgrace on her husband and 
family. Indeed, Confucianism promoted the male position in the family and 
supported the authority of patriarchy, rather than gender equality.  
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Moreover, after the People’s Republic of China’s foundation in 1949, Mao Zedong 
launched the ‘Great Cultural Revolution’ criticising Confucian culture, which he 
claimed represented decadent beliefs. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
promotes gender equality as a basic policy of China and required banning arranged 
marriage, foot binding, and concubinage, as well as giving females the same 
opportunities in education and work.  
 
However, both the May 4
th
 Movement and the ‘Great Cultural Revolution’ only 
criticized Confucian hierarchical relationships called “san gang wu chang” which is 
not the original doctrine of Confucius and Mencius. Although “Wulun” in the 
original doctrine of Confucius and Mencius included hierarchical relationships, 
friendship in “wu lun” was an equal relationship. “San gang wu chang” was used by 
feudal rulers to structure and sustain social relationships. Confucianism was 
criticized and abandoned in order to overthrow feudal institutions and establish new 
institutions. However, because only Confucian hierarchical relationships were 
criticized, Confucian ideas of friendship were still maintained, and called guanxi, in 
an expanded meaning of guanxi. This ‘friendship in Confucianism’, guanxi, is 
different from normal friendship, because in a friendship the exchange of favours is 
not expected, but in guanxi, people expect exchanges of favours. Also guanxi can be 
divided into an organizational level and an individual level. Kosmala and Xian 
(2011) stated that guanxi at the organizational level “informs the construction and 
enactment of identity, as it guides daily business running, supervisor-subordinate 
relations, and by the cultivation of a network of the ‘right people who help the 
business’, enables survival of the firms” (p. 203), while guanxi at the individual level 
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refers to more informal personal relationships which are established with a trust-
based commitment.  
 
Moreover, ironically, although the CCP in the Maoist era abolished Confucianism, 
organizations and individuals still sought guanxi to gain benefits. For example, some 
empirical studies found that guanxi benefited companies’ competitive positions and 
enabled companies to survive, especially when resources are scarce (Park and Luo, 
2001; Qin, 2011). Tian (2000) argued that state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which 
had government guanxi in China were in a privileged position for successful 
production when resources were scarce after the war, because SOEs depending on 
guanxi ties to governments could gain more resources compared to private 
companies. Moreover, before Chinese economic reforms, at the individual level, all 
the family was proud of and depended on a family member who worked in a SOE, 
because jobs in SOEs were called the ‘Iron Rice Bowl’. If a parent worked in a SOE, 
his son or daughter could get a position in the SOE when the parent retired, by an 
arrangement called ‘ding ti’ (顶替 take over). In addition, when China implemented 
the planned economy, people bought food using Liang Piao (粮票 ration tickets). If 
Liang Piao ran out, the family would starve. However, if a family member or a close 
friend worked in a food supply centre which was an SOE, family and friends would 
get the benefits of more food. Moreover, girls wanted to marry men who worked in 
SOEs rather than men with their own businesses, the SOE employee had a stable 
income. This kind view of marriage changed after the enterprise reforms. But in any 
case, both organizations and individuals still went underground and looked for 
guanxi to get own benefits in the Maoist era. People underground looked for guanxi 
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because of the limitation of political factors. People called seeking guanxi as ‘zou 
hou men’ (走后门 getting in by the back door), which was dishonourable behaviour.  
 
However, since the implementation of Chinese economic reforms in the late 1970s, 
looking for guanxi among people and organizations is no longer underground. The 
state looks at the rapid economic recovery and individuals look at earning more and 
enjoying more benefits. Consequently, successfully looking for guanxi determines 
the success of individuals in the current society, because people still remember that 
guanxi brought extra benefits in the Maoist era and was called “zou hou men” (走后
门 getting in by the back door).  However, the difference is that today people do not 
feel that seeking guanxi is dishonourable behaviour, and they gloss over seeking 
guanxi as seeking ‘ren mai’ (in Chinese: 人脉).  
 
5.3.6 Unique guanxi environment in China 
Guanxi is one of the most important aspects of Chinese culture and is embedded in 
social and business activities. However, guanxi is different to social networking in 
the western world. To understand guanxi requires understanding of conceptions of 
the world and the cognitive processes. According to Nisbett and Masuda (2003), the 
ancient Chinese saw matter as interpenetrating substances. As a Chinese old saying 
states, “万物有因，世事有果” (where there is reek, there is heat), which means all 
occurrences must have reasons and everything is related. In addition, Nisbett and 
Masuda (2003) stated that the ancient Chinese attended to relationships among 
objects. For example, in China, when people see a child they normally ask her or him 
who her or his father is. People judge the child’s character according to the father’s 
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character. Similarly, if the child does something wrong, people usually blame his 
parents for not disciplining and educating the child well. Chinese people’s belief that 
everything is related might be due to the social system, that China is a relationship-
oriented society. Nisbett and Masuda (2003) stated that in Chinese society, people 
“were engaged in multiple, complex role relations with other individuals, with the 
extended family, the village, and the representatives of the state” (p. 11163).  
 
Guanxi also organizes social activities. To build guanxi, Berger et al (2015) argued 
that guanxi includes three constructs: Ganqing, Renqing, and Xinren. Firstly, 
ganqing refers to feelings of loyalty and harmony. In China, there is a common 
practice whereby many things are resolved in restaurants that supply private informal 
environments to promote and establish ganqing. When Chinese people have a 
meeting for work-related matters they do not directly start to talk about work and 
working payments. In contrast, they talk about irrelevant things, common 
acquaintances, hometown, and personal interests. This kind of small talk builds up 
both sides’ common topics and interests. It can be reflected in a Chinese old saying: 
“酒逢知己千杯少, 话不投机半句多” (A thousand cups seem still less when friends 
drink together, but even a word is redundant when conversation is not congenial.). 
Moreover, the Chinese people do not directly negotiate working payments, because 
there is another old saying: “谈钱伤感情” (Talking about money hurts feelings). It 
does not mean that they do not care about payments. In contrast, they believe when 
ganqing is ripe, payments are assured. Ganqing is built up in a harmonious 
environment. Chinese culture encourages individuals to compromise with others in 
order to maintain harmony, particularly when conflicts of interests occur. 
Maintaining harmony not only keeps good guanxi, but also gives others face. 
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Payments refer to one side losing money while the other side gains money, which is 
a sensitive topic in China. However, if both sides build up good ganqing, when one 
side gives an offer, the other side finds it difficult to say ‘no’. That is because they 
need to maintain a harmonious relationship. This is also called giving face (gei mian 
zi 给面子). Of course, in China, there are people who do not give face to others. 
They break up the harmony of relationships, and will find it difficult to ‘survive’ in 
Chinese social activities. These kinds of people are seen as lacking sophistication.  
 
In addition, to build up a good ganqing, people are likely to call each other brothers 
and sisters when they are not actual relatives because this makes individuals feel 
close and loyal. This feeling may derive from the ancient Chinese societies that were 
constructed on the basis of familiar collectivism. However, in contemporary Chinese 
society, real familial relations cannot satisfy all people’s social activities, while this 
kind of fake familial terms may expand people’s relationships. For example, when an 
employee calls a manager or supervisor ‘older brother/sister’ or ‘teacher’, this kind 
of emotional bond makes both of them feel close and means the manager or 
supervisor is respected in a hierarchical relationship. From other employees’ point of 
view, this employee has a good ganqing with the manager or supervisor. As such, 
Chinese people attach great importance to ganqing in the process of building guanxi. 
In other words, building up good ganqing is a good start to building up guanxi. 
 
Secondly, renqing means to create commitment through beneficial and reciprocal 
exchanges. Beneficial exchanges maintain guanxi in contemporary Chinese society, 
and guanxi is subtly different to friendship. The meaning of guanxi between friends 
in original Confucianism has changed in contemporary Chinese society. The original 
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Confucian philosophy required friendship to be built on emotional honesty rather 
than beneficial exchanges, as in: “君子之交淡如水，小人之交甘若醴” (The 
friendship between men of virtue is light like water, yet affectionate; the friendship 
between men without virtue is sweet like wine, yet easily broken). However, in the 
contemporary context of China, people normally build up guanxi because they aim to 
get beneficial exchanges, especially in working environments. As a foreigner, it may 
be difficult to understand sometimes a person gives a gift of greater value than a 
favour merits. That is because in China people like others to owe them favours as 
personal assets that can be received in the future. As such, renqing is not just a one 
off favour exchange. Guanxi is a long term relationship. In other words, maintaining 
guanxi relies on continuing beneficial exchanges. 
 
Thirdly, xinren means trust and is a foundation of guanxi. As guanxi is a long term 
relationship, favour exchanges need trust. If there is no trust in guanxi, guanxi is easy 
to break. Trust is also derived from the Chinese social system. In Chinese society, 
people “were engaged in multiple, complex role relations with other individuals, with 
the extended family, the village, and the representatives of the state” (Nisbett and 
Masuda, 2003, p.11163). Chinese societies are constructed on the basis of familial 
collectivism. The family is considered to be the core unit of society. As it is built on 
family relations, interpersonal trust is beyond any other trust. As such, in the ancient 
business environment, most business operated as small family businesses. In fact, the 
trust in familial relations still has great emphasis in Chinese modern societies. For 
example, in Chinese private companies, many accountants have familial relations 
with the boss. That is because the accountant controls the money of the company and 
means the accountant holds the wallet of the boss. In such a situation, the boss needs 
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to find a person who can be sufficiently trusted to be the accountant. The trust in 
familial relations is normally prioritised, because the concept of family is important 
for Chinese people. There is an old saying: “打断骨头连着筋” (Brothers are by flesh 
even if our bones are broken). That means conflicts among family members are 
smaller matters than conflicts outside the family.  
 
In addition, the treatment of princelings of Chinese private equity also reflects that 
the trust within family is beyond any other trust. Princelings are “children of former 
high-ranking officials of the CCP” (the Chinese Communist Party) (Bo, 2008, 
p.342). For example, Jiang Zemin was China’s chairman from 1993 to 2003, and his 
son, Jiang Mianheng, is CEO of Shanghai government investment vehicle Shanghai 
Alliance Investment (Aldred and Liu, 2014, p.2), which is one of Shanghai’s largest 
state-owned enterprises. Jiang Zemin’s grandson, Alvin Jiang, is a founding partner 
at Hong Kong-based Boyu Capital which is one of the famous firms in China 
(Aldred and Liu, 2014, p.2). Liu Lefei is CEO and president of CITIC Private Equity 
Funds Management, who is the son of politburo member Liu Yunshan (Aldred and 
Liu, 2014, p.3). He Guoqiang’s Son, He Jintao, is co-founder of Nepoch Capital 
(Aldred and Liu, 2014, p.3). Li Xiaolin is CEO of China Electricity, and his father is 
former Premier Li Peng. This kind of family relations reflects China’s unique guanxi, 
including ‘blood is thicker than water’. 
 
In fact, trusting family members above all others reflects Chinese people’s lack of 
security. Although people use the appellation of fake family relations to promote 
ganqing in order to gain trust from others, in modern Chinese society, guanxi is 
based on favour exchanges that may cause one side to obtain more benefits than the 
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other side if one side does not give any favours. Guanxi is an informal relationship 
which is not the same as contracts that are protected by laws. However, in modern 
Chinese society, only family relationships do not satisfy people’s social activities. 
Therefore, people need to not only keep commitments for favour exchanges but also 
maintain a harmonious environment and provide face-giving in order to maintain a 
healthy guanxi.  
 
5.4 An analysis of individuals’ behaviours changing in the mixed moderate 
solidarities 
Although individuals are in the same social environment, they may be located in 
different positions in the grid-group frame because of their different cognition styles. 
6 (2005) stated that “at least some and perhaps many individuals in almost any 
society are likely to be located in different solidarities in different contexts. Few 
people can expect to live lives of total consistency between all the contexts of home, 
work, leisure, local community of residence, religious and political affiliations, 
etc…cognition styles will differ between contexts for many individuals” (p. 102). For 
example, institutional activities, such as Chinese enterprise reform, have different 
impacts on individuals and organizations, such as laid-off workers and auditors. 
Different individuals under the impact of institutional changes may locate themselves 
in different places of the grid-group frame in the same social environment.  
 
5.4.1 Laid-off workers 
The enterprise reform was almost completed by 2004, but the influence of this 
reform is still being felt in China (Gomersall and Wang, 2013). Although this reform 
made Chinese SOEs improve their management and become more efficient in a 
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global marketplace, laid-off workers were the sacrifice of this reform, because few or 
none of the benefits or security was provided for workers that the previous state 
system had provided (Gomersall and Wang, 2013). Workers were protected by their 
SOEs before the enterprise reform, and their jobs were guaranteed by a system of job 
allocation across the workforce (Dong and Bowles, 2002; Guiheux, 2007, cited from 
Gomersall and Wang, 2013). Such benefits from SOEs were known as the ‘Iron Rice 
Bowl’ since workers at a SOE would never lose their job.  
 
However, with the enterprise reform accelerating the transition to a market economy, 
the ‘Iron Rice Bowl’ has gone, and thousands of workers have lost their jobs 
(Gomersall and Wang, 2013). “To restructure its SOE sector, the Chinese central 
government institutionalized the policy of: ‘nurturing the big, while letting go of the 
small’” (Gomersall and Wang, 2013, p. 221). The concept of being ‘laid-off’ first 
happened in Guangdong. In 1993, the Guangzhou state-owned radio factory laid off 
1000 workers, to avoid bankruptcy (Guoqi, 2013; Wu, 2008). During the period 
between 1996 and 2001, approximately 40% of SOEs were lost. The increasing 
number of laid-off workers was concentrated in the wholesale and retail-trading 
sectors, the manufacturing industry and mineral mining, which were predominantly 
in north-east China where there is a high concentration of SOEs (Gomersall and 
Wang, 2013). In south coastal regions, laid-off workers generally could accept this 
reform, because in this region people already had the opportunity for a ‘second 
career’. The laid-off compensation could become their start-up capital for a small 
business. However, in the north, especially in the region with a high concentration of 
SOEs, people have become accustomed to bundling their lives with the enterprises. 
With the collapse of the SOEs, people suffered low compensation.  
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Hurst (2004) found different views and acceptance of laid-off workers in four main 
regions of SOEs: the Northeast (Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang), North-Central 
China (the provinces of Henan, Shanxi, and Shaanxi, plus the cities of Baotou and 
Lanzhou), the Central Coast (Tianjin, Shandong, Jiangsu, and Shanghai), and the 
Upper Changjiang (Hubei, Hunan, Chongqing, and Sichuan) (see Figure 5). The 
Northeast has been the Chinese industrial base since the Japanese occupation during 
the Second World War, with the principle sectors of steel, railroad equipment, 
mining, and petroleum (Hurst, 2004). Although Chinese economic reforms were 
implemented in the late 1970s, the Northeast old industrial base lost out at every 
stage of Chinese transition to a market-based economy (Hurst, 2004).  
 
Compared with the Northeast, the Central Coast started to industrialize rapidly in the 
1950s. With a massive influx of foreign investment, the Central Coast became one of 
China’s richest regions, with the largest centres of trade and commerce, and the 
majority of ports of entry (Hurst, 2004). 
 
Coal mining is a pillar industry in the North-Central economy, as well as 
manufacture of agricultural machinery and light industrial goods. The economy of 
the North-Central had a tentative transition, since economic reform did not fail as in 
the Northeast (Hurst, 2004).  
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Figure 5: Chinese map – four main regions with SOEs  
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Upper Changjiang also has a political economy of tentative transition. Industries in 
the Upper Changjiang are mainly related to textile, mining, steel, machine building, 
and some light manufacture (Hurst, 2004). 
 
Hurst (2004) stated that since the implementation of economic reform, the Central 
Coast had rapidly developed into a booming market; both the North-Central and 
Upper Changjiang regions had stayed in a tentative transition; the Northeast, instead 
of pressing forward, had drawn back in political economic collapse (or near collapse) 
(see Table 4). 
 
Due to regional differences in the results of economic reforms, there are different 
views of workers laid-off by enterprise reform, according to interviews by Hurst 
(2004). The interviewees who were laid-off in the Northeast complained that: 
“Reform has brought nothing but problems. Political reforms have taken away rights from the 
people and undermined the revolution’s victories…Even the Japanese managed things in the 
Northeast better than today’s government. Managers and officials are all corrupt nowadays and 
they get away with everything… The Northeast is dying and the Communist Party does not 
care about socialism anymore. During the planned economy we were all poor. But we were 
poor together. We were all proletarians. We all ate the food from the common pot. Now, the 
rich people get richer while we all get poorer. The special characteristic of Chinese socialism is 
that it is especially unfair!” (Hurst, 2004, pp. 103-104) 
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Table 4: Chinese regional political economy 
(Hurst, 2004) 
Regional political 
economy 
Primary type of 
grievances 
Primary type of 
claims 
Political dominant 
frame 
Opportunity structure Overt target Hidden target 
Stalinist Rustbelt 
(Northeast) 
Subsistence  General, Subsistence, 
Restorative 
Maoist moral 
economy 
Relatively open/ 
sympathetic 
Local government Central state 
Tentative transitional 
(Upper Changjiang and 
North-Central) 
Opportunity Specific, Opportunity, 
Regulatory 
Head down & muddle 
through 
Relatively closed Local government Local state, 
corrupt officials 
Booming market 
(Central Coast) 
Contractual Specific, Legalistic 
enforcement 
Market hegemony Malleable Firms or local government firms 
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In contrast, in the Central Coast, laid-off workers blamed individual mismanagement 
(an inability to adapt to new conditions) and corruption only in particular firms. One 
of the laid-off workers in Shanghai claimed that since economic reform, her family 
had a television, refrigerator, and air conditioner, which were impossible luxuries in 
the 1970s. She also said that “protesting would not be worth the trouble and that her 
problems were probably unique to her experience (or at least to her work unit)” 
(Hurst, 2004, pp. 104-105). 
 
Although the North-Central and Upper Changjiang regions belong to a middle 
category of tentative transition between the Northeast and the Central Coast, laid-off 
workers in the these two regions generally keep quiet as long as they can find 
temporary work because of the benefits of working combined with threats of 
repression and lost income (Hurst, 2004). One of the laid-off workers in Chongqing 
said:  
“Protest is of no use for us laid-off workers. No one ever gets anything from stirring up trouble 
and people like me can’t stop working and go protest. We have to feed our children” (Hurst, 
2004, p.105) 
 
Another laid-off worker in Datong in Shanxi province had a similar view: 
“I am afraid of what would happen if I were caught protesting. Some of my co-workers from 
the mine have protested violently and have been arrested. I am able to find enough work 
around town to feed my family, but I have no health insurance or pension. If I get in trouble, I 
don’t know what would happen” (Hurst, 2004, p.105) 
 
To sum up, due to regional differences among Chinese political policies, there are 
different views on Chinese economic reform. Laid-off workers in different regions 
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lost their ‘Iron Rice Bowl’ and never felt their national ‘host’ position, compared to 
the Maoist period. As such, the strong group moved to the relatively weak group 
from laid-off workers’ perspective.  
 
However, the grid dimension has different degrees among Chinese regions. Since the 
implementation of Chinese economic reform, the Central Coast has been the 
frontline border, where the market encourages individuals to have more freedom of 
competition and choice. Thus, there is more individualism in the Central Coast. Laid-
off workers in the Central Coast blamed themselves for mismanagement and 
positively look for a second career. In contrast, the Northeast lost out at every stage 
of China’s transition to a market-based economy and has maintained a highly 
regulated system. Thus, there is more a culture of isolates in the Northeast. Laid-off 
workers in the Northeast felt frustrated and did not feel part of a community. They 
blamed institutional changes but also accepted their fate. The North-Central and 
Upper Changjiang regions have stayed in a tentative transition, where there is a 
moderate solidarity between the Central Coast and the Northeast cultures. Laid-off 
workers in these two regions had less complaint about institutions but looked for 
working opportunities and felt their lives were under pressure.  
 
Moreover, the Central Coast is the frontline border of the implementation of Chinese 
economic reform. Here rules of the market-oriented economy were established at the 
beginning of China’s economic reform, and a more individualism thought style has 
been cultivated. As such, under this kind of thought style, laid-off workers positively 
reinforced the new form of institutions.  
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In contrast, the Northeast lost out at every stage of Chinese transition to a market-
based economy. The old hierarchical culture (the old thought style) still remained in 
this region. However, a new institution (the enterprise reform) enacted a new 
interaction order (workers getting laid off) which cultivated a new thought style 
(market-oriented economic thought). The new thought style conflicts with the old 
thought style. It was difficult for laid-off workers to reinforce the new institution in 
the Northeast. As such, there were a lot of complaints in the Northeast.   
 
The North-Central and Upper Changjiang regions have stayed in a tentative 
transition in that the new institution was cultivating a new thought style, but the old 
thought style was also maintained. Thus, in these regions, the new thought style 
reinforced the institution, while the old thought style was undermining of the 
offsetting of the institution. Laid-off workers had complaints about the new 
institution, but also looked for job opportunities.  
 
5.4.2 Chinese supervisors and independent directors in the Chinese State-owned 
enterprises 
Before the enterprise reform of the early 1980s, most Chinese companies were state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) that were administered by either the central government or 
local governments. During that time, China’s market implemented a planned 
economy and the central government allocated national resources. The SOEs were 
placed in a hierarchical culture (strong grid-strong group).  
 
Chinese enterprise reform was initiated in May 1984 to expand SOEs’ autonomy in 
production planning and profit retention (Kang and Kim, 2012). In July 1992, SOEs 
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were allowed to set their own prices and wages, hire and fire employees, and invest 
fixed capital (Kang and Kim, 2012). The completion of the first enterprise reform 
saw the adoption of the Company Law in December 1993, which provided a legal 
framework for SOEs to clarify property rights. This was a landmark for Chinese 
enterprise reform, seeing the separation of ownership from management in SOEs.  
 
SOEs became less related to government which means becoming more independent, 
compared to before enterprise reform. In SOEs, the hierarchical culture (strong grid-
strong group) moved to the culture of ‘moderate individualists’. Why did SOEs move 
to a culture of ‘moderate individualists’ rather than a culture of ‘individualists’? 
Because Party organizations are set up in Chinese enterprises to strengthen the 
Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) position of highest leadership in the country. 
 
Chinese SOEs are operated under the dual leadership of the state and the CCP. On 
the state side, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
(SASAC) play a role as ultimate owner (Yu, 2013). On the party side, the 
Organization Department “selects and appoints firms’ top executives, evaluates their 
performance, gives them incentives, and oversees their work” (Yu, 2013, p. 384). 
This kind of corporate structure is to ensure SOEs respond to policy signals from the 
CCP.  
 
 
The leadership of Chinese SOEs has been controlled by the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) since the founding of the People’s Republic of China. Since the 
enterprise reforms in the early 1980s the leadership has made ongoing efforts to 
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transfer SOEs’ decision making power from local party committees and the state 
bureaucrats to the company itself. However, transforming SOEs still allowed the 
interference of the party and state institutions in the corporate governance (Yu, 
2013). Enterprise reform has not been able to disentangle party management from 
corporate governance (Yu, 2013). 
 
Therefore, SOEs just moved to the culture of ‘moderate individualists’. In the culture 
of ‘moderate individualists’, internal control systems in companies need to balance 
their authorities and rights, which may cause their dysfunction.  
 
During the process of Chinese enterprise reform, Chinese enterprises firstly adopted 
a structure of corporate governance in the 1990s which was based on the German 
model, including a board of directors, a board of supervisors, and managers. In 
Germany “supervisors are empowered to appoint and dismiss members of a 
managing board, as well as to represent the company in its dealings with members of 
the management board” (Zhou, 2011, p. 276). According to Chinese Company Law, 
supervisors are one part of the internal governance structure of the company, and 
their positions are in parallel with the board of directors. Supervisors are responsible 
to shareholders and perform overseeing functions, such as examining a company’s 
financial affairs and overseeing the conduct of directors and managers. However, 
supervisors’ positions and functions differ significantly between the definition in 
Company law and the real situation in transforming SOEs. In reality, a board of 
supervisors belonging to an outside agency of the State Council or provincial 
government, is responsible for the State Council or provincial government and 
supervises the status of state-owned assets. According to Company Law, supervisors 
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should be elected within the company’s shareholders and employees. However, in 
reality, supervisors are appointed by the State Council, provincial governments, 
autonomous regional governments, or municipal governments. 
 
In 2001, the Guidelines for Introducing Independent Directors to the Board of 
Directors of Listed Companies (the Guidelines) was announced by the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission, which provides the main practical rules for 
regulating independent directors (Zhou, 2011). In the US, UK, and under the 
Australian corporate governance system, independent directors provide such 
supervision functions. Under the independent directors, an audit committee is 
established. In 2002, the Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies 
introduced audit committees into Chinese listed companies (Wu and Patel, 2015). 
The audit committee is led by an independent director. The function of an audit 
committee is “recommending the engagement of the external auditor, overseeing the 
interaction between the internal auditor and external auditor, inspecting the 
company’s financial reports, and monitoring the company’s internal control system” 
(CSRC, 2002, cited from Wu and Patel, 2015, p. 34).   
 
Within the corporate governance structure of Chinese listed companies, you would 
think that the identity and specified duties of supervisors and independent directors 
would prevent tunneling
10
 and earnings management fraud in order to maintain the 
quality of financial reporting. However, China adopted two western models, resulting 
in a Chinese crossing tiers corporate structure. In reality, China only adopted the 
names of the models. The board of directors in Chinese companies is strongly 
                                                 
10
 Tunneling is the transfer of assets and profits out of firms for the benefit of those who control them 
(Huang, 2016). 
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controlled by majority shareholders, so the companies retain a traditionally 
hierarchical management. Chen et al. (2009) reviewed prior studies and claimed that 
the average shareholding of controlling owners was 45.13% in 1088 Chinese listed 
companies at the end of 2000, and in state-owned holding companies controlling 
shareholders dominated the board of directors and the executive management team 
and almost 100% of the senior executives were appointed by the controlling 
shareholders from 1993 to 2000. From the observation of corporate governance, 
although China transplanted corporate governance systems from western countries, 
they implemented them in the Chinese way.  
 
Moreover, the supervisors and independent directors are strongly controlled by 
majority shareholders, meaning internal auditors are not independent resulting in 
their dysfunction. A board of supervisors belongs to an outside agency of the State 
Council or provincial governments (majority shareholders), as well as independent 
directors, where the strong group form is present. Moreover, majority shareholders 
have the authority to appoint supervisors and independent directors. Thus, 
supervisors and independent directors shift their accountability from the company 
and all shareholders to majority shareholders, causing their dysfunction.   
 
5.4.3 Chinese Certified Public Accountants 
The Chinese financial auditing service is derived from the principal-agent 
relationship arising from the separation of ownership and management that occurred 
with enterprise reform. The Chinese CPAs Law was established in 1993 (Yang et al., 
2001) and the Chinese Independent Auditing standards (中国独立审计准则) took 
effect in 1994 and was terminated in 2003. In 2006, the Chinese CPA 
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Implementation Standards (CCIS) (中国注册会计师执业准则) were issued by the 
CICPA (Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants) and approved by the 
MOF (Ministry of Finance). They were based on the revised content of the Chinese 
Independent Auditing Standards, with the aim of converging to the International 
Standards on Auditing (ISA). CPAs have much freedom to choose their auditing 
procedures. Public accounting firms in China readily provide unqualified audit 
reports so that they keep the engagement. Thus public accounting firms maintain the 
status quo of ‘only issue the audit report but do not do audit inspection’. Many 
auditing scandals such as in Yin Guang Xia, Amoi, and Green Land cases 
demonstrate the prevalence of this attitude. As such, Chinese CPAs are located in the 
moderately weak grid.  
 
In the beginning, CPA firms which include accounting firms and auditing firms were 
established and sponsored by government bodies or government controlled 
institutions (Yang et al., 2001). The auditing firms were sponsored by regional audit 
offices, while accounting firms were controlled by the Ministry of Finance. In June 
1995, the two professional bodies merged to form a new professional body named 
CICPA, under the direct control of the MOF (Lin and Chan, 2000). To converge to 
the global auditing system, from 1997, Chinese CPA firms started to disaffiliate from 
their sponsoring body.  
 
Since the disaffiliation program, the Chinese CPA body has become a highly 
competitive industry. In 1981, the first Chinese public accounting firms was 
registered in Shanghai (Chong, 2008). With rapid economic growth, there has been 
the establishment of a number of public accounting firms. At the end of 2014, there 
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were 8295 public accounting firms and 99045 CPAs (Ministry of Finance of the 
People’s Republic of China, 2015b).  
 
However, Chinese CPAs are located in the moderate individualist culture. This is 
because it is still essentially governed and regulated by the MOF. The government 
impacts the operation of CICPA in various ways, for example, by allowing the 
appointment of senior directors in CICPA who also have government positions. Sun 
Baohou (孙宝厚) who is vice-chairman of the Chinese Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants also works in the National Audit Office (CICPA, 2012a). This situation 
also happens at regional level institutes. For example, Zhang Shunjian (张顺建), the 
vice-secretary general of Anhui Institute of Certified Public Accountants, also works 
in the Anhui Provincial Department of Finance (The Anhui Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants, 2013). Many leaders in the CICPA and provincial institutes of 
Certified Public Accountants have governmental working experience.   
 
Chinese CPAs are located in the moderate culture of individualist. In a highly 
competitive industry CPAs shift their accountability from public interests 
(stakeholders) to majority shareholders in order to keep the loyalty of customers. In 
addition, due to the effect of Chinese culture, guanxi exists between leaders in public 
accounting firms and government. According to interviews by Wu and Patel (2015), 
one of interviewees stated that: 
“I should say basically the link between government and auditing firms has been cut off. It was 
a successful restructure. There is no longer business relationship. However, due to the 
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historical factor, many firm managers have some government connection, which gives them an 
advantage in obtaining business” (Wu and Patel, 2015, p. 187).  
 
Moreover, according to interviews by Wu and Patel (2015), guanxi is important for 
accounting firms to obtain an audit engagement, especially in state-owned holding 
companies. One interviewee claimed that: 
“…one large central government controlled company wanted four audit firms. They invited 
bidders on a 3:1 basis (three bidders compete for one project or one client) … auditors who 
were not familiar with the company, or with State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission, had no chance of being invited… on that day we saw other 
auditor firms who came to bid as well. Because we were in the same circle, we knew each 
other. We found they already knew the evaluation criteria, which had not been disclosed in the 
invitation letter of bidding, because of their guanxi with the government authority. Also the 
assessment is very subjective… Now we won’t go for any bid invited by centrally controlled 
enterprises. We know we cannot win such a bid. Other competitors have better relationship 
with government authorities… Currently in the auditing industry there are lots of complaints 
about bidding, particularly bids invited by State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission. This (unfair) situation also arises in bids organized by local State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission” (Wu and Patel, 2015, p. 188). 
 
As such, Chinese CPAs are located in the moderate culture of individualist, while 
also having strong group cognition with government in order to obtain audit 
engagements. Thus, auditors may present dysfunctional behaviour that leads to a 
compromise of their integrity and professionalism and a decrease of auditing quality.  
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5.5 Conclusion 
In the context of Chinese social culture, the Chinese auditing profession adopts the 
international auditing standards in order to seek legitimacy in the global market. The 
study uses the grid-group approach to map Chinese social cultures. Due to the impact 
of Chinese social cultures and institutional changes, the auditors’ position shifted to a 
‘moderate’ culture of the individualist position. Meanwhile, Chinese auditors’ 
accountability was also moved, leading them to misinterpret auditing standards in 
order to obtain more benefits.  
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CHAPTER 6 CHINESE AUDITING SYSTEM 
6.1 Introduction 
The auditing profession is struggling to regain public trust after high profile 
corporate scandals, such as Toshiba and Enron accounting scandals, which indicates 
problems with the quality of auditing reports on a global scale. In China, continuing 
instances of unexpected corporate failures and scandals where subsequent 
investigation shows the financial reports were misleading leads not only to disrepute 
of the entire audit industry, but also to a loss of faith in the profession. 
 
There is increasing realization that auditing socially constructed since it is not only 
shaped by institutions but also impacted by culture. Investigating auditor 
independence is important to understand the contextual nature of auditing. Burchell 
el al. (1985) suggested that: 
“Little is known of how the technical practices of accounting are tethered to the social, of how 
wider social forces can impinge upon and change accounting, and of how accounting itself 
functions in the realm of the social, influencing as well as merely reacting to it.” (Patel and 
Psaros, 2000, p. 314) 
 
Therefore, this study describes the context of external auditing, including 
government and financial auditing. Specifically, this study examines how Chinese 
auditor independence has developed with the transition from a planned economy to a 
market economy and convergence with the global market. Firstly, this chapter 
discusses the establishment of Chinese auditor independence. General issues caused 
by culture are examined in section two. Sections three and four describe the 
development of government audit and explore issues of government auditor 
independence, respectively. Sections five and six describe the development of 
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financial audit and explore issues of financial auditor independence, respectively. 
The final section presents a conclusion. 
 
6.2 The establishment of Chinese auditor independence and general issues 
caused by culture 
Chinese auditing practices have existed for more than 3000 years, but during that 
time auditing practice was used to ensure accuracy and accountability of all the items 
and inventories that belonged to the emperors (Chong, 1999, cited in Chong, 2008). 
Since the ‘new’ China was founded in 1949, during the Mao regime (1941-1967), 
some scholars argued that auditing practices were suspended because of 
incompatibility with the socialist planned economy (Xia, 1992, cited Chong, 2008). 
In fact, Chinese auditing practices did exist between 1952 and 1982 with a different 
name, ‘fiscal supervision’ (in Chinese: 财政监察), although auditing practices were 
suspended twice during that period (Hu, 2011). ‘Fiscal supervision’ was first 
suspended between 1958 and 1961 (Hu, 2011), the period that is also called the 
‘Great Leap Forward’. From 1962 ‘fiscal supervision’ institutions started to reappear 
across the country (Hu, 2011). ‘Fiscal supervision’ was suspended for a second time 
during ‘the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution’ (1966-1976). From then until 
1979 the State Council asked that ‘fiscal supervision’ institutions should reappear 
again (Hu, 2011). During this time, the role of ‘fiscal supervision’ institutions was 
similar to government auditing, that is, to maintain the financial health of the 
government.  
 
In the late 1970s, with the implementation of the ‘Open’ door policy and the 
transition from a planned economy to a market-based economy, Chinese corporations 
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underwent significant changes, especially with regard to a massive influx of foreign 
investment (Warner, 1996) and Chinese auditing systems also changed in order to 
adapt to this new environment. 
 
Before the enterprise reforms in the early 1980s, most Chinese companies were state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) that were administered by either the central government or 
local governments. According to Kang and Kim (2012), Chinese enterprise reform 
was initiated to expand SOEs’ autonomy in production planning and profits retention 
in May 1984. In July 1992, SOEs were allowed to set their own prices and wages, 
hire and fire employees, and invest fixed capital (Kang and Kim, 2012). The first 
enterprise reform was completed by the adoption of the Company Law in December 
1993, which was a landmark for Chinese enterprise reform with the separation of 
ownership from management in SOEs. 
 
However, in the early stages of Chinese enterprise reform in the 1990s, the 
government still held the majority of shareholdings in SOEs (Yang et al., 2001; Yang 
et al., 2003), where “the managers of such firms were given considerable decision-
making autonomy, as well as financial incentives” (Yang et al., 2003, p.57). 
Accounting information is often used to measure a company’s performance. 
Therefore, when the state-owned enterprises started to separate ownership and 
control, independent auditing was seen to have an important role in these agency 
problems
11
. “The Chinese Constitution (1982) recognizes the need for independent 
auditing in the specific context of economic reform, and such an auditing approach 
                                                 
11
 An agency relationship is defined as “one in which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engages 
another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some 
decision-making authority to the agent” (Hill and Jones, 1992). 
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was established under the Chinese Constitution” (Article 91 of the Constitution cited 
from Yang et al., 2003, p.57). Article 91 of the Chinese Constitution describes the 
status of auditing and supervision in China: 
“The State Council shall establish an auditing body to supervise through auditing the revenue 
and expenditure of all departments under the State Council and of the local governments at 
various levels, and the revenue and expenditure of all financial and monetary organizations, 
enterprises and institutions of the state. Under the direction of the Premier of the State Council, 
the auditing body independently exercises its power of supervision through auditing in 
accordance with the law, subject to no interference by any other administrative organ or any 
public organization or individual.” (The National Audit Office of the People’s Republic of 
China, 2015a). 
 
The idea of Chinese independent audit is seen as the result of Chinese economic 
reforms. 
 
Due to enterprise reform and the separation of ownership, auditing has become an 
essential element in maintaining healthy economic development. However, 
continuing instances of a lack of auditor independence have drawn more and more 
attention from the public. Although Chinese auditing standards are continuing to be 
revised and converged with international auditing standards, failures in auditor 
independence have still occurred in recent years. Chinese auditor independence may 
be negatively influenced by culture and by the high competition in the auditing 
profession that has occurred with the transition from a planned to a market economy.  
 
Confucian culture, deeply embedded in Chinese culture, also influences Chinese 
business ethics (Hwang et al., 2008). Guanxi, one of the most important factors in 
Confucian culture, is a medium to develop business networking between families, 
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friends, colleagues, and other people (Hwang and Staley, 2005; Hwang et al., 2008). 
“The philosophy of Confucius stresses that individuals are not isolated entities but 
are a part of a large system of interdependent relationships. As such, building and 
managing effective relationships have been innate in the cultures of China” (Hill et 
al., 2002, p.358). Hwang et al. (2008) stated that “guanxi is a personal asset because 
one may request and receive favours; it is also a personal liability because one must 
repay favours” (p. 238). In a relationship-based society, social network success 
determines the success of the individual: “it refers to the networks of informal 
relationships and exchange of favours that dominate all business and social activities 
that occur throughout China and are strongly influenced by Chinese culture” (Hwang 
et al., 2008, p. 507). Why is guanxi important to Chinese people? It is because 
guanxi can help people reap benefits. Although similar relationships also exist in 
most western countries, such as ‘the old school tie’ or club affiliations or family or 
gentlemen’s agreement, the main difference with guanxi is the notion of obligation. 
Western countries generally operate a code which could described as ‘enlightened 
self-interest’ which carries a less fixed notion of favours being returned than does the 
idea of obligation under guanxi. 
 
 
Guanxi is cultivated by the exchange of personalized favours (Lee et al., 2001; 
Pederson and Wu, 2006), while mutually beneficial and reciprocal exchange is its 
core (So and Walker, 2006, citied Hwang et al., 2008). Hwang and Staley (2005) 
stated that “such gifts strike an ethical nerve in a western society and are contrary to 
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at least the spirit of Sarbanes-Oxley Act
12
 in the U.S.” (cited Hwang et al., 2008, p. 
237). Guanxi is also contrary to the spirit of auditor independence in Chinese CPA 
Professional Ethical Standards, which requires that auditors should retain 
independence both in form and substance.  
 
Pederson and Wu (2006) argued that officials using their guanxi connections practice 
the exchange of favours, which leads to a great deal of bureaucratic corruption. Many 
researchers perceived that guanxi is associated with corruption and bribery (Lee et 
al., 2001; Norton, 2006; Hwang et al., 2008; Yang, 2011). In the guanxi environment 
auditors seeking to keep clients may be more likely to behave in an unethical 
manner, which may also reduce auditor independence.  
 
This study focuses on discussing independent auditing both in terms of government 
audit and financial audit. Simply, to identify differences between the government 
audit and financial audit are who the auditors are and who the auditees are. In 
government auditing, the government audit offices implement audit practices, while 
financial auditing is carried out by public accounting firms. Government audit offices 
have the responsibility to audit government invested companies and departments, and 
monitor the effectiveness, efficiency, and legality of state-owned enterprises and 
government departments (Taplin et al., 2014). Public accounting firms provide 
corporate auditing services to all listed companies, and non-listed companies.  
 
                                                 
12
 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act is legislation passed by the U.S. Congress on July 25, 2002 (Coates IV, 
2007). The Sarbanes-Oxley legislation was designed to fix auditing of U.S. public companies after a 
series of high-profile financial scandals that occurred in the early 2000s including Enron, Worldcom, 
Tyco, and others. The Sarbanes-Oxley created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 
which is to enlist auditors to enforce existing laws against theft and fraud by corporate officers 
(Coates IV, 2007). The new rules were “concerning the auditor-firm relationship, auditor rotation, 
auditor provision of non-audit services, and corporate whistle-blowers” (Coates IV, 2007, p. 91). 
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6.3 The development of Chinese government audit 
Although the practice of auditing has been identified as existing in China for 3000 
years (Li, 1998), the present advanced government auditing system was not 
established until the 1980s (Yarong and Xin, 2011). The present government auditing 
practices are regulated through a range of auditing standards. In 1994, the Audit Law 
of the People’s Republic of China was established, which was enacted in 1995 (Li, 
1998) and revised in 2006. And the Implementation of the Audit Law of the People’s 
Republic of China was promulgated in 1997 (Gong, 2009). The law and provisions 
provide the legal framework for government auditing in China.  
 
6.3.1 Chinese government auditing system 
The Chinese auditing system functions at both national and regional levels. The 
National Audit Office of the People’s Republic of China (NAO) was established in 
1983 as a department of the State Council (Yang et al., 2008) and is directly under 
the leadership of the Premier, who organizes and administers auditing work of the 
whole country, and reports its work to the State Council (The National Audit Office 
of the People’s Republic of China, 2015b). Regional audit offices were set up at the 
provincial, municipal, and county levels, and are supervised under both the next 
higher level of audit offices and the corresponding level governments (Yang et al., 
2008). For example, the municipal audit office is under the joint leadership of the 
provincial audit office and the municipal government. Under this joint leadership, the 
provincial audit office provides auditing regulatory guidance and supervision for the 
municipal audit offices, while the municipal government provides the operational 
funds and exercises personnel control. Moreover, regional audit offices execute 
audits on implementation budgets at the corresponding levels as well as other 
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government revenues and expenditures, and submit audit reports to the government 
at the corresponding levels and the next higher level of audit offices (The National 
Audit Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2015c). In 2015, there were 32 
provincial audit offices, 442 municipal and 2687 county audit offices (The National 
Audit Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2015b). The NAO has also set up 
audit offices in Hong Kong and Macau. 
 
In addition, the NAO has set up a network of resident offices in certain large cities 
under the direct leadership of the NAO in order to audit provincial governments, 
State Administration of Taxation and the Central State Treasury, branches of state 
monetary institutions, branches of Customs, state-owned enterprises, and key state 
construction projects. These undertakings are directly subordinate to departments of 
the State Council but are not located in Beijing (The National Audit Office of the 
People’s Republic of China, 2015d). For example, the principal office of the Bank of 
Communications in China, which is a state monetary institution, is located in 
Shanghai, but is subject to the central government. The regional audit office is not 
allowed to audit it, but the resident audit office can. The 18 resident audit offices are 
located in Ha’erbin, Changchun, Shenyang, Tianjin, Jinan, Zhengzhou, Wuhan, 
Nanjing, Changsha, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Kunming, Chengdu, Xi’an, 
Lanzhou, Taiyuan, and Chongqing (The National Audit Office of the People’s 
Republic of China, 2015d). Each resident office is responsible for two or three 
provinces or municipalities. For example, the resident office in Nanjing is 
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responsible for Jiangsu and Anhui provinces. The resident office in Shanghai is 
responsible for Shanghai city, Zhejiang province, and Ningbo city
13
 (Chen, 2013).  
 
Moreover, the NAO has also established 20 dispatched audit offices which are 
responsible for auditing revenues and expenditures of ministries and agencies of the 
State Council (The National Audit Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2015d).  
The details of the government auditing system are displayed in Figure 6 and Figure 
7.  
 
  
                                                 
13
 Shanghai is a municipality directly under the central government which is provincial level, while 
Ningbo is a city specifically designated in the state plan which means that in terms of the politics, it is 
a vice-provincial position governed by affiliated provincial government, while in terms of economics, 
it is a provincial position directly controlled by central government. In China, there are five cities 
specifically designated in the state plan, namely Dalian, Qingdao, Ningbo, Xiamen, and Shenzhen.  
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Figure 6: The political hierarchy and government audit system in China  
(Yang et al., 2008, p.120) 
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Figure 7: The government auditing system in China (The National Audit Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2015d) 
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6.3.2 Chinese government audit procedures 
The procedures for government audits usually include four steps: audit planning, 
audit preparation, audit implementation, and conclusion of audit. 
 
Firstly, the audit planning step requires an audit office to specify certain periods of 
time for auditing projects in order to ascertain objectives, missions, priorities and 
implementation measures (The National Audit Office of the People’s Republic of 
China, 2015e). 
 
Secondly, audit offices need to form an audit team and send an audit notification to 
the auditee three days before audit implementation (The National Audit Office of the 
People’s Republic of China, 2015e). The audit notification includes the name of the 
audited unit, the scope and content of the audit, the time and requirements of the 
audited unit in order to cooperate with the audit team, and a list of names of the team 
leader and team members. In some special circumstances, the audit team can directly 
execute the audit on the strength of an audit notification with approval of the 
corresponding level of government (The National Audit Office of the People’s 
Republic of China, 2015e). According to the Implementation of the Audit Law in 
2010, the special circumstances can be understood as emergency audit matters, 
finding that audited units were suspected of serious illegal conduct, and other 
situations in which it is not suitable to serve the audit notification three days before 
(Shenzhen Audit Office, 2010).  
 
Thirdly, during audit implementation, auditors should collect auditing evidence 
through “examining accounting documents, account books, financial statements, 
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consulting documents and data relating to the audit matters, checking cash material 
objects and negotiable securities, and conducting fact-finding among the units and 
individuals concerned” (The National Audit Office of the People’s Republic of 
China, 2015e). Auditors also need to compile audit logs and audit working papers 
(The National Audit Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2015e). 
 
After executing an audit, the audit team needs to solicit the auditee’s opinions before 
submitting their audit report to the audit office. The audit office produces the final 
audit report after analysing the audit team’s report and auditee’s comments (The 
National Audit Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2015e).  
 
6.3.3 The content of government audit 
According to the Audit Law in 2006 and the Implementation of the Audit Law in 
2010, the audit institutions should carry out audit on the following objects: 
“1. Budget implementation and other government revenues and expenditures at the 
corresponding levels; 
2. Budget implementation, final accounts and other government revenues and expenditures of 
the departments (including the units directly subordinate to them) at the corresponding levels 
and of the people's governments at lower levels; 
3. Financial revenues and expenditures of the State institutions as well as other public 
institutions using government funds; 
4. Financial revenues and expenditures of the Central Bank; 
5. Assets, liabilities, profits and losses of the State-owned monetary institutions and the 
monetary institutions where State-owned capital dominates or predominates; 
6. Assets, liabilities, profits and losses of the State-owned enterprises and the enterprises with 
State-owned capital controlling their shares or playing a leading role; 
7. Budget implementation and final accounts in respect of the construction projects fully or 
mainly financed by government investment; 
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8. Financial revenues and expenditures involving social security funds, public donations and 
other related funds and capital which are managed by government departments and other units 
authorized by the government; 
9. Financial revenues and expenditures in connection with the projects for which aid or loans 
are provided by international organizations or governments of other countries; 
10. The performance of accountabilities of the principal leading persons of local Party 
committees, governments, judicial organs and procuratorate organs, the principal leading 
persons of central and local Party and governmental departments, public institutions and 
people’s organizations, and the heads of state-owned enterprises.” (The National Audit Office 
of the People’s Republic of China, 2015c) 
 
6.4 Issues of government audit independence  
Government financial accountability is closely related to the implementation of fiscal 
power and the use of public economic resources. Gong (2009) stated that “at the 
most basic level, financial accountability in public governance denotes the obligation 
of financial power holders to make their policies and actions justifiable in terms of 
the public interest and to be held responsible for any failure to do so” (p. S7).  
 
Financial accountability is critically important for the Chinese government because 
China has suffered from financial irregularities and corruption since the 1980s 
(Gong, 2009). For example, during the period from 1982 to 1992, the total loss in 
state assets reached more than ￥500 billion (Fang and Zhang, 2005; cited from 
Gong, 2009). Gong (2009) stated that the loss in state assets related to corruption was 
still drastically increasing. The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of the 
Communist Party of China (2015) stated that violations and corruption were detected 
in 680 government offices in 2014 and 368 government offices had been investigated 
from 1
st
 January to1
st
 August, 2015. 
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Government audit plays an important role in monitoring, ensuring, and appraising the 
accountability of government (Liu and Lin, 2012). According to Liu and Lin (2012), 
government audit should be the ‘immune system’ with emphasis not only on 
detecting irregularities and violations, but also on preventing all risks hidden in 
economics. In 2003, the NAO for the first time disclosed government auditing results 
to the public, in a campaign named ‘audit storm’, which made government auditing 
widely known to the public in China and around the world (Yang, et al., 2008; Liu 
and Lin, 2012). It not only strengthened the role of government audit, but it also 
promoted government transparency and accountability.  
 
However, although ‘audit storm’ drew the public’s attention, the question is whether 
this government audit reform was an instrumental or symbolic adoption of the 
Western developed countries’ government auditing report system. If it was 
instrumental, why is corruption still the No.1 problem in China?  
 
The Chinese government’s auditing system is different to that of developed Western 
countries, such as Australia and America. The Australian National Audit Office 
(ANAO) is an independent agency providing auditing services to the Parliament and 
public sector entities (Auditor-General Act, 1997). The American Government 
Accountability Office is also an independent, nonpartisan agency (U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2015).  
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The Chinese Government’s auditing system not only exercises auditing of 
government performance and state assets
14
, but it is also a part of the executive 
branch of the state (Liu and Lin, 2012). This means auditors and auditees are not 
completely independent, and this can be observed from two aspects: one is the 
government’s auditing operation system; the other is the government’s auditing 
report system.  
 
Firstly, regional audit offices are supervised by both the next higher level of audit 
office, and the corresponding level government. Under this dual leadership, the next 
higher level of audit office provides regulatory guidance and supervision while the 
corresponding level government provides the operational funds and exercises control 
over local audit offices. In the meantime, regional audit offices execute audits on the 
budget’s implementation at the corresponding levels as well as other government 
revenues and expenditures. It means that local government acts not only as the 
supervisee, but also as the supervisor. Moreover, the head of the local audit office is 
assigned by local government and builds the relationship between local government 
and local audit offices. Therefore, Chinese relationship-based culture significantly 
reduces local government auditor independence.  
 
Secondly, according to Audit Law, regional audit offices execute audit within the 
budget implemented at the corresponding level as well as other government revenues 
and expenditures, and submits audit reports to the government at the corresponding 
levels and the next higher level of audit offices. Local government is not only the 
                                                 
14
 At the beginning of the government audit system established in the 1980s and 1990s, auditing 
activities were mainly targeted at financial problems in state-owned enterprises (Gong, 2009). 
However, since the late 1990s, the auditing objects have been expanded to all government offices and 
administrative units (Gong, 2009).  
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auditee but also reviews the audit report. According to government audit procedures, 
the audit team needs to solicit an auditee’s opinions before submitting their audit 
report to the audit office. The local government may significantly impact the auditing 
reports and bring about favourable results. Moreover, in fact any local government-
owned enterprise having a good financial performance reflects favourably on the 
political achievements of its local government. Local government may influence the 
government auditing results by using the relationship between the government and 
the audit office, in order to show favourable political achievements, which leads to 
government failure on their functions (Lin and Liu, 2012). Therefore, Chinese 
government audit plays a more limited role than might be expected. 
 
6.5 The development of Chinese financial audit 
The Chinese auditing system in the People’s Republic of China has undergone many 
changes since Chinese economic reform, especially regarding the financial auditing 
system. In early 1983, the financial auditing service was really started in the People’s 
Republic of China. At the beginning CPA firms, which included accounting firms 
and auditing firms, had been established and sponsored by government bodies or 
government controlled institutions (Yang et al., 2001). The auditing firms were 
sponsored by regional audit offices, while accounting firms were controlled by the 
Ministry of Finance. For example, the Shanghai Da Hua CPA Firm was sponsored by 
Shanghai University of Finance and Economic which is controlled by the Ministry of 
Finance (Yang et al., 2001). The CICPA was founded in November 1988 (Lin and 
Chan, 2000, p.560) and was the first professional association established in China 
since 1949. In 1991, the Chinese Association of Certified Public Auditors (CACPA) 
was established (Lin and Chan, 2000). In June 1995, the two professional bodies 
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merged to form a new professional body named CICPA, under the direct control of 
the MOF (Lin and Chan, 2000). Yang et al. (2001) stated that “the association 
between accounting firms and their sponsors typically meant that the sponsoring 
body owned the firm, and staffs were included in the personnel of the government 
unit. Firm operating policy could be influenced or even controlled by the 
government” (p. 178). 
 
Compared to Chinese accounting firms, “in most western countries, accounting firms 
and auditing firms are alike and their associated professional bodies are independent, 
private, and self-governed organizations not affiliated with the state” (Lin and Chan, 
2000, p. 560). To converge with the global auditing system Chinese CPA firms 
started to disaffiliate from their sponsoring body from 1997. The CICPA is deemed 
as a private organization, but it is essentially governed and regulated by the MOF. 
The government is still able to heavily influence public accounting firms. Many 
leaders in the CICPA and provincial institutes of Certified Public Accountants have 
governmental working experience. Due to the effect of Chinese culture, guanxi may 
still exist between leaders and government. Therefore, it is difficult to maintain 
auditing independence under the influence of government. Another example of the 
influence of government on public accounting firms is that the establishment of a 
public accounting firm must be reported and approved by the provincial department 
of finance, but not the provincial institute of Certified Public Accountants (Ministry 
of Finance of the People’s Republic of China, 2015a). As such, the institute of 
Certified Public Accountants seems to help the government supervise public 
accounting firms, because many important decisions are made by the government. 
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In addition, although Chinese central government has allowed foreign accounting 
firms to operate in China since 1996, the government still has the right to supervise 
and govern these firms. Taplin et al. (2014) cited that 
“Article 44 of the Law allows foreigners’ participation and registration in the Chinese 
accounting system under the principle of reciprocity: the establishment of representative office 
of a foreign accounting firm in China must be reported to and approved by the Finance 
Department of the State Council. The application for the establishment of a Sino-foreign joint 
venture accounting firm jointly run by a foreign accounting firm and a Chinese accounting firm 
must be examined and agreed upon by the department in charge of foreign economic relations 
and trade of the State Council or the departments as authorized by the State Council and the 
governments at provincial level before being reported to and approved by the Finance 
Department of the State Council.” (p. 315) 
 
According to ‘The provision for the administration of representative offices of 
foreign accounting firms’ (“境外会计师事务所常驻代表机构管理暂行办法”) 
(Ministry of Finance of the People’s Republic of China, 1996) announced by the 
Ministry of Finance, a foreign accounting firm
15
 cannot apply to establish a 
representative office in China as a subsidiary of an international accounting firm. 
Therefore, the big-4 accounting firms operating in China are named Ernst & Young 
with Hua Ming, KPMG with Hua Zhen, Deloitte with Hua Yong, and PWC with 
Zhong Tian (Taplin et al., 2014). Although the Chinese government allows foreign 
accounting firms to establish representative offices providing auditing services which 
increase competition in the Chinese CPA industry and improve independent auditing, 
government regulations and supervision decreases the independence of foreign 
accounting firms. 
 
                                                 
15
 Foreign accounting firms include Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan’s firms.  
 
139 
 
6.6 Issues of financial auditor independence  
The Chinese CPA industry is a highly competitive industry. In 1981, the first 
Chinese public accounting firm was registered in Shanghai (Chong, 2008). Rapid 
economic growth has been accompanied by the establishment of a number of public 
accounting firms. Up until the end of 2014, there were 8295 public account firms and 
99045 CPAs (Ministry of Finance of the People’s Republic of China, 2015b). If 
some public accounting firms improve the quality of service and others still maintain 
the status quo of “only issue the audit report but do not do audit inspection”, the 
market of auditing services will be greatly inclined to the latter. As long as this 
continues, there will be no change in the quality of audits. However, if all auditors 
improve the quality of their audit, companies will have no choice but to engage 
auditing services of ethical audit firms leading to an overall improvement of the 
quality of financial reports. 
 
Retaining the loyalty of existing customers as well as attracting new customers is the 
anchor of a public accounting firm’s survival and growth. Public accounting firms 
are often threatened with dismissal by their client companies. That is because some 
companies will move to other firms, if the current audit firm does not satisfy the 
requirements of management. Therefore, public accounting firms will make 
compromises with their client companies in order to maintain customers. 
Notwithstanding, Chinese Company Law requires listed companies to issue an 
announcement not only when they engage the services of public accounting firms but 
also when they dismiss the public accounting firms. If there is no proper reason to 
dismiss the public accounting firms, the public accounting firms have the right to 
report to the Chinese Stock Supervisory Committee. This right is designed to ensure 
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auditor independence. However, company managers may choose to default on 
payment of auditing fees and to not coordinate with auditors to create difficulties in 
order to pressure public accounting firms to compromise with them. Thus, auditor 
independence may suffer different degrees of damage.  
 
In addition, the law of the People’s Republic of China on Certified Public 
Accounting (CPAs Law) requires auditors to perform the following service:  
“to audit the enterprise’s financial statements, to verify the enterprise’s capital contribution, to 
engage in the audit work of the enterprise’ merger, demerger and liquidation, and to provide 
professional services specified by the law and regulations” (Lin and Chan, 2000, p. 561). 
 
However, the State Administration for Industry and Commerce of P.R. China (SAIC) 
announced The reform program of the registration system – the registered capital
16
 
on 19
th
 February 2014, which officially stopped corporate annual financial report 
auditing
17
 to take effect from 1
st
 March 2014. The main purpose of annual financial 
report audits was to review whether the company had a legally registered business 
and whether it has an ability to continue operations. According to the State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce of People’s Republic of China, this 
regulation changed companies’ from an annual financial auditing system to an annual 
reporting system, with the effect that industrial and commercial annual audits are not 
enforceable, nor is the capital verification auditing service. The new announcement 
gave the initiative to companies, but it cut out much of the business of public 
                                                 
16
  The reform program of the registration system – the registered capital (注册资本登记制度改革方
案) 
17
 The following companies need annual financial audits: 1. One person limited liability companies; 2. 
Listed companies; 3. Finance, securities, and futures companies; 4. Engaged in the insurance, venture 
capital, capital verification, assessment, guarantees, real estate brokers, immigration agency, labor 
service intermediary companies; 5. The companies’ registered capital paid by installments have not 
been paid in full; 6. The companies have false registered capital, false investment, capital flight, and 
problems found by SAIC within 3 years. 
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accounting firms, especially in medium and small public accounting firms. In some 
small public accounting firms, there were only two or three staff, and the annual 
revenues were almost a hundred thousand yuan. After the implementation of this 
regulation, small public accounting firms nearly lost most businesses (Accounting 
society of China, 2014).  According to deputy secretary-general of the CICPA in 
Zhejiang province, Wenjun Jiang, 2012 revenues of Zhejiang accounting firms were 
3.8 billion yuan of which income from capital verification business was more than 
200-million-yuan and accounted for approximately 5.2%. After this business was 
cancelled, small accounting firms that relied on income from capital verification 
business would face transformation or merger into other accounting firms 
(Accounting society of China, 2014).  
 
According to research by Zhang (2013), there were 7780 public accounting firms in 
2011. As shown in Table 4, most public accounting firms are concentrated in east 
and middle regions, while less accounting firms are located in the west region. In 
addition, most of the top 100 Chinese public accounting firms are concentrated in 
Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Fujian province, Zhejiang province, and Jiangsu 
province (Zhang, 2013). In more economically developed regions competition is 
more intense. When the reform program of the registration system – the registered 
capital was announced in 2014, competition was more intense among medium and 
small accounting firms due to less auditing business. These accounting firms which 
need to survive and develop may focus on providing non-auditing services or using 
personal relationships to gain auditing projects and this in turn may increase the 
number of potential professional ethical issues. 
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Table 5: The distribution of Chinese public accounting firms in 2011 
(Zhang, 2013, p.25) 
 
Province/ City Total number 
(public accounting firms) 
Province/ City Total number 
(public accounting firms) 
Beijing 584 Hubei 363 
Tianjin 89 Hunan 208 
Hebei 295 Guangdong 529 
Shanxi 286 Guangxi 125 
Inner Mongol 252 Hainan 55 
Liaoning 390 Chongqing 108 
Jilin 193 Sichuan 446 
Heilongjiang 321 Guizhou 81 
Shanghai 307 Yunnan 153 
Jiangsu 507 Tibet 11 
Zhejiang 379 Shanxi 195 
Anhui 244 Gansu 114 
Fujian 197 Qinghai 30 
Jiangxi 169 Ningxia 28 
Shandong 557 Xinjiang 12 
Henan 444 Total 7780 
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Moreover, according to the Chinese CPA Professional Ethical Standards – 
Professional Ethical Basic Standards (中国注册会计师职业道德守则第 1 号——
职业道德基本原则) (2010), No 10 in Article 3 only requires that CPAs need to keep 
auditor independence both in form and substance, when they provide auditing and 
non-auditing services, such as in verifying and consultant services (The Chinese 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 2012b). The standards do not clarify 
whether or not public accounting firms could provide auditing and non-auditing 
services to the same client. Although the purpose of providing accounting 
consultation is to use the CPA’s extensive management experience, accounting 
knowledge and resources to help customers standardize the accounting process and 
improve management, they also need to monitor the customers to whom they have 
provided non-auditing services. It is possible that the public accounting firms 
encourage financial report misstatement. In many Western developed countries, 
legislation prohibits the provision of both audit and management consulting services 
to the same customers. The Enron bankruptcy in the United States demonstrates this 
point. In 2000 Arthur Andersen received audit fees of $ 25 million from Enron, and 
management consulting fees of $ 27 million (Healy and Palepu, 2003). The Arthur 
Andersen audit team had found serious financial problems in Enron, but these issues 
were not disclosed in the auditing report (Fernando, 2010), because Arthur Andersen 
did not want to lose the client in order to earn more auditing and accounting 
consulting fees. In China, the revenue of public accounting firms, especially to 
medium and small public accounting firms is not only from auditing services but also 
from non-auditing services, such as verifying capital services and accounting 
consulting services. Therefore, it is often observed that public accounting firms 
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providing auditing and non-auditing services to the same client. This conflict was not 
only obvious in Chinese public accounting firms, but it also had potential to 
influence auditor independence. 
 
6.7 Conclusion 
The establishment of Chinese auditor independence followed Chinese economic 
reforms. Although Chinese auditing plays an important role in Chinese economic 
development, there exist many auditor independence issues.  
 
The purpose of government audit is to maintain the financial health of the 
government and prevent all risks of irregularities and violations. However, the 
government auditors’ independence is significantly reduced by the government 
auditing political structural position and procedures. Therefore, it could be argued 
that the Chinese government auditing system converges with western developed 
countries’ auditing system, but it is largely a symbolic acceptance. 
 
Financial auditor independence is also significantly reduced because of the heavy 
influence of government. In addition, the high level of competition between public 
accounting firms, means it is not easy to retain auditors’ independence, particularly 
in a social environment that emphasizes guanxi. 
 
  
 
145 
 
CHAPTER 7 CASE STUDY 1 – YIN GUANG XIA 
7.1 Introduction 
Guang Xia (Yinchuan) Industry Co., Ltd., referred to as ST Guang Xia securities, is 
listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, stock code 000557. The case of Yin Guang 
Xia occurred between 1999 and 2000. This chapter uses Yin Guang Xia to observe 
whether Chinese corporate governance and public accounting firms were functioning 
as intended after the Chinese enterprise reform and the disaffiliation program of 
accounting firms. 
 
Yin Guang Xia is the first publicly listed company in the Ningxia (Hui) Autonomous 
Region. Before the corporate reformation, Yin Guang Xia was a well-known and 
important state-owned enterprise. After corporate restructuring, Yin Guang Xia 
became a company limited by shares. It has a board of directors, a board of 
supervisors, and managers. Yin Guang Xia issued 74,000,000 shares to the public on 
the 26
th
 November in 1993 when approved by the Ningxia (Hui) Autonomous 
Region Economic Restructuring Committee, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Trade 
and Economic Cooperation and the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission. On 
28
th
 January 1994, Yin Guang Xia was officially established. On 17
th
 June 1994, the 
company’s stocks traded on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. The company’s business 
scope included high-tech products development, production and sales; natural 
products development, processing and sales; animal breeding and plant cultivation, 
processing and sales; food, daily chemical products, development of wine production 
and sales; real estate development. Their main productions were grape planting, wine 
making, and wine sales.  
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7.2 The case story 
The case story is based upon the information provided by the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (2002) and Lanzhou University (2015). According to the 
Punishment Decision of China Securities Regulatory Commission (2002), during the 
period from 1998 to 2001, Yin Guang Xia conducted the cumulatively fraudulent 
revenues that totalled in value 1,049.626 million yuan (equal to AU$ 202.55 
million), resulting in inflated profits of 771.567 million yuan (equal to AU$ 148.89 
million). In 1998, Yin Guang Xia inflated the profit of 17.761 million yuan. Due to 
the loss of financial information of Tianjin Guang Xia
18
 in 1998 and previous years, 
the actual profit of Yin Guang Xia in 1998 could not be determined. In 1999, Yin 
Guang Xia inflated profit of 177.819 million yuan, where in fact they made a loss of 
500.320 million yuan. In 2000, Yin Gunag Xia declared inflated profit of 567.047 
million yuan, but in fact made a loss of 149.401 million yuan. During the first half 
year of 2001, Yin Guang Xia inflated the profit of 8.94 million yuan, but made a loss 
of 25.571 million yuan (China Securities Regulatory Commission, 2002).  
  
                                                 
18
 Tianjin Guang Xia was a subsidiary of Yin Guang Xia.  
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Table 6: The fraudulent profits and the actual loss of Yin Guang Xia from 1998 to 2001 (China 
Securities Regulatory Commission, 2002) 
 
Year Inflated profits (million Yuan) Actual profits (million Yuan) 
1998 17.761 N/A 
1999 177.819 500.320 
2000 567.047 149.401 
2001 (1~6 months) 8.94 25.571 
Total 771.567 675.292 
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On November 1999, Ding Gongmin, the CFO and the secretary of the board of 
directors, called Dong Bo requesting him to increase the profit of each share of 
Tianjin Guang Xia to ￥0.8. Dong Bo was the chairman of the board of directors and 
CFO in Tianjin Guang Xia Company, the subsidiary company of Yin Guang Xia 
(Yin Guang Xia held 75% stake of Tianjin Guang Xia). Based on this requested 
profit benchmark, Dong Bo commenced financial fraud through raw materials 
purchase in 1999. Dong Bo fabricated nonexistent companies that included Beijing 
Rui Jie Company, Beijing Jing Tong Shang Company, Beijing Dong Feng Technical 
Institute, and other companies. Dong Bo contrived a story that Tianjin Guang Xia 
Company purchased raw material, such as ginger and cinnamon from those 
nonexistent companies. Dong Bo then forged the invoices of raw materials from the 
nonexistent companies and cheques sent these companies based on invoices, 
remittance slip, cheques and other financial documents obtained from the black 
market. In this manner, Dong Bo forged sales transactions that totalled in value of 
more than 199 million. To improve the fraud operation, Dong Bo asked Yan Jindai, 
the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and vice chairman of the board of directors in 
Tianjin Guang Xia Company, to forge production records. Yan Jindai obeyed Dong 
Bo’s command to forge material receipts, production records, and products delivery 
notes and so on. Finally, Dong Bo forged the revenue, a total value of 238.986 
million. In 1999, Tianjin Guang Xia used forged invoices, fake sale contracts, and 
forged bank cheques to inflate the profit, resulting in Yin Guang Xia’s inflated profit 
of 159.819 million yuan (China Securities Regulatory Commission, 2002).  
 
In 2000, the financial fraud continued, except there was no false raw material 
purchase. In accordance with Ding Gongmin’s request, Dong Bo forged a false sales 
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contract, remittance slip, sales invoices, export declarations, and cheques from a 
German company. As a result, in 2000, the total reported export revenue of Tianjin 
Guang Xia Company was 724 million yuan. The financial report in 2000 was audited 
by the Shenzhen Zhong Tian Qin public accounting firm. Liu Jiarong and Xu 
Lingwen, the Chinese CPAs, signed an unqualified opinion report. Yin Guang Xia 
published the false net profit which was 417.646430 million yuan.  
 
In 2001, in order to further improve the fraud operation, Dong Bo purchased 500 
value-added tax (VAT) invoices from Tianjin Beichen State Tax Bureau via false 
revenue declaration. Apart from normal sales, Dong Bo sent 290 VAT invoices to 
Tianjin He Yuan Company which was the Tianjin Guang Xia production distribution 
company. These VAT invoices referred to the total value of 221.456594 million 
yuan, including 37.647619 million yuan tax. The company then reported that the 
sales largely become account receivable and eventually only paid 5 million yuan in 
tax. In May 2001, in order to be able to distribute interim dividends, Li Youqiang 
(the vice chairman of the board of directors and CEO in Yin Guang Xia Company) 
borrowed 150 million yuan from Shanghai Jin Er Dun Investment Company, on the 
false excuse of an equipment purchase for Tianjin He Yuan Company. So 150 
million yuan was sent to Tianjin He Yuan’s bank account. And then Tianjin He Yuan 
Company sent 150 million back to Tianjin Guang Xia Company as paid account 
payable. After that, Tianjin Guang Xia Company transferred 125 million yuan to Yin 
Guang Xia Company as the subsidiary company’s profit. According to Dong Bo 
statements, in the fraud operation, the company seal was forged by the computer. 
The relationship of key players can be seen in the Figure 8. The information of 
fraudulent profits of Yin Guang Xia and its subsidiaries can be seen in Table 7. As 
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shown Table 6, Tianjin Guang Xia made false profits from 1998 to 2001, resulting in 
Yin Guang Xia’s inflated profit of 682.723 million yuan, and occupied 88.5% of Yin 
Guang Xia inflated profits.  
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Figure 8: The relationship of the key players in the Yin Guang Xia case 
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Table 7: The information of fraudulent profits of Yin Guang Xia and its subsidiaries (China Securities Regulatory Commission, 2002) 
 
Year The information of fraudulent profits 
1998 1. Wuhan Shi Mao company, which was a subsidiary of Yin Guang Xia, cancelled a contract of selling building with Wuhan Commercial 
Development company in 1999, but the contract was signed in 1998. Wuhan Shi Mao did not reduce sales revenue, resulting in inflated profits of 
26.904 million yuan, which inflated the profit of Yin Guang Xia accounted for 13.721 million yuan.  
2. Yin Guang Xia also used allotment funds (30 million yuan) to invest Guang Xia Yinchuan Natural Products Company to receive interests in 
allotment funds and offset financial expenses, resulting in Yin Guang Xia inflated profits of 4.04 million yuan.  
 
1999 1. Tianjin Guang Xia used forged the invoices, fake sale contracts, and forged bank notes to inflate the profit of Yin Guang Xia, amounting to 159.819 
million yuan. 
2. Yin Guang Xia also used allotment funds to invest Guang Xia Yinchuan Natural Products Company and He Lan Mountain Wine Company to 
receive interests in allotment funds and reduce financial expenses, resulting in Yin Guang Xia inflated profit of 17.64 million yuan.  
3. Wuhu Guang Xia, which was another subsidiary of Yin Guang Xia, reduced costs of glass products (2.68 million yuan), cuted down interests 
334,400 yuan, and increased depreciation 1.30 million yuan and other expenses 880,200 yuan, resulting in Yin Guang Xia inflated profit of 350, 980 
yuan. 
 
2000 1. Tianjin Guang Xia forged sales contracts, invoices, bank notes, and export declarations, resulting in Yin Guang Xia inflated profits of 522.874 
million yuan. 
2. Wuhu Guang Xia intentionally decreased costs of goods sold, management expenses, and operating expenses, resulting in Yin Guang Xia inflated 
profits of 2.774 million yuan. 
3. Hai Yun cultural company, which was a subsidiary of Yin Guang Xia, forged advertising revenue of 30 million yuan, resulting in Yin Guang Xia 
inflated profit of 26.70 million yuan.  
4. Yin Guang Xia used 104.55 million yuan of allotment funds to increase its investment into the He Lan Mountain Wine company to receive interests 
and offset financial expenses, resulting Yin Guang Xia inflated profit of 14.70 million yuan.  
 
2001 
(1~6 months) 
Yin Guang Xia received the interest of allotment funds from He Lan Mountain Wine company, valued of 8.94 million yuan, and used the interest to 
offset financial expenses, resulting in Yin Guang Xia inflated profit of 8.94 million yuan.  
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7.3 An analysis of auditing failure 
In 1999 and 2000, Liu Jiarong and Xu Lingwen, the CPAs in the Shenzhen Zhong 
Tian Qin public accounting firm, signed unqualified opinion reports. The information 
on auditing failure is described according to Zheng and Zhou (2004, pp.197-203) 
(Table 8). 
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Table 8: The auditing failure in Yin Guang Xia (Zheng and Zhou, 2004, pp.197-203) 
The auditing failure 1 When Yin Guang Xia prepared the consolidated financial statements, the associated transactions between subsidiaries were not offset, which 
inflated huge assets and profits values. The auditors did not discover and report the prominent fraudulence issues which violated the 
requirements of Chinese Independent Audit Practice Bulletin No. 5 - audited consolidated financial statements of special consideration
19
 
 
The auditing failure 2 CPAs did not effectively implement account receivable confirmations procedures. During the audit of Tianjin Guang Xia, all the confirmation 
letters were sent by Tianjin Guang Xia, but the debtors were not requested to send reply mail back directly to the public accounting firm. In 
2000, 14 letters had been sent by Tianjin Guang Xia, but none had been replied to. Due to the account receivable confirmations that were not 
verified, the auditors used alternative procedures but failed to obtain relevant external evidence such as customs report, delivery notice and 
notice of receipt which violated the Independent Auditing Standard No. 5 - auditing evidence and the Independent Auditing Standard No. 27 - 
confirmation. 
 
The auditing failure 3 CPAs did not effectively implement analytical testing procedures. For example, in 2000, Yin Guang Xia’s main business revenue had 
substantial growth, while its electricity expenses had reduced. This unusual phenomenon were not found and reported by CPAs. In addition, the 
input-output ratio of lecithin production dropped significantly in 2000, compared with the ratio in 1999. The CPAs did not examine nor consult 
expert opinions. Instead, they chose to believe the statement of Yin Guang Xia which was that the ‘production (process) became matured’. The 
auditors’ behaviour violated the Independent Auditing Standard No. 11 - analytical review and the Independent Auditing Standard No. 12 - the 
use of expert work. 
 
The auditing failure 4 The auditors did not pay serious attention to value added tax (VAT) and income tax policy disclosure which did not comply with the national 
tax law. The auditors did not give serious attention after collecting two different customs declarations (for example, CPA reviewed several 
declarations and found the ‘export number’ of each commodity was blank, which violate the basic requirement of declaration to fill oversees  
sales). The auditors did not collect and review important legal documents, which violate the Independent Auditing Standard No. 21 - Know 
audited entity’s situation, the Independent Auditing Standard No. 5 - Audit evidence, the Independent Auditing Standard No. 3 – Audit Plan, the 
Independent Audit Standard No. 6 - Audit Working Papers. 
 
                                                 
19
 Chinese Independent Audit Practice Bulletin No. 5 - audited consolidated financial statements of special consideration in Chinese is 独立审计实务公告第 5 号——合并
会计报表审计的特殊考虑. This case study occurred between 1999 and 2000. During this period, the Independent Auditing Standard (独立审计准则) and Chinese 
Independent Audit Practice Bulletin (独立审计实务公告) were the practical guidance of CPAs. 
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To sum up, the auditing processes of Yin Guang Xia and Tianjin Guang Xia failed to 
follow the guidance of the Independent Auditing Standard. In reality, these kinds of 
phenomena are continuing to occur, but the reasons are various. For example, in 
order to maintain customers or to gain lucrative personal benefits, auditors may 
compromise with audited companies. However, sometimes it is hard for auditors to 
follow auditing standards. For example, according to the Chinese CPA 
Implementation Standard – audit working paper (中国注册会计师执业准则—— 审
计工作底稿), an audit working paper needs to be reviewed or checked by the Chief 
Accountant, department managers, and project managers (called three stages review). 
The first stage is a detailed review. In the first stage, the project manager is 
responsible for making sure all audit working papers following the guidelines of 
regulatory requirements and for identifying problems to be amended. In the second 
stage, the general review, department managers are responsible for reviewing the 
audit procedures of material accounting accounts in audit working papers, audit 
adjusting events, and audit results. The second stage review is to check important 
matters in audit working papers, based on auditing standards and guidelines. The 
third review is implemented by the Chief Accountant, and is based on the result of 
general review. The purpose of third stage is to review the whole auditing plan, 
schedule, implementation, and auditing results to make sure that the auditing quality 
meets the requirements of auditing standards. However, in reality, the three-stage 
review is rarely achieved, especially in small public accounting firms. To establish 
partnership public accounting firms only requires two partners or more. Two partners 
are also only two CPAs in public accounting firms. In small public accounting firms 
like these, the three-stage review cannot be implemented. Thus, sometimes this kind 
of review system is more symbolical than real.  
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Moreover, according to the Chinese CPA Implementation Standard – the 
communication between former and successor CPAs (中国注册会计师执业准则—
— 前任注册会计师和后任注册会计师的沟通), the communication with former 
CPAs should be started by successor CPAs, but also needs the consent of the audited 
company. Even though an audited company may consent to this communication, the 
former CPAs can still decide whether the successor could review audit working 
papers. Thus, in reality, in most cases this kind of communication between former 
and successor CPAs does not happen.  
 
7.4 Institutional background and critical analysis 
The case of Yin Guang Xia was disclosed in 2000. In 1999, China completed the 
enterprise reform and the disaffiliation program of public accounting firms. In the 
process of these reforms, many new concepts of corporate governance and auditing 
were transplanted into China. If business culture has not changed that would mean 
the cognition of these new concepts also remain unchanged, it would mean the 
transplanted law would be ineffectively enforced.  
 
This section analyses potential issues within the enterprise reform and disaffiliation 
program of public accounting firms. 
 
7.4.1 The enterprise reform 
Before the enterprise reforms of the early 1980s, most Chinese companies were state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) that were administered by either the central government or 
local governments. According to Kang and Kim (2012), Chinese enterprise reform in 
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May 1984 was initiated to expand SOE’s autonomy in production planning and profit 
retention. In July 1992, SOEs were allowed to set their own prices and wages, hire 
and fire employees, and invest in fixed capital (Kang and Kim, 2012). The 
completion of the first enterprise reform saw the adoption of the Company Law in 
December 1993, which provided a legal framework for SOEs to clarify property 
rights. This was a landmark for Chinese enterprise reform, seeing the separation of 
ownership from management in SOEs. 
 
However, in the early stages of Chinese enterprise reform in the 1990s, the 
government still held the majority of shareholdings in SOEs (Yang et al., 2001; Yang 
et al., 2003). For example, the Party organizations are set up in Chinese enterprises in 
order to strengthen the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) highest leadership in the 
whole country. 
 
7.4.1.1 The Chinese Communist Party Structure 
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is the party in power in China and has both 
central and local organizations. The Central Committee is elected by the National 
Party Congress for a term of five years, and leads all the work of the CCP, also 
representing it outside the Party (China.org.cn, 2003). 
 
The Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee, the Standing Committee of the 
Political Bureau, and the General Secretary of the CCP are all elected by the Central 
Committee plenary. The Political Bureau and its Standing Committee exercise the 
functions and powers of the Central Committee (China.org.cn, 2003). The Secretariat 
of the Central Committee is the administrative body of the Political Bureau and its 
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Standing Committee (China.org.cn, 2003). The General Secretary is responsible for 
calling sessions of both the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee, and is in 
charge of the work of the Secretariat of the Central Committee (China.org.cn, 2003). 
 
Local organizations of the CCP include congresses of various provinces, autonomous 
regions, municipalities directly under the Central Government, cities with districts, 
autonomous prefectures, counties, autonomous counties, and cities without districts 
as well as districts of cities which are held once every five years (China.org.cn, 
2003). Grassroots organizations of the Party, where there are more than three full 
members of the Party, are set up in enterprises, rural villages, organizations, schools, 
research institutes, neighbourhoods, the People’s Liberation Army companies and 
other basic units (China.org.cn, 2003).  (See Figure 9) 
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Figure 9: Party structure in China (China.org.cn, 2003) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Local organizations of the CCP include congresses of various provinces, autonomous regions, 
municipalities directly under the Central Government, cities with districts, autonomous prefectures, 
counties, autonomous counties, and cities without districts as well as districts of cities (China.org.cn, 
2003). 
Grassroots organizations of the Party, where there are more than three full members of the Party, are 
set up in enterprises, rural villages, organizations, schools, research institutes, neighbourhoods, the 
People’s Liberation Army companies and other basic units (China.org.cn, 2003). 
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7.4.1.2 Party secretaries in China’s corporate governance structure 
Chinese SOEs are operated under the dual leadership of the state and the CCP. On 
the state side, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
(SASAC) plays a role as ultimate owner (Yu, 2013). On the party side, the 
Organization Department “selects and appoints firms’ top executives, evaluates their 
performance, gives them incentives, and oversees their work” (Yu, 2013, p. 384). 
This kind of corporate structure is to ensure SOEs respond to policy signals from the 
CCP.  
 
Although China’s SOEs have adopted western corporate governance structures 
formally, in reality they create their own structure that establishes the primary 
organizations of the party. All types of organisations are required to establish the 
primary organisations of the party if they have three party members (Yu, 2013, p. 
385). Over time, increasing numbers of private enterprises have established primary 
organizations of the party, in which a CCP member (中共党员) is selected as a party 
secretary (党组书记). The primary organizations of the party established are not 
based on the type of company (eg. SOEs or non-SOEs), but depend on whether there 
are at least three party members in an organization. According to statistics of the 
Organizing Department of the Central Committee of the CCP, by the end of 2014, 
there were 87.793 million CCP members in China (CPC news, 2015). By the end of 
2014, there were 236,000 government branches establishing the primary 
organizations of the party, accounting for 99.6% of 237,000 government branches 
(CPC news, 2015). Out of 546,000 public institutions
20
, 506,000 had established the 
                                                 
20
 Public institutions in China are invested by government and mainly perform social services such as 
education, science and technology, culture and health. Compared to companies, public institutions do 
not pursue profit and government financial investment is not for economic benefits in return. 
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primary organizations of the party (CPC news, 2015). In enterprises, there were 
194,000 out of 213,000 SOEs and 157,900 out of 297,300 non-SOEs which had 
established the primary organizations of the party.  
 
Although the purpose of establishing the primary organizations of the party is to 
strengthen the CCP’s highest leadership in the whole nation, the effort of the primary 
organizations of the party is different in SOEs and non-SOEs. In SOEs, a party 
secretary is powerful, because he or she serves concurrently as a chairman of the 
board or CEO. For example, in this case, Zhang Jisheng (张吉生) was not only the 
chairman of the board, but also the party secretary. As such, it is easy for the party 
secretary to exercise party control in a SOE. However, in non-SOEs, a party 
secretary normally is symbolic, since they do not interfere with the company’s 
operational and strategic decisions but disseminate the CCP’s principles or carry out 
governmental policies. 
 
7.4.1.3 Yin Guang Xia 
Guang Xia (Yinchuan) Industry Co. Ltd., formerly a SOE, issued 74,000,000 shares 
to Chinese society on the 26
th
 November in 1993 after approval by the Ningxia Hui 
Autonomous Region Economic Restructuring Committee, the Chinese Ministry of 
Foreign Trade, and the Economic Cooperation and Chinese Securities Regulatory 
Commission. On the 28
th
 January 1994, Yin Guang Xia was officially established 
and became the first publicly listed company in the Ningxia (Hui) Autonomous 
Region. On the 17
th
 June 1994, the company’s stock traded on the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange.  
 
 
162 
 
Although Chinese Company Law was announced in December 1993, providing a 
legal framework for SOEs to clarify property rights, the government continued to 
heavily relate to top directors and managers throughout the 1990s. For example, 
many members of the board in Yin Guang Xia were working for the government or 
had worked in the government. Zhang Jisheng (张吉生) was not only the Chairman 
of the board, but also the director of Ningxia Science and Technology Department 
and party secretary (宁夏科技厅厅长、党组书记). Kong Xiangping (孔祥平) was a 
member of the board, the head of development office, and vice CEO in Yin Guang 
Xia, who was also the director of the Enterprise Reform Committee of the Ningxia 
Autonomous Region, managing the application of the listed companies in this region. 
Du Yu (杜裕 ), the chairman of the board of supervisor, was also the head of 
Yinchuan Health Bureau and party secretary (银川市卫生局局长、党委书记). As 
such, Yin Guang Xia was heavily related to the government. Although Company 
Law provided the legal framework for SOEs to clarify property rights, Yin Guang 
Xia was still controlled by the government. Yin Guang Xia could not independently 
make decision because of the government’s influence. 
 
In addition, although the enterprise reform occurred in 1990s, the adoption of the 
new corporate governance system was immature in China. In the view of the internal 
system of Yin Guang Xia, there was a board of directors, a board of supervisors, and 
mangers (See Table 8). This structure of corporate governance in 1990s was based 
on the German model. In Germany, “supervisors are empowered to appoint and 
dismiss members of a managing board, as well as to represent the company in its 
dealings with members of the management board” (Zhou, 2011, p. 276). This system 
had never occurred in China before. People were not familiar with concepts of the 
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new corporate governance system. Moreover, in 2001, the Guidelines for Introducing 
Independent Directors to the Board of Directors of Listed Companies (the 
Guidelines) was announced by the China Securities Regulatory Commission, and 
provides the main practical rules for regulating independent directors (Zhou, 2011). 
In the US, UK, and under the Australian corporate governance system, independent 
directors undertake these supervision functions. According to Chinese Company 
Law, supervisors are one part of the internal governance structure of the company, 
whose positions are in parallel with the board of directors. Supervisors are 
responsible to shareholders and perform overseeing function, such as examining 
company’s financial affairs and the conduct of directors and managers. However, 
supervisors’ positions and functions are significantly different in the definition in 
Company law and in the real world in transforming SOEs. In reality, a board of 
supervisors belongs to an outside agency of the State Council or provincial 
government, who are responsible for the State Council or provincial government and 
supervise the status of state-owned assets. According to Company Law, supervisors 
should be elected within the company’s shareholders and employees. However, in 
reality, supervisors are appointed by the State Council, provincial governments, 
autonomous regional governments, or municipal governments. For example, in this 
case, Du Yu (杜裕), the chairman of the board of supervisor, was also the head of 
Yinchuan Health Bureau and party secretary (银川市卫生局局长、党委书记).  
 
In addition, Company Law does not provide substantial right to ensure supervisors’ 
effective supervision. For example, compared to German company laws, Chinese 
Company Law does not provide supervisors with the right to dismiss members of a 
managing board; only a shareholders’ general meeting is given the power to elect and 
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dismiss members of a managing board (Zhou, 2011). Indeed, supervisors in China 
have often been referred to as ‘vase supervisors’ meaning they have no substantial 
power in companies but are more like displayed furniture. However, in Germany, 
“supervisors are empowered to appoint and dismiss members of a managing board, 
as well as to represent the company in its dealings with members of the management 
board” (Zhou, 2011, p. 276). 
 
165 
 
Table 9: Yin Guang Xia corporate structure – Namelist 
 
Name Position Government relationship 
Zhang Jisheng The chairman of the board of directors The director of Ningxia Science and Technology Department and party secretary 
Kong Xiangping A member of the board of directors, the head of 
development office, and the vice CEO 
The director of the Enterprise Reform Committee of the Ningxia Autonomous 
Region 
Wei Deyuan A member of the board of directors, and the director 
of the secretariat 
A member of standing committee of Ningxia Zhongning (country) and vice 
secretary, the prefectural governor of Long De (country) and secretary in Ningxia 
Zhao Yinsheng A member of the board of directors The vice director of Industrial office in Ningxia Science and Technology 
Department, and the vice prefectural governor of Xi Ji (country) in Ningxia 
Li Wei A member of the board of directors The General manager of the Ningxia Securities Investment Banking 
Du Yu The chairman of the board of supervisors The head of Yinchuan Health Bureau and party secretary 
Du Naiwen A member of the board of supervisors The head of Yinchuan Health Bureau and party secretary, and the vice director of 
Yinchuan Arbitration Commission 
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Moreover, supervisors’ and independent directors’
21
 functions cross over. In other 
countries’ corporate governance system, the Anglo-American model of corporate 
governance is the model in which there is no a board of supervisors but independent 
directors, while the German model is the model in which there is a board of 
supervisors in parallel with a board of directors. In the US, UK, and under the 
Australian corporate governance system, independent directors take up their 
supervision functions. Under the independent directors, an audit committee is 
established. In 2002, the Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies 
introduced audit committees into Chinese listed companies (Wu and Patel, 2015). 
The audit committee is charged by an independent director. The function of audit 
committee is “recommending the engagement of the external auditor, overseeing the 
interaction between the internal auditor and external auditor, inspecting the 
company’s financial reports, and monitoring the company’s internal control system 
(CSRC, 2002, cited from Wu and Patel, 2015, p. 34)”. However, China adopted both 
two western models, resulting in a crossing tiers corporate structure. Chinese listed 
corporate structure can be seen in the Figure 10. Really, China only adopted the 
names of these institutions, and the board of directors in Chinese companies is 
strongly controlled by majority shareholders, so that it remains with the traditionally 
hierarchical management.  
  
                                                 
21
 In 2001, the China Securities Regulatory Commission issued the Guidelines for Introducing 
Independent Directors to the Board of Directors of Listed Companies (Zhou, 2011), which marks 
formally introducing the concept of independent director to China. 
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Figure 10: Listed corporate structure in China 
 
 
  General meeting of shareholders 
Board of directors 
Board of supervisors 
Managers 
Vice general managers 
Independent director Secretary of board 
Board of directors of the 
company office 
Chief financial officer 
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In the 1990s, Chinese listed companies still used the traditional hierarchical 
management, although under a different name. That is why the government still had 
control of listed companies that had transformed from SOEs, such as Yin Guang Xia. In 
the process of the corporatization of traditional state-managed SOEs, the state still holds 
shares of companies, but the state is an abstract entity, not a real person. China was 
trying to materialise the state shareholders to appoint a legal person as the state 
shareholder, which resulted in a complicated relationship between the government and 
companies. Zhou (2011) stated that “the supervisory state and party organs at the top as 
‘outsiders’ are primary in charge of appointing managers, while they lack effective 
check-and-balance mechanisms, such as ‘well-functioning capital markets or active 
monitoring by banks’, to ensure managers’ good performance” (p.276). In short, during 
this period, there were still existing hierarchical layers of supervision and governance in 
the transforming SOEs. For example, in this case, Ding Gongming was the ex-CFO and 
secretary of the board of directors in the parent company, Yin Guang Xia. Dong Bo was 
the board chairman of Tianjin Guang Xia Company which was a subsidiary company of 
Yin Guang Xia. The whole fraud operation was made by Ding Gongming’s request and 
carried out by Dong Bo. In Tianjin Guang Xia Company, Dong Bo could control the ex-
CEO, Yan Jindai. Thus, in the 1990s, the adoption of a corporate governance system 
appears to be more symbolic than real.  
 
This is another issue of the phenomenon of excessive insider control by self-interested 
managers in the early stage of enterprise reform. The aim of enterprise reform is to 
separate the state from the management and leave the state as just a controlling 
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shareholder of the enterprise in order to promote higher efficiency, enhance the profit-
making capability of the company, and increase competitiveness among companies by 
decreasing the ability of the bureaucracy to interfere in the lawful activities of 
corporations (Zhou, 2011). The board of directors is like the ‘brain’ of a corporation; 
managers are like the ‘heart’, while the board of supervisors is like the ‘immune system’ 
of corporations. These changes gave managers more autonomy of daily management and 
the control of strategic decisions. However, these changes also made several agency 
problems, such as the control of the firm and the ability of majority shareholders to 
expropriate minority shareholders’ interests (Huang, 2016). This type of expropriation is 
referred to as ‘Tunneling’ (Huang, 2016). Tunneling is prevalent among Chinese listed 
companies because of “its relatively underdeveloped legal environment, absence of 
effective corporate governance, high concentration of corporate ownership, and high 
level of government intervention” (Huang, 2016, p.858). 
 
7.4.1.4 The analysis of Chinese corporate governance by the Grid-Group approach 
Before the enterprise reform of the early 1980s, most Chinese companies were SOEs 
that were administered by either the central government or local governments. During 
that time, China’s implemented the planned economy market. The central government 
allocated national resources. The SOEs were placed in the hierarchical culture as strong 
grid – strong group.  
 
Chinese enterprise reform in May 1984 was initiated to expand SOE’s autonomy in 
production planning and profit retention (Kang and Kim, 2012). In July 1992, SOEs 
were allowed to set their own prices and wages, hire and fire employees, and invest in 
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fixed capital (Kang and Kim, 2012). The completion of the first enterprise reform saw 
the adoption of the Company Law in December 1993, providing a legal framework for 
SOEs to clarify property rights. This was a landmark for Chinese enterprise reform, 
seeing the separation of ownership from management in SOEs.  
 
SOEs became less related to government which means becoming more independent, 
compared with the previous time of the enterprise reform. In SOEs, the hierarchical 
culture (strong grid-strong group) moved to the culture of ‘moderate individualists’. 
Why did SOEs move to the culture of ‘moderate individualists’ rather than the culture of 
‘individualists’? That is because the Party organizations are set up in Chinese enterprises 
in order to strengthen the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) highest leadership in the 
whole country. The leadership of Chinese SOEs have been controlled by the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) since the founding of the People’s Republic of China. Since the 
enterprise reforms in the early 1980s the leadership has started ongoing efforts to 
transfer SOEs’ decision making power from local party committees and the state 
bureaucrats to the company itself. However, the transforming SOEs still allowed the 
interference of the party and state institutions in the corporate governance to continue 
(Yu, 2013). The enterprise reform has not been able to disentangle party management 
from corporate governance (Yu, 2013). 
 
Although Chinese enterprises adopted the structure of corporate governance during the 
process of the enterprise reform, such as a board of supervisors and independent 
directors, Chinese enterprises, in fact, adopted these names, and the board of directors is 
strongly controlled by majority shareholders. Chen et al. (2009) reviewed prior studies 
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and claimed that the average shareholding of controlling owners was 45.13% in 1088 
Chinese listed companies in the end of 2000, and in the state-owned holding companies 
controlling shareholders dominated the board of directors and the executive management 
team, in which almost 100% of the senior executives were appointed by the controlling 
shareholders from 1993 to 2000. From the observation of corporate governance, 
although China transplanted corporate governance systems from western countries, this 
system might be implemented in a Chinese way.  
 
The reason for the superficial adoption of western corporate governance rather than 
substantial acceptance of it might be because of the limitations of informal institutions – 
i.e. Chinese culture. China’s hierarchical culture dominated Chinese societies for a long 
time. As mentioned in Chapter 5, China is a relationship-oriented society, and 
Confucianism divided social relationships into five categories called “Wulun” (五伦)22. 
However, in the Han dynasty, these five categories of social relationships have been 
reconstructed as the “san gang” (三纲) that are the three cardinal guides: the monarch 
guides his subjects, the father guides his son, and the husband guides his wife – a form 
of politicized Confucianism to maintain political order. This politicized “san gang” 
proposed strictly hierarchical relationship in ancient Chinese societies, meaning that ‘if 
the monarch asked his subjects to die, the subjects must die; if a father asked the same 
requirement, the son must obey this order’ (in Chinese: 君要臣死，臣不得不死；父要
子亡，子不得不亡). This sense of obedience continues to impact modern society. In 
                                                 
22
 “Wulun” generalised the relationship between monarch and his subjects (Jun chen 君臣 ), the 
relationship between father and son (fu zi 父子), the relationship between younger and older brother 
(xiong di 兄弟), the relationship between wife and husband (fu fu 夫妇), and the relationship between 
friends (peng you 朋友). 
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context of the hierarchical culture, it is important that rules are adhered to, and that 
tradition and authority is respected. However, the sense of independence in independent 
directors and boards of supervisors is contrary to the sense of obedience. To break the 
old culture and accept a new institution, a new thought style needs to be cultivated. It is 
as Chan et al (2014) stated: 
“(corporate governance) these rules were developed by the courts in the UK dating back to the 
eighteenth century, containing elements of both trusteeship and agency-like legal obligations. If 
laws are culturally neutral, and since directors’ duties have worked well in the UK in terms of 
receptiveness of the regulated and the effectiveness of the laws, then it should perform equally well 
in other jurisdictions, like China. If not, this would suggest that what the law prescribes and the 
manner by which cultural values guide behaviour are different.” (p.184) 
 
As such, western regulations were introduced into China, while the Chinese government 
still kept a one-party dictatorship, whereby the party structure was still embedded in 
Chinese companies in order to keep the Chinese Communist Party’s position of highest 
leadership in the whole country. Although Chinese individuals have considerable 
freedom in terms of economic and social transformation in this kind of institutional 
environment the hierarchical culture could only move to a ‘moderate’ hierarchical 
culture. Thus, a new thought style was cultivated which might not properly reinforce the 
new institutional changes. In metaphorical terms, it is like drawing a tiger with a cat as a 
model, meaning that you would draw it catching its spirit. The substance is that it is 
informal institutions of culture that limit individuals’ opinions and cognition to adopt 
institutional changes. From the observations of the case study, it appears that the higher 
level officers required the lower lever officers to conduct fraud, while the lower level 
officers did not oppose this, which means that the sense of obedience dominated in Yin 
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Guang Xia. Thus, there is no expectation that a board of supervisors which could be 
functional.  
 
7.4.2 The disaffiliation program of public accounting firms 
Accounting information is often used to measure a company’s performance. Therefore, 
when state-owned enterprises started to separate ownership and control, independent 
auditing was seen to have an important role in solving agency problems
23
. Due to 
enterprise reform and the separation of ownership, auditing has become an essential part 
of healthy economic development. However, continuing instances of auditor 
independence failure has drawn more and more attention from the public. Financial 
auditing service began in the People’s Republic of China in early 1983. In the beginning, 
CPA firms, including accounting and auditing firms were established and were 
sponsored by government bodies or government controlled institutions (Yang et al., 
2001). The auditing firms were sponsored by regional audit offices, while accounting 
firms were controlled by the Ministry of Finance. In June 1995, the two professional 
bodies merged into a new professional body named CICPA, under the direct control of 
the MOF (Lin and Chan, 2000).  
 
From 1997, to converge with the global auditing system, Chinese CPA firms started to 
disaffiliate from their sponsoring bodies. This was because continuing instances of 
affiliated CPA firms’ scandals, such as Qiong Min Yuan (琼民源事件) and Hong Guang 
(红光事件), which led to the disrepute of the entire CPA industry. The aim of the 
                                                 
23
 An agency relationship is defined as “one in which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engages 
another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some 
decision-making authority to the agent” (Hill and Jones, 1992). 
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disaffiliation program was to make the CPA firms’ financially and operationally 
independent (Yang et al., 2001) in order to improve the auditing quality.  
 
The CICPA is deemed to be a private organization, but it is essentially governed and 
regulated by the MOF. The CICPA is required to a private organization in order to 
guarantee its capabilities of professional status, integrity, objectivity, and independence. 
However, the Chinese government is still able to heavily influence public accounting 
firms. For example, the government impacts the operation of CICPA in various ways 
such as allowing the appointment of senior directors in CICPA who also have 
government positions (dual appointments). Sun Baohou (孙宝厚) vice-chairman in the 
Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants also works in the National Audit 
Office (The Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 2012a). This situation 
also happens at the regional level. For example, Zhang Shunjian (张顺建 ), vice-
secretary general of Anhui Institute of Certified Public Accountants, also works in the 
Anhui Provincial Department of Finance (The Anhui Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants, 2013). Moreover, many leaders in the CICPA and provincial institutes of 
Certified Public Accountants have government working experience. Although the 
government is still able to heavily influence public accounting firms, since the 
disaffiliation programme Chinese public accounting firms started to disaffiliate from 
their sponsoring bodies. Public accounting firms have also changed from the strong grid-
strong group form to the weak grid-strong group form.  
 
 
175 
 
7.4.2.1 The Shenzhen Zhong Tian Qin public accounting firm 
In this case, auditors did not effectively implement accounts receivable confirmation 
procedures. During the audit of Tianjin Guang Xia, all confirmation letters were sent by 
the company, but the debtors were not requested to reply by mail directly to the public 
accounting firm but instead they were requested to reply by mail to Tianjin Guang Xia 
who then handed reply mail to the CPAs. This process significantly reduced the 
reliability of confirmation letters. Moreover, the auditing leaders of Tianjian Guang Xia 
were not registered public accountants. They lacked knowledge of foreign trade and 
were not professionally competent, which seriously violated the Independent Auditing 
Basic Standard and the Independent Audit Guideline No. 3 – Audit plan
24
. In fact, in 
China, in the highly competitive CPA’s industry, public accounting firms encourage 
their employees to use their guanxi to find auditing projects. Whoever finds an auditing 
project, will be in charge of it, which means even people without qualifications are in 
charge of auditing projects and also become leaders of an auditing team. This is because 
whoever is in charge of the auditing project will get more bonuses. Due to the way 
auditing projects involve close relationships between auditors and auditees, the auditing 
process has become more symbolical than real. 
 
                                                 
24
 For example, Article 5 in Chapter 2 of Independent Auditing Basic Standard states: an independent 
CPA should have specialized knowledge and experience, be professionally trained and have enough 
analysis and judgment competence. Article 7 in Chapter 2 of Independent Audit Guideline No. 3 – Audit 
plan points out that during the preparation of the audit plan, the CPA should consider the following 
factors: the auditing competence of the members in the audit team, audit experience, and the level of 
familiarity with audited entity. Article 17 in Chapter 4 the review of audit plan requires: the audit plan 
should be reviewed and approved by the person who is in charge of the public accounting firm. Article 18 
points out: the audit plan should be reviewed as to whether the members of audit team were selected 
appropriately.  
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One may wonder why Yin Guang Xia which was a listed company in Yinchuan (in the 
interior region), asked the Shenzhen Zhong Tian Qin public accounting firm in 
Shenzhen (in the coastal region) to audit its financial reports. In China, to audit listed 
companies, public accounting firms must have securities and futures business 
qualifications. In China, there are only 40 qualified public accounting firms as of 2015. 
According to the Ministry of Finance of the People’s Republic of China (2015), these 40 
public accounting firms are required to supply auditing services to more than 2500 listed 
companies. Although these public accounting firms have sub-offices in different cities 
some public accounting firms were amalgamated into one, the situation that whoever is 
in charge of auditing projects gets more bonuses creates difficulties in the management 
of public accounting firms. In this case, the Shenzhen Zhong Tian Qin public accounting 
firm was amalgamated from the Shenzhen Zhong Tian public accounting firm and the 
Shenzhen Tian Qin public accounting firm, but the two public accounting firms worked 
separately in two different places. In this case, the Shenzhen Zhong Tian public 
accounting firm audited Yin Guang Xia Company, but the partners of the Shenzhen Tian 
Qin public accounting firm even did not know the details of the auditing procedure when 
the Yin Guang Xia scandal was disclosed by the media.  
 
On the other hand, the supervision of the Shenzhen Chartered Accountants Association 
is suspect. The Shenzhen CPA Association is supposed to supervise and inspect auditing 
activities of Shenzhen public accounting firms. However, the main revenue of local CPA 
Association depends on membership fees which are calculated from the revenue of 
member public accounting firms. Between 1999 and 2000, the revenue of membership 
fees in the Shenzhen CPA Association was around 5 million yuan, while the 
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membership fees of the Shenzhen Zhong Tian Qin was more than 800 thousand yuan 
(Jin, 2001). If the media had not disclosed the Yin Guang Xia fraud, the question is 
whether the Shenzhen CPA Association would have initiatively inspected the auditing 
activities of the Shenzhen Zhong Tian Qin public accounting firm. The Shenzhen CPAs 
Association’s behaviour was consistent with the value of harmony which Confucianism 
emphasises. When one is in conflict with someone else within their social network, the 
first thing they have to learn is ‘forbearance’ (Lim, 2009, p. 403). The Shenzhen CPA 
Association gave up its professional goal that is inspection of Shenzhen public 
accounting firms’ auditing activities, for the prior consideration of maintaining a 
harmonious relationship, ultimately for its own interests. 
 
7.4.2.2 The analysis of Chinese auditor independence using the Grid-Group approach 
Public accounting firms started to disaffiliate from government sponsors and the Chinese 
Independent Auditing standards commenced to act in concert with enterprise reforms, 
although governments still heavily influenced public accounting firms. Did Chinese 
culture also limit the concept of auditor independence in the auditing industry? As 
mentioned before, Chinese CPA firms were sponsored by government bodies or 
government controlled institutions before the disaffiliation program. The affiliation 
system had played a positive influence at the beginning of the development of China’s 
financial auditing system, including providing office space and equipment and a 
guarantee of credibility by governments. However, the affiliation system also caused 
disruption in the CPA market. First, the establishment of affiliated CPA firms was to 
create extra revenues for sponsoring government agencies as the agencies would 
introduce auditing business to sponsored CPA firms. Second, government agencies 
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might directly interfere with the auditing process and the final audit opinion, because the 
government agencies sponsored CPA firms in the context of Chinese culture (for 
example, the sense of obedience). Therefore, before the disaffiliation program, Chinese 
CPA firms were controlled by sponsoring government agencies, and most auditing 
business was introduced by sponsors, presenting a strong grid and strong group form.  
 
After the disaffiliation program, Chinese accounting firms disaffiliated from sponsoring 
government bodies and the CICPA was deemed a private organisation. Now at least, 
Chinese accounting firms and the CICPA are nominally independent, because they are 
still governed and regulated by the MOF. In the context of Chinese culture, guanxi is 
important for accounting firms to obtain audit engagements, especially in state-owned 
holding companies. According to one of Wu and Patel’s interviewees (2015): 
“I should say basically the link between government and auditing firms has been cut off. It was a 
successful restructure. There is no longer business relationship. However, due to the historical 
factor, many firm managers have some government connection, which gives them an advantage in 
obtaining business” (Wu and Patel, 2015, p. 187).  
 
 Another interviewee claimed that 
“…one large central government controlled company wanted four audit firms. They invited bidders 
on a 3:1 basis (three bidders compete for one project or one client) … auditors who were not 
familiar with the company, or with State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission, had no chance of being invited… on that day we saw other auditor firms who came to 
bid as well. Because we were in the same circle, we knew each other. We found they already knew 
the evaluation criteria, which had not been disclosed in the invitation letter of bidding, because of 
their guanxi with the government authority. Also the assessment is very subjective… Now we 
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won’t go for any bid invited by centrally controlled enterprises. We know we cannot win such a 
bid. Other competitors have better relationship with government authorities… Currently in the 
auditing industry there are lots of complaints about bidding, particularly bids invited by State-
owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission. This (unfair) situation also arises in 
bids organized by local State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission” (Wu and 
Patel, 2015, p. 188). 
 
Thus, Chinese CPAs are located in the ‘moderate’ culture of individualist, while also 
having strong group cognition with government in order to obtain audit engagements.  
 
Another question is whether Chinese auditors understand why the independence is 
important for them. In China, the demand for auditing service does not come from 
shareholders, but is due to the requirements of government supervision and 
management, such as capital verification of enterprises, annual inspection of SOEs, 
auditing financial statements of foreign-invested enterprises, and annual inspection of 
foreign exchange. Audited companies would draw more attention to whether satisfy the 
requirement of governmental regulations, while is not due to the principal-agent 
relationship arising from the separation of ownership and management. As it is, auditors 
are more concerned with whether they can obtain auditing business.  
 
Therefore, although the disaffiliation program has been implemented, Chinese auditors 
may not cultivate the notion of independence. In addition, Chinese culture, especially 
guanxi and a sense of obedience, also impacts on auditor independence. Although 
Chinese CPAs are located in the ‘moderate’ culture of individualist, the strong group 
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resists the cultivation of the notion of independence. This means the disaffiliation 
program may not substantially improve the auditor independence.  
 
7.5 The motivation of investigating Yin Guang Xia 
The case of Yin Guang Xia occurred between 1999 and 2000, when China completed its 
enterprise reform and its disaffiliation program of public accounting firms. Chinese 
accounting and auditing standards and regulations have been continuing to converge and 
adapt to the international standards. For example, as will be covered in Chapter 9, the 
MOF announced the Chinese Accounting Standards in 2006, which were the adoption of 
principles-based accounting standards, by the publication of converged to the 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs). With the increasingly 
convergence to the International Standards on Auditing (ISA), the Chinese Auditing 
Standards has revised and developed 3 times, which were the Chinese Independent 
Auditing Standards (CIASs) (中国独立审计准则) (effected in 1996), the Chinese CPA 
Implementation Standards (CCISs) (中国注册会计师执业准则) (effected in 2007), and 
the Chinese Auditing Standards (CAS) (中国注册会计师审计准则) (effected in 2012). 
As covered in Chapter 8 mentioned that the CSRC and MOF jointly issued a regulation 
of mandatory audit partner rotation. Therefore, Chinese regulators continuously issued 
regulations in order to improve auditor independence and the quality of accounting 
financial reports. However, despite the improvement of legislation in China, there are 
continuing instances of unexpected corporate failures and scandals, such as Amoi 
Electronics and Green Land, which emerged after the scandal of Yin Guang Xia was 
disclosed in 2000. Some may argue that professionals need to cultivate their cognitions 
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of new introduced institutions, which needs a period of time to adapt to the new 
institutions. From the observation of Chapter 8, Green Land conducted fraud from 2004 
to 2010, which indicated that guanxi might still impact auditor independence. Thus, 
regulators were trying to improve legislation to correct for problems that occurred, while 
business culture, including guanxi, still resisted changes to professionals’ cognition. The 
cases demonstrate that Chinese culture, especially guanxi and the sense of obedience, 
remained unchanged and continued to impact the cultivation of the sense of 
independence through time. The government’s practice of continuously issuing new 
regulations as problems occurred may be a facile solution to this problem.  
 
In addition, according to the Punishment Decision of China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (2002), Yin Guang Xia was imposed a fine of 600,000 yuan. However, 10 
years later, another corporate scandal Jinlin Zixin Pharmaceutical (002118) resulted in a 
fine of 400,000 yuan (China Securities Regulatory Commission, 2014). Compared to the 
degree of damage caused by these two corporate scandals, the punishment was 
symbolic. As such, even after the reform had been experienced for more than three 
decades, the attitude to corporate scandals seems not to have changed, because although 
regulations and standards were formally adopted in China, culture resisted behaviour 
changes.  
 
7.6 Conclusion 
This chapter uses the case of Yin Guang Xia to observe whether Chinese corporate 
governance and public accounting firms were functioning as intended after the Chinese 
enterprise reform and the disaffiliation program of accounting firms. The observations 
 
182 
 
from the case study found that the transplanted western corporate structures might not be 
functioning as expected because China adopted two western models of corporate 
governance systems (the German model and the Anglo-American model), resulting in 
Chinese crossing tiers in the corporate structure. It might reflect the fact that China 
adopted only the naming protocol of these structures, such as supervisors and 
independent directors, leaving a company strongly controlled by majority shareholders, 
and remaining in traditional hierarchical management. In addition, party secretaries are 
embedded in Chinese corporate structures, which means that companies (especially 
SOEs) might not really clarify the relationship with the government after the Chinese 
enterprise reform. In context of Chinese culture, guanxi and hierarchical management 
might cause the transplanted corporate governance to be superficial.  
 
In addition, although Chinese accounting firms disaffiliated from their sponsoring body 
(the government), they are still governed by the MOF, arising from the dual appointment 
of senior directors in the CICPA and the party secretaries. In fact, the government, as a 
majority shareholder in some SOEs, also governs and monitors the CICPA operations, 
which may risk decreasing auditor independence, because of Chinese culture. In this 
case, the government is both regulator and participant, and may use guanxi to gain its 
favourite benefits. Meanwhile, CPAs who are impacted by the government may also 
change their accountability to the government rather than the public interest.  
 
Therefore, although China has adopted the international auditing standards and other 
regulations, it also needs to consider the Chinese cultural and institutional environments. 
Otherwise, these adopted regulations might not be effective.  
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CHAPTER 8 CASE STUDY 2 – GREEN LAND 
8.1 Introduction 
This is a case study of accounting fraud in Yunnan Green Land Biological Technology 
Co., Ltd. by shares (Green Land) (云南绿大地生物科技股份有限公司 ). The 
predecessor of Green Land, Yunnan Hekou Green Land Industry Co., Ltd. (云南河口绿
大地实业有限公司), was founded in 1996. On the basis of literal interpretation, the 
difference between Green Land and Yunnan Hekou Green Land Industry Co., Ltd is a 
company limited by shares and a company with limited liability. The Companies Law of 
the People’s Republic of China, Article 2 states that “the term company refers to a 
company with limited liability or a company limited by shares incorporated within the 
territory of the People’s Republic of China in accordance with this law” and Article 3 
states that “shareholders of a company with limited liability shall assume liability 
towards the company to the extent of the capital contributions subscribed respectively by 
them; and the shareholders of a company limited by shares shall assume liability towards 
the company to the extent of the shares subscribed respectively by them” (Companies 
Law of the People’s Republic of China, 2006, pp. 2-3). These two kinds of companies 
have several differences under the Chinese company law. Firstly, the number of 
shareholders differs. According to Article 24, “a company with limited liability shall be 
jointly invested in and incorporated by not more than 50 shareholders” (Companies Law 
of the People’s Republic of China, 2006, p.6). And also Article 59 requires that “A 
natural person may only make investment for the incorporation of one-person company 
with limited liability. Such a company may not make investment for the incorporation of 
a new one-person company with limited liability” (Companies Law of the People’s 
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Republic of China, 2006, p.14). However, Article 79 in the Chinese companies law 
requires “to incorporate a company limited by shares, there shall be not less than 2 but 
not more than 200 promoters, more than half of whom shall have their domiciles with 
the territory of the People’s Republic of China” (Companies Law of the People’s 
Republic of China, 2006, p.18). After a company has been established, the number of 
shareholders is no longer limited.  
 
Secondly, according to Chinese company law, there are no requirements of registered 
capital for a company with limited liability. However, in the case of a company limited 
by shares, according to Article 90, “after payment in full of the subscription money for 
the shares issued, such money shall be subject to verification by the capital verification 
authority established according to law, which shall produce a capital verification 
certificate” (Companies Law of the People’s Republic of China, 2006, p.20).  
 
Thirdly, the capital contribution certificates in the two kinds of companies are different. 
According to Article 32, in a company with limited liability, “after a company with 
limited liability is incorporated, it shall issue investment certificates to its shareholders” 
(Companies Law of the People’s Republic of China, 2006, p.8). However, according to 
Article 126, “the capital of a company limited by shares shall be divided into shares of 
equal value; the shares of the company shall take the form of share certificates, which 
are vouchers issued by the company to certify the shares held by its shareholders” 
(Companies Law of the People’s Republic of China, 2006, p.27). 
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In addition, the way of establishing the company is different. In a company with limited 
liability, the amount of capital contributions can only be subscribed by its shareholders. 
According to Article 26, “the registered capital of a company with limited liability shall 
be the amount of capital contributions subscribed for by all of its shareholders, as is 
registered with the company registration authority” (Companies Law of the People’s 
Republic of China, 2006, p.7). However, for companies limited by shares, according to 
Article 78 and Article 85,  
“companies limited by shares may be incorporated by means of promotion or by means of share 
offer. A company incorporated by means of promotion is one incorporated by the promoters 
subscribing for all the shares to be issued by the company. A company incorporated by means of 
share offer is one incorporated by the promoters subscribing for a portion of the shares to be issued 
by the company, with the rest offered to the general public or to specific quarter … where a 
company limited by share is incorporated by means of share offer, the shares subscribed for by the 
promoters shall be not less than 35 percent of the total number of the shares issued by the 
company” (Companies Law of the People’s Republic of China, 2006, pp.18-19). 
 
Moreover, there are differences in the publication of financial reports. According to 
Article 166, “a company with limited liability shall send its financial report to each of its 
shareholders within the time limit stipulated”, while “a company limited by shares shall, 
20 days prior to the convening of the annual meeting of the shareholders general 
assembly, make the financial report available at the company for examination by its 
shareholders; and a company limited by shares that publicly issues its shares shall 
publicize its financial report” ” (Companies Law of the People’s Republic of China, 
2006, p.34). 
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Figure 11: The relationship between Green Land and subsidiaries in 2007 
 
  
Yunnan Hekou Green Land Industry Co., Ltd. 
The predecessor 
Yunnan Green Land Biological Technology Co. Ltd. by shares 
 
Chengdu Green Land 
Gardening Co., Ltd. 
(Holding subsidiary) 
Legal Representative: Yunkui 
Xu 
Shenzhen Green Land 
Gardening Technology 
Development Co. Ltd. 
(Holding subsidiary) 
Legal Representative:    Kaixi 
Jiang 
Yunnan Flowers World 
Logistics Co. Ltd. 
(Share subsidiary) 
Legal Representative:      Qin 
Duan 
90% 90% 
3.03% 
Kaixi Jiang: a director and CFO in 
Green Land (2.26% stock control) 
Yunkui Xu: The secretary of the 
board (0% stock control) 
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Figure 12: The relationship of key players in Green Land case  
Yunnan Hekou Green Land Industry Co., Ltd. 
 
 
 
Yunnan Green Land Biological Technology Co. Ltd. by 
shares 
Xuekui He 
28.63% stock control 
Shenzhen Peng Cheng public accounting firm 
(2001-2007) 
Zhong He Zheng Xin public accounting firm – 2008 
Zhong Shen Ya Tai public accounting firm – 2009 
Zhong Zhun Public accounting firm - 2010 
Auditing relationship 
The predecessor 
Xuekui He: the chairman of the board of directors; in 
2008, the general manager and the chairman of the board 
of directors 
Mingxing Pang: the financial consultant of Green Land; the 
partner of the Sichaun Hua Yuan public accounting firm 
Sichuan Hua Yuan Public accounting firm 
The partner 
Feng Liang: one of the 9
th
 Issuance Examination Committee 
Members; the partner of the Shenzhen Peng Cheng Public 
accounting firm 
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Green Land completed the shareholding reform to become a company limited by shares, 
and was the first registration at Yunnan Administration Bureau for Industry and 
Commerce on 28
th
 March 2001 (The report and plan of strengthened corporate 
governance and self-examination in Green Land, 2008, p14). Section 2 of this chapter 
not only discloses Green Land’s fraud accounting operations before listing, but also 
analyses issues in the initial public offering (IPO) process. Section 3 describes 
continuing fraud operations in Green Land after listing and also analyses some reasons 
for auditor independence failure due to the impact of Chinese guanxi. Section 4 argues 
that guanxi is in conflict with auditor independence and introduces Chinese mandatory 
audit partner rotation. Section 5 discusses the relationship between Chinese CPAs and 
governments in which there may be potential risks of decreasing auditor independence, 
and also compares the inspection system of Chinese CPAs with American ones. Section 
6 analyses local governments protectionism in Green Land. Section 7 discusses the 
accountability of CPAs in the context of Chinese culture while Section 8 concludes the 
analysis of Green Land case. 
 
8.2 An analysis of IPO process in Green Land 
8.2.1 Requirements for listing  
In 2007, Green Land’s stock traded on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange and it became the 
first listed company in the horticultural industry, and also the first listed private 
company in Yunnan province. Where were the requirements that needed to be met for 
the company’s listing? According to listing requirements of the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange, a company seeking to launch an IPO and listing on the Main Board and SME 
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Board (a small and medium-sized enterprise) needs particular finance and accounting 
requirements as stated: 
“(1) Its net profit has been positive for the last three financial years, with the aggregate amount 
exceeding RMB 30 million, and net profits shall have been calculated as the lower of the amounts 
before and after deducting non-recurring losses and profits; 
(2) Its cumulative net cash flows from business activities for the last three financial years exceed 
RMB 50 million; or cumulative business income for the last three years exceeds RMB 300 million; 
(3) Its total stock capital before issuance is no less than RMB 30 million; 
(4) Its intangible assets (excluding land use rights, marine cultivation rights and mining rights, etc.) 
do not exceed 20% of net assets at the end of the latest period; and 
(5) No loss has not been made up for in the latest period.” (Shenzhen Stock Exchange, 2006).  
 
According to the IPO prospectus of Green Land in 2007, the net profits in the last three 
consecutive years from 2004 to 2006 were 33.421 million yuan, 37.236 million yuan, 
and 47.070 million yuan, respectively, which is more than 30 million yuan. In addition, 
the revenues from 2004 to 2006 were 146.736 million, 157.792 million, and 190.545 
million, respectively, in which the accumulated revenue in these three years was 495.073 
million, more than 300 million. Moreover, the net operating cash flows from 2004 to 
2006 were 19.937 million, 3.349 million, and 47.517 million, respectively, in which the 
accumulative net operating cash flows were 70.803 million, more than 50 million. And 
also the intangible assets in 30
th
 June 2007 were 84.032 million, which accounted for 
18.75% of total assets (The IPO prospectus of Green Land, 2007, p.13, p.175) (See 
Table 10).  
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Table 10: selected data from Green Land’s financial reports from 2004 to the first half year of 2006  
(The IPO prospectus of Green Land, 2007, p.13, p.175) (Unit: Yuan) 
 
 2004 2005 2006 Total 
Net profit 33.421 million 37.236 million 47.070 million 117.727 million 
Revenue 146.736 million 157.792 million 190.545 million 495.073 million 
Net operating cash 
flow 
19.937 million 3.349 million 47.517 million 70.803 million 
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It appears that all requirements were met. However, in 2006, Green Land applied for a 
share listing, but failed. This raises the question: why did Green Land fail in 2006, yet 
one year later it was able to pass the IPO application? According to News.cn (2012), the 
reason it failed the application of listing in 2006 was that not only that the application 
forms were poorly filled out, but it also failed to answer questions on market research 
operations, market prospects, and raising funds for investment and operations. After the 
first application of the IPO, the applicant, Xuekui He, trained for one year, and Green 
Land finally succeeded in the share listing in 2007. The 2006 application failure may not 
have been because of a lack of professionalism. In fact, Xuekui He did not even hesitate 
to release some original shares to Kaixi Jiang in 2001 when asking him to be the Chief 
Financial Officer (CFO) and the director of Green Land (finance.ifeng.com). Kaixi Jiang 
had worked in the Guizhou Institute of Finance between 1985 and 1987, and also 
worked for the Department of Yunnan Audit between 1987 and 1996 (Green Land 2007 
annual report, 2008, p.12). The record of his experience shows, Kaixi Jiang to be an 
expert in accounting and finance. In 2003, Kaixi Jiang introduced Xuekui He another 
auditing expert, Mingxing Pang. With their help, although Green Land made fraud 
accounting operations for listing, the different results for listing in 2006 and 2007 might 
be because of failure of Guanxi system in the 2006 application, which is analysed in 
section 8.2.3.  
 
8.2.2 Fraud accounting operations for listing  
To become a listed company Green Land committed several accounting frauds. 
According to the audit report of Green Land in 2011 by Shandong Zhengyuan Hexin 
public accounting firm (2012), there were many errors in the financial reports of Green 
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Land between 2004 and 2007, mainly regarding inflating assets though false contracts 
(The audit report of Green Land in 2011, 2012, pp.35-36) (See Table 11).   
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Table 11: Selected frauds in the financial reports of Green Land between 2004 and 2007  
(The audit report of Green Land in 2011, 2012, pp.35-36) 
 
Fraud 1: Green Land made false contracts to inflate the price of 3500 acres of land in Maming town of Malong county
25
 (马龙县马鸣乡), which was 
recorded as 31,900,000.00 yuan. However, the real cost of land was 1,700,000.00 yuan. 
Fraud 2:  Green Land made false contracts to inflate the cost of land reclamation of the 3500 acres of land in Maming town of Malong county (马龙县
马鸣乡), accounted for 21,240,000.00 yuan. However, the real cost of land reclamation was 4,051,272.00 yuan. 
Fraud 3:  Green Land used false contracts to inflate the cost of irrigation system in Maming town of Malong county (马龙县马鸣乡), accounted for 
7,972,000.00 yuan. However, the real cost incurred was only 7,510,820.00 yuan.  
Fraud 4: Green Land used false contracts to inflate the cost of a 960 acres land purchase in Jiuxian village of Malong county (马龙县旧县村), 
accounting for 9,002.000.00 yuan. However, the real cost of land purchase was 550,000.00 yuan. 
  
                                                 
25
 Counties, townships, and villages are at different levels in the Chinese administration frame. 
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Evidence suggests that Green Land forged accounting records so as become a listed 
company. After Green Land successfully became a listed company, it issued 21 million 
shares of one yuan par value stock at a price of 16.49 yuan a share on 6
th
 December 
2007, which raised a total capital of 34.629 million yuan (The IPO prospectus of Green 
Land, 2007, p.1, p. 13). In fact, a company listed by shares needs to engage in complex 
processes in order to list. So how did Green Land make things look alright during the 
listing processes? And why did not the failed case just a year before draw the IPO 
review committee’s attention to Green Land’s application？ 
 
8.2.3 Listing processes 
According to the listing processes provided by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, a 
company limited by shares needs to engage in a complex process to be listed, which can 
be summarized by the following points. First, the company needs to employ 
intermediaries such as securities companies, public accounting firms, asset agencies, and 
law firms to inspect their development history, operation condition, and financial 
situation.  Then the company and intermediaries prepare and submit the application 
documents to the China Security Regulatory Commission (CSRC). The CSRC will 
conduct a preliminary review. After the preliminary review, the application will be 
submitted and reviewed by the Initial Public Offering (IPO) Review Committee which 
consists of seven committee members from both CSRC professionals and non-CSRC 
experts. After reviewing the application, the committee members vote. With five or 
more consent votes, the application will pass the IPO review and the CSRC will grant 
approval to the company. Before the IPO, the company needs to disclose and publish its 
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summary prospectus and make an IPO announcement in the newspapers designated by 
the CSRC (Shenzhen Stock Exchange, 2016). The full listing processes can be seen in 
Appendix 8.2. 
 
In the listing process, seven issuance examination committee members votes determine 
whether the issuance company can pass the IPO review, which is the key part of the 
listing process. The Measures of China Securities Regulatory Commission for the 
Issuance Examination Committee, which had been “deliberated and adopted at the 179
th
 
chairman’s meeting of China Securities Regulatory Commission on 8
th
 May 2006, was 
hereby promulgated and shall come into force on 9
th
 May 2006” (China Securities 
Regulatory Commission, 2006). Article 6 states: “the issuance examination committee 
members comprises of both CSRC professionals and non-CSRC experts, who should be 
appointed by the CSRC. The total of members are 25 people, including 5 CSRC 
professionals and 20 non-CSRC experts” (China Securities Regulatory Commission, 
2006). 
 
On 9
th
 May 2007, the China Securities Regulatory Commission held the meeting of the 
establishment of the 9
th
 Issuance Examination Committee. The 25 committee members’ 
names were published in the website of China Securities Regulatory Commission (China 
Securities Regulatory Commission, 2007a). The names can be seen in Table 12. 
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Table 12: The names of the 9
th
 Issuance Examination Committee members 
 
 Names 
The 9
th
 Issuance Examination 
Committee members 
王志雄 Zhixiong Wang、白彦春 Yanchun Bai、白维 Wei Bai、吕
苏阳 Suyang Lv、孙勇 Yong Sun、张圣怀 Shenghuai Zhang、陆
军 Jun Lu、郑建彪 Jianbiao Zheng、金黎明 Liming Jin、徐珊
Shan Xu、郭洪俊  Hongjun Guo、高忻 Xin Gao、梁烽  Feng 
Liang、傅炳辉 Binghui Fu、温京辉 Jinghui Wen、韩厚军 Houjun 
Han、魏先锋 Xianfeng Wei、白英姿 Yingzi Bai、吴晓求 Xiaoqiu 
Wu、李旭利 Xuli Li、陈飞 Fei Chen、陈洪 Hong Chen、胡宝剑
Baojian Hu、徐林 Lin Xu、郭旭东 Xudong Guo. 
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Interestingly, among these 25 committee member, Feng Liang (梁烽 ) worked in 
Shenzhen Peng Cheng public accounting firm (Finance.sina, 2007) and since 1999, was 
a partner in Shenzhen Peng Cheng public accounting firm. However, prior to 2008, the 
Shenzhen Peng Cheng public accounting firm conducted auditing services for Green 
Land for seven years. The Shenzhen Peng Cheng public accounting firm was founded in 
1992, which is qualified to conduct security and future-related business. In the Shenzhen 
Peng Cheng public accounting firm, there were 500 staff members, and of these 200 
were CPAs and 50 CPAs were qualified to conduct security and future-related business. 
There is a question as to whether Feng Liang (梁峰) played an important role in the 
listing process of Green Land.  
 
According to the announcement of the 157
th
 issuance examination committee working 
meeting in 2007, the issuance examination committee members who attended Green 
Land’s IPO review were Yanchun Bai (白彦春), Yong Sun (孙勇), Jun Lu (陆军), 
Liming Jin (金黎明), Shan Xu (徐珊), Binghui Fu (傅炳辉), and Baojian Hu (胡宝剑) 
(China Securities Regulatory Commission, 2007b) (see Table 13). 
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Table 13: issuance examination committee members who attended Green Land’s IPO review 
 
 Name 
Issuance examination committee members Yanchun Bai (白彦春), Yong Sun (孙勇), Jun Lu (陆
军), Liming Jin (金黎明), Shan Xu (徐珊), Binghui Fu 
(傅炳辉), and Baojian Hu (胡宝剑) 
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Feng Liang (梁峰) was not one of Green Land’s IPO examination committee members. 
The reason is according to No. 3 of Article 15 in The Measures of China Securities 
Regulatory Commission for the Issuance Examination Committee (China Securities 
Regulatory Commission, 2006), if issuance examination committee members or their 
working units have, in the past two years, provided sponsorship, underwriting, audit, 
evaluation, law, consulting, and other services to an issuance company that could 
interfere with their impartial performance, they should request CSRC for permission to 
avoid attending issuance examination committee meetings for the issuance company 
(China Securities Regulatory Commission, 2006). Apparently, Feng Liang complied 
with the rules. 
 
However, do not forget guanxi in the Chinese cultural context. Du et al. (2013) found 
that the relation between issuance companies and issuance examination committee 
members (or a member’s firm) could significantly increase possibilities of passing an 
IPO review. In a silimilar vein, this study finds involvement of issuance examination 
committee members’ public accounting firms from the 6
th
 to 9
th
 Issuance Examination 
Committee (See Table 14).  
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Table 14: List and tenure of the involved public accounting firms where issuance examination committee 
members worked from the 6
th
 to 9
th
 Issuance Examination Committee (Tan et al., 2013, p.192) 
 
Main Board     
Term Tenure involved public accounting firms 
6
th
 24.12.2003 – 
10.12.2004 
Zhong He Zheng Xin, Xin Yong Zhong He, An Yong Hua 
Ming, Zhejiang Tian Jian, PricewaterhouseCoopers Zhong Tian 
7
th
  10.12.2004 – 
31.12.2005 
Zhong He Zheng Xin, Tian Jian Xin De, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers Zhong Tian, Xin Yong Zhong He, An 
Yong Hua Ming 
8
th
  31.12.2005 – 
09.05.2007 
Zhong He Zheng Xin, Tian Jian Xin De, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers Zhong Tian, Xin Yong Zhong He, An 
Yong Hua Ming 
9
th
  09.05.2007 – 
30.04.2008 
Zhejiang Dong Fang Zhong Hui, Shenzhen Peng Cheng, Da 
Xin, Zhejiang Tian Jian, Shanghai Zhong Hua Hu Yin, Yue 
Hua, Li An Da Xin Long, Tian Jian Hua Zheng Zhong Zhou 
(Beijing), Beijing Jing Du 
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According to records (Table 13), Shenzhen Peng Cheng public accounting firm was not 
formally involved in the issuance examination committee until 2007. This evidence 
alone cannot guarantee that Feng Liang did not play an important role in Green Land’s 
listing process, or that the involvement of the Shenzhen public accounting firm increased 
the possibility of Green Land passing its listing review.  
 
In fact, between Green Land and the Shenzhen Peng Cheng public accounting firm, 
there was a complex relationship. Prior to 2008, the Shenzhen Peng Cheng public 
accounting firm conducted auditing services for Green Land for seven years. The 
Shenzhen Peng Cheng public accounting firm reported unqualified opinions on Green 
Land’s financial reports in 2004, 2005, 2006, and the first half year in 2007 (Green 
Land’s audit report, 2007, p.3). One note is that according to the sentence of the 
Kunming Intermediate People’s Court in 2013 (Haitong, 2013), Pang Mingxing (庞明星
) as the financial consultant of Green Land was sentenced to five years imprisonment 
and made to pay a fine of ￥300,000 yuan (about AU$ 60,000). In addition, Pang 
Mingxing was a partner of the Sichuan Hua Yuan public accounting firm which was 
established in December 2005. However, the Sichuan Hua Yuan public accounting firm 
was not qualified to conduct security and future-related business, while the Shenzhen 
Peng Cheng public accounting firm was. Pang Mingxing had working experience in the 
Shenzhen Peng Cheng public accounting firm, and the two public accounting firms had 
a good working relationship. Between 2005 and 2007, Pang Mingxing helped Green 
Land falsify annual financial reports in order to list. The relationship between Green 
Land and public accounting firms is illustrated in Figure 13.  
 
202 
 
Figure 13: The relationship between Green Land and public accounting firms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Green Land He Xuekui 
(The Chairman of the board) 
The Shenzhen Peng 
Cheng public 
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Collusion 
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Even if Pang Mingxing was not signing auditing reports in 2007 (Green Land’s audit 
report, 2007, p.2), according to the sentence of the Kunming Intermediate People’s 
Court in 2013 (Haitong, 2013) Green Land’s audit engagement was associated with a 
personal relationship. Thus, according to the complex relationships within the Green 
Land case, it might be assumed that Feng Liang used guanxi to impact the result of 
Green Land’s listing review, even if he did not attend the IPO review meetings for 
Green Land. 
 
Moreover, the issuance examination committee members should have disaffiliated from 
their original firms and companies, but no laws and regulations clearly state that these 
firms and companies cannot provide services to issuance companies (Du et al., 2013). In 
this case, although Feng Liang was pro forma independent to Green Land and did not 
attend its issuance examination committee meetings, the question remains as to whether 
Feng Liang was in fact independent. Feng Liang disaffiliated his partner position in the 
Shenzhen Peng Cheng public accounting firm, meaning he sacrificed a higher salary to 
become a committee member (Du et al., 2013). That Feng Liang could get extra money 
after helping Green Land to list could be a possibility, especially in the context of 
Chinese guanxi, because guanxi is a long term relationship. Maintaining guanxi in the 
long term relies on continuing beneficial exchanges. 
 
8.3 An analysis of fraud operations after listing 
After becoming a listed company, Green Land continued to commit fraudulent 
accounting operations. Some fraudulent operations are listed in Table 15.   
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Table 15: Selected fraudulent accounting operations after Green Land listing between 2007 and 2009 (The 2011 audit report of Green Land, 2012, pp.36-37) 
 
Fraud 1 Green Land inflated the value of the 9000 acres of land at Maomaodong village in Yuewang town of Malong county (马龙县月
望乡猫猫洞村), accounting for 83,700,000.00 yuan. In 2009, Green Land recorded allowances for assets impairment for this 
land, accounting for 42,852,400.00 yuan. However, the real purchase cost of this land was 0.00 yuan. Green Land used false 
contracts to inflate the cost of the irrigation system of this land, accounting for 34,380,150.00 yuan between 2007 and 2009. 
However, the real cost that occurred was only 8,319,850.00 yuan. 
 
Fraud 2 Green Land inflated the purchase cost of 12,830 acres of land in Wenshan Zhou Guangnan county (文山州广南县), accounting 
for 104,070,550.00 yuan. However, the real cost was 6,039,950.00 yuan. 
 
Fraud 3 At the beginning balance of 2010, the account receivable balance for Kunming Qianke Flower Company (昆明千可花卉有限公
司) was 15,971,970.00 yuan and the account receivable balance for Kunming Xiaolin Gardening Company (昆明晓林园艺工程
有限公司) was 10,500,000.00 yuan. Account payables for these two companies totalled 25,369,412.90 yuan at the beginning 
balance of 2010. All these transactions were forged by Green Land. 
 
Fraud 4 In addition, the account payables beginning balance of 2010 comprised balances for Kunming Free Space Gardening Company 
(昆明自由空间园艺有限公司) 20,814.20 yuan, Kunming Dian Wen Hui Company (昆明滇文卉有限公司) 1,297,173.24 yuan, 
Kunming Yong Hong Gardening Company (昆明永红园艺有限公司) 2,467,987.80 yuan, Kunming Kai Jun Material Company 
(昆明凯珺建筑材料有限公司 ) 5,693,257.92 yuan, Kunming Run Lin Gardening Company (昆明润林园艺有限公司) 
251,354.40 yuan, which were all forged by Green Land. 
 
Fraud 5 On 25
th
 August 2010, Green Land received a bank remittance from Yunnan Xiang Yang Gardening Technical Company (云南
向阳园林科技有限公司) (account no.: 20353011100100000126471), accounted for 1,076,800.00 yuan. Actually, this account 
was opened by Green Land and this transaction did not exist at all 
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There were many other accounting errors between 2007 and 2010, including 
inventories, raw materials, accrued payroll, and other accounting subjects. This raises 
another question: from 2004 to 2010, Green Land committed fraud, while it received 
five unqualified audit reports within 7 years. Did auditors not find any issue within 
the first 5 years or other reasons to impact audit opinions?  
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Table 16: Green Land changing public accounting firms from 2008 to 2010 
 
Year Name of public 
accounting firms 
Auditing 
fees 
Auditing opinion Reasons of changing public accounting 
firms 
2008 Zhong He Zheng Xin ￥300,000 Unqualified 
opinion 
Working arrangement of the Peng Cheng 
public accounting firm 
2009 Zhong Shen Ya Tai ￥500,000 Qualified opinion The Zhong He public accounting firm 
merged with the Tian Jian Guang Hua 
public accounting firm 
2010 Zhong Zhun ￥500,000 Disclaimer of 
Opinion 
Working arrangement of the Zhong Shen 
Ya Tai public accounting firm 
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After listing, Green Land changed its public accounting firms three times in three 
years and each time these happened on the eve of the disclosure date of the annual 
report. The audit fees nearly doubled in cost after changing public accounting firms, 
thereby raising suspicion that Green Land may have ‘bought’ the audit opinions 
(Table 16).  
 
According to the sentence of the Kunming Intermediate People’s Court in 2013 
(Haitong, 2013), punishment for the Shenzhen Peng Cheng public accounting firm 
was to revoke the license of its securities services business, but this did not have a 
great impact on the partners, because the Shenzhen Peng Cheng public accounting 
firm had already merged into the Guofu Haohua public accounting firm in 2012. 
However, three other public accounting firms listed in Table 16 did not receive any 
punishment. This begs the question: what are the responsibilities of auditors? 
 
According to the regulation of the Audit Engagement Letter, the company’s 
responsibilities are: 
1. According to Accounting Law of The People's Republic of China and Regulations on 
Financial Reporting of Enterprises, the Company and the Company's management are 
responsible for the authenticity and integrality of the accounting records. Therefore, the 
Company's management is responsible for properly maintaining the accounting records and 
providing us the financial information (but not limited to accounting vouchers, books and 
records and other accounting information).  Such records should reflect a true and fair view of 
the Company's financial position, operating result and cash flow.   
2. It is the Company's management responsibilities to prepare the financial statements in 
accordance with Accounting System for Business Enterprises. Such responsibilities also 
include, (1) the design, establishment and maintenance of a proper internal-control system that 
to avoid the financial statements contain material misstatements because of frauds or mistakes; 
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(2) to decide and to use appropriate accounting policies; (3) to make reasonable accounting 
estimates. (The Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 2006) 
 
The public accounting firm’s duties: 
1. Our duties are to express our opinions to the Company’s financial statements. We will 
perform our audit based on the Auditing Standards of People’s Republic of China (referred 
hereinafter as the “PRC Auditing Standards”). The PRC Auditing Standards require us to 
follow the professional ethics requirements, to plan and to perform our audit, so as to obtain 
the necessary assurance that the financial statements are free of material misstatement.   
2. Our audit comprises of performance of our audit procedures so as to obtain audit evidence in 
relation to the amounts on the financial statements and the related disclosures. We shall select 
the necessary audit procedures using our professional judgments. The audit procedures include 
the evaluation of the material misstatements resulting from fraud and other mistakes. When we 
are evaluating the inherent audit risks, we also consider internal controls relating to the 
compilation of financial statements, in order to decide the appropriate audit procedures. The 
purpose of the risk assessment is not to provide any opinion to the effectiveness of the internal 
controls. The audit procedures also include the evaluation on appropriateness of the adoption 
of the accounting policies, reasonability of accounting estimates and the evaluation of the 
overall financial statements presentation which are decided by the Company's management.   
3. We need to perform a reasonable audit plan and carry out our audit works which ensure us to  
obtain sufficient and appropriate audit evidence to have the assurance for the Company's 
financial statements do not contain any material misstatement.   
4. We have the responsibility to state in the auditors' report for any Company's activities that 
do not follow the <Accounting System for Business Enterprises> where the Company do not 
adjust their financial statements in accordance with our suggestions.   
5. Because of the nature and the inherent limitation of our audit tests and the inherent limitation 
of the internal controls, the risk of the probabilities of the existence of material misstatement 
after our audit still exists.   
6. During our audit, if any material weakness in the internal control is noted, we might provide 
management suggestion letter to the Company.  In our management suggestion letter, it does 
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not provide all probable weaknesses in the internal control or all possible remedies to the 
weaknesses found. The Company should evaluate the effectiveness before implementing our 
suggested remedies. The Company cannot disclose the management suggestion letter to any 
other parties without our written consent.   
7. Our audit does not reduce the responsibilities of the Company and the responsibilities of the 
management of the Company. (The Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 2006) 
 
Therefore, the public accounting firm’s responsibilities are based on the authenticity 
and integrity of the accounting records provided by the company, while the public 
accounting firm’s duties are placed on auditors who should comply with professional 
ethics requirements (including independence) properly. In addition, the China 
Standard on Auditing No. 1141 – The auditor’s responsibility to consider fraud in an 
audit of financial statements clearly divides responsibilities of auditors and company 
governance and management tiers. Article 13 states that preventing and detecting 
fraud is the responsibility of company governance and management layers. Article 
16 requires auditors to implement auditing processes based on the China Standard on 
Auditing and to reasonably assure that there are no material misstatements in 
financial statements, regardless of whether the misstatement is due to fraud or errors. 
In fact, Article 16 does not conflict with Point 5 of the public accounting firm’s 
duties, because Article 16 requires auditors to reasonably assure there are no material 
misstatements, so it considers the nature and the inherent limitation of audit tests and 
the inherent limitation of the internal controls. Although the inherent limitation of the 
internal controls may limit auditors’ judgments, the process of auditing risk 
assessment may help auditors find risks of material misstatements. The auditing risk 
assessment is a process that occurs before implementing the audit. If there are 
material risks after completing the risk assessment, the auditor should refuse to 
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continue auditing. If auditors do not implement the risk assessment properly, they 
may not find existing miss-statements through collecting their auditing evidence. 
Evaluating internal controls is the auditor’s responsibility.   
 
In the Green Land case, this raises another question: whether there were no issues 
within Green Land corporate governance or whether auditors had difficulty in 
finding potential risks within Green Land’s internal control. In fact, there were some 
suspect issues in Green Land corporate governance. For example, according to 
financial reports before 2010, independent directors did not point out any issues in 
the company. In March 2010, CSRC started to investigate fraud operations in Green 
Land and the 22
nd
 meeting of the 4
th
 board of directors in March 2011 decided to 
dismiss Xuekui He of the position of chair of the board. Yaguang Zheng replaced her 
position as the chairman of directors and the secretary of the board until the 
restricting of Green Land. In this way, according to the 2010 annual report of Green 
Land published in April 2011, independent directors gave suggestions on the internal 
control of the company.  
 
In addition, from 2007 to 2010, there was a rapid movement across positions in 
Green Land. For example in this period Yunkui Xu took several positions, first as the 
secretary of the board, then deputy general manager, followed by general manager, 
and finally the deputy general manager. Zhiming Mao was the general manager in 
2007. Xuekui He held two positions in 2008 chairman of the board the general 
manager. In 2010, Guangzhong Wang was the general manager and also the director. 
The position of general manager was frequently changed, which might be because 
this position did not have real authority while the chairman of the board, Xuekui He, 
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was in control. Xuekui He had a bachelor degree, was a graduate from the School of 
Commerce in Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, and had the 
qualification as senior economist. From 1990 to 1993, she was an accountant in Lu 
Da company affiliated to Yunnan Provincial Science and Technology Department. 
From 1993 to 1995, she was project manager in Sheng Long company affiliated to 
the Health and Family Planning Commission of Yunnan Province. From 1995 to 
1996, she was the chairman of the board in Yunnan He Kou Yong An company. 
From1996, she ran Yunnan Hekou Green Land Industry Co., Ltd. (云南河口绿大地
实业有限公司) (The 2010 financial report of Green Land, 2011, p.11). After listing, 
in 2007, Green Land raised 346 million yuan. Xuekui He was the largest shareholder 
in Green Land from 2007 to 2010, and had a 28.63% shareholding. As such, she 
ranked among the 2009 Hurun List which reports the richest people in China.  
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Table 17: Selective positions in Green Land from 2007 to 2010 
 
 Name list 
           Year  
Position 
2007 2008 2009 2010 
The chairman of the board of 
directors 
Xuekui He Xuekui He Xuekui He Xuekui He 
The secretary of the board Yunkui Xu Linming Tang Linming Tang Xuekui He 
The general manager Zhiming Mao Xuekui He Yunkui Xu Guangzhong Wang 
The deputy general manager Desheng Chen Linming Tang; Desheng Chen; 
Yunkui Xu; Menglong Li 
Linming Tang; Desheng Chen; 
Menglong Li 
Yunkui Xu; Desheng Chen; 
Gang Li 
The Chief Financial Officer Kaixi Jiang Kaixi Jiang Kaixi Jiang Peng Li 
 
213 
 
In addition, in 2010, Guangzhong Wang was general manager, which might be 
because Green Land wanted to make use of Guangzhong Wang’s political 
background to facilitate financing and get protection from the inspection of CSRC. 
According to the news from XZBU website, in the construction of green seedling 
production base, there was a 550-million-yuan shortfall in 2009. Green Land faced 
huge financial pressure; Guangzhong Wang might have been used to help in 
financing. Guangzhong Wang was party secretary of the Kunming foreign trade and 
economic relations commission from 2001 to 2004. And also from 2004 to 2010 he 
was placed as deputy director, director, and party secretary of the Kunming Bureau 
of Commerce (The 2010 financial report of Green Land, 2011, p.12).  
 
It is insightful to compare details from the annual reports of 2007 and 2010. In 2007, 
there were 6 directors on the board (Xuekui He, Guoquan Zhao, Hong Hu, Kaixi 
Jiang, Gang Li, and Jiafu Zhong), while in 2010 there were only three directors on 
the board (Xuekui He, Hong Hu, and Guangzhong Wang). Only two original 
directors remained. If Green Land’s performance was good, why did so many 
directors leave their position? Could it be that they have realised that Green Land 
was going to collapse, so they left? 
 
Therefore, facing such chaos within Green Land corporate governance, auditors did 
not detect fraud operations and reported unqualified opinions in the first 5 years 
(from 2004 to 2008). Auditors might have used fraudulent financial information 
provided by the audited company to explain and reduce their responsibilities in 
Green Land case, but CSRC needed to consider whether it was true or whether 
auditors did not keep to their professional ethics or even not implement auditing risk 
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assessment, especially under the effect of Chinese culture and high competition in 
the CPA industry. China’s audit services market has been in rapid growth since the 
1980s. By 2016, the Chinese CPA had become a highly competitive industry. 
According to the Overview of the Accountancy Profession in China (The Chinese 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 2016), “CICPA has 8,374 accounting firms 
as group members (accounting firms), 40 of them are qualified to conduct security 
and future-related business and 11 firms are authorized to conduct H-share audit” (p. 
2). In the end of 2015, there were approximately 2,800 listed companies (The 
Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 2016), while only 40 public 
accounting firms were qualified to audit them, averaging 70 clients per audit firm. 
According to Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014) and Huang et al. (2016), during the period 
from 1999 to 2007, the Big 4 audit firms accounted for only 17% of market share in 
China. Within the Chinese audit market, the Big 4 audit firms accounted for 61% of 
American market share, 71% of Australian market share, and 74% of Taiwan market 
share during the period from 1999 to 2007 (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014, p.21). In 
2014, the revenue of the Chinese accountancy profession reached 60.357 billion yuan 
(The Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 2016, p.2), while the revenue 
of the ‘Big 4’ in China was approximately 10 billion yuan which only accounted for 
16% (The Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 2016) (Figure 14). This 
shows the low concentration of the Chinese audit market and this is likely to have 
increased competition which in turn might have weakened the bargaining power of 
auditors and interfered with auditor independence. The following example describes 
how auditors might not have defended their rights in Green Land due to the effect of 
Chinese culture in the context of high competition within the CPA industry.  
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Figure 14: Revenue of Top 100 Accounting firms of China from 2006 to 2014 (The Chinese Institute 
of Certified Public Accountants, 2016, p.8) 
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According to the Notice of listed companies to hire and replace public accounting 
firms (Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission, 1996), if a listed company 
replaces a public accounting firm, it should inform the public accounting firm and 
give reasons. If the public accounting firm is not satisfied with the reasons, it can 
report the listed company to the China Security Regulatory Commission and the 
Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants. Moreover, the new auditors should 
communicate with their predecessors as to why they were replaced. If the new 
auditors know of any unreasonable reasons for replacement, they should not provide 
auditing services to the listed company. 
 
From this case, it is difficult to identify whether the new auditors communicated with 
the former auditors. However, when all four public accounting firms were replaced, 
none of them reported to the China Security Regulatory Commission and the Chinese 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants for the reason of replacement. The replaced 
accounting firms did not report against being sacked by Green Land. The reasons 
may be as follows. Firstly, the reporting process can be time-consuming. Even if the 
China Security Regulatory Commission and the Chinese Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants support a report, they only provide suggestions to the general meeting 
of shareholders to reconsider the replacement. Secondly, due to Chinese culture, 
people save face for others and keep good guanxi with others, so determining the 
success of an individual. If the public accounting firms had reported to Green Land 
about the replacement, they would have completely damaged their relationship with 
the company. Moreover, if Green Land had spread information about the reporting 
among listed companies, other listed companies might not want to hire these public 
accounting firms either because someone who did not give face to another must be a 
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difficult person. Nobody wants to cooperate with a difficult person. Thirdly, the 
reason might be from the public accounting firms’ point of view. They might have 
known Green Land’s real financial situation because all of them were big accounting 
firms qualified to conduct security and future-related business. However, they might 
have only issued audit reports and not reported real facts, especially those who issued 
unqualified opinions. 
 
In addition, from Green Land’s point of view, frequently changing public accounting 
firms from 2008 to 2010 might have been because Green Land was not in a 
harmonious situation during that time, although reasons given for changing public 
accounting firms by Green Land were not convincing. In contrast, changing to the 
Zhong He Zheng Xin public accounting firm in 2008 might have been because a 
person such as Pang Mingxing was introduced to Green Land by using guanxi. Thus, 
although the 2008 auditing report issued an unqualified opinion, it appears that such 
harmonious guanxi might have been broken after 2008. That is because the audit fees 
nearly doubled in cost after hiring the Zhong Shen Ya Tai public accounting firm. 
Green Land might have ‘bought’ the audit opinion. However, the Zhong Shen Ya Tai 
public accounting firm might not have had a deep relationship with Green Land. 
Thus, Zhong Shen Ya Tai issued a qualified opinion in the 2009 auditing report and 
Green Land did not have its wishes fulfilled. Thus, Green Land continued to change 
public accounting firms and hired the Zhong Zhun public accounting firm for its 
2010 annual financial report audit. This was also because Zhong Shen Ya Tai had 
issued a qualified opinion in the 2009 auditing report released in 2010. In the same 
year, the China Securities Regulatory Commission started to investigate Green 
Land’s suspected financial information disclosure. Therefore, one likely reason for 
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Green Land’s scandal being exposed was that Green Land had not kept harmonious 
relationships. With guanxi harmony it might not only be difficult to discover 
corporate scandals, but also possible to induce a lack of auditor independence. 
 
Moreover, in reality, public accounting firms will have signed an auditing contract 
with audited companies or even issued audit reports. However, due to audit reports 
not satisfying their requirements, audited companies scrapped the contract. Public 
accounting firms normally did not sue audited companies because they wanted to 
keep a harmonious relationship with them, especially in small public accounting 
firms. Keeping a harmonious relationship is not just to obtain future business with 
the audited company, but also to show that the public accounting firm has a 
harmonious relationship and gives face to potential clients. In China, there is an old 
saying: “和气生财” (Do business with a smile and you'll make a pile; Harmony 
breeds wealth.). 
 
8.4 Guanxi conflict with auditor independence 
However, in the context of harmony and face-giving situations, guanxi is contrary to 
the spirit of auditor independence. Auditor independence is recognized as one of the 
core values of modern auditors. Independence has been of concern and a topic of 
debate in the auditing profession for a long time. Carey and Doherty (1966) defined 
the meaning of auditor independence: 
“First, in the sense of not being subordinate, it means honesty, integrity, objectivity and 
responsibility. Second, in the narrow sense in which it is used in connection with auditing and 
expression of opinions on financial statements, independence means avoidance of any 
relationship which would be likely, even subconsciously, to impair the CPA’s objectivity as 
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auditor. Third, it means avoidance of relationships which to a reasonable observer would 
suggest a conflict of interest.” (Vanasco, 1996, p.4). 
 
Bartlett (1991) stated that “independence is a term used every day by CPAs. It is a 
common English word which has assumed a special significance in the linguistic 
structure of the accounting profession” (p. 11). Bartlett (1991) defined independence, 
as a characteristic of individuals, is “a mental state of being unbiased with regard to a 
particular client” (p. 11), and as a set of constraints, is “adherence to rules which are 
designed to create the appearance that the CPA is disinterested in the outcome of the 
audit process” (p. 11). Bartlett’s definition of independence also emphasised self-
determination and no other influences.  
 
Guenin-Paracini et al. (2015) distinguished two senses of independence: 
organizational and operational senses, based on Power’s (1999) study. The 
organizational dimension of independence is primarily regarded to “design an 
incentive [organizational] structure together with a range of escalatory possibilities 
such that auditors…will not be deterred from using the available enforcement options 
when necessary” (Power, 1999, p. 132, cited from Guenin-Paracini et al., 2015, p. 
202). That means auditors would not change auditing opinions when reporting errors 
found during an audit, which is consistent with Bartlett’s individual independence. 
Guenin-Paracini et al. (2015) focused on operational independence. Operational 
independence is more concerned with the audit process itself and is linked to the 
notion of competence as the “ability [of auditors] to detect material misstatements” 
(Humphrey et al., 2007, p. 151, cited from Guenin-Paracini et al., 2015, p. 202). 
However, auditors’ capability to work with diligence and efficacy depends on 
information supplied by the auditee. Ultimately, Guenin-Paracini et al. (2015) found 
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that the reality of operational independence could not design as Bartlett’s (1991) 
definition as “adherence to rules which are designed to create the appearance that the 
CPA is disinterested in the outcome of the audit process” (p. 11), because official 
arrangement designed to guarantee operational independence are unlikely to be 
effective and independence is a personal state of mind which drives action. 
 
As mentioned before, no matter which dimension of independence was defined, 
all emphasised there being no relationship and no other influence. However, 
guanxi is cultivated by the exchange of personalized favours. Mutually beneficial 
and reciprocal exchange is the core of guanxi. Hwang and Staley (2005) state, 
“such gifts strike an ethical nerve in a western society and are contrary to at least 
the spirit of Sarbanes-Oxley Act
26
 in the U.S.” (Cited Hwang et al., 2008, p. 237). 
Guanxi is contrary to the spirit of auditor independence in Chinese CPA 
Professional Ethical Standards that require an auditor to be independent in both in 
form and substance. 
 
8.4.1 Chinese mandatory audit partner rotation 
In 2002, Section 203 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 implemented mandatory 
audit partner rotation. Its purpose was to keep auditor independence and reduce 
auditors collaborating with audited companies to do accounting fraud after the 
scandal of Enron and Arthur Andersen was exposed. This section states that: 
                                                 
26
 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act is legislation passed by the U.S. Congress on July 25, 2002 (Coates IV, 
2007). The Sarbanes-Oxley legislation was designed to fix auditing of U.S. public companies after a 
series of high-profile financial scandals that occurred in the early 2000s including Enron, Woldcom, 
Tyco, and others. The Sarbanes-Oxley created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 
which is to enlist auditors to enforce existing laws against theft and fraud by corporate officers 
(Coates IV, 2007). The new rules were “concerning the auditor-firm relationship, auditor rotation, 
auditor provision of non-audit service, and corporate whistle-blowers” (Coates IV, 2007, p. 91). 
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“it shall be unlawful for a registered public accounting firm to provide audit services to an 
issuer if the lead (or coordinating) audit partner (having primary responsibility for the audit), or 
the audit partner responsible for reviewing the audit, has performed audit services for that 
issuer in each of the 5 previous fiscal years of that issuer” (Sec.gov, 2002, p.773). 
 
Chinese regulators considered that Chinese guanxi could heavily influence auditor 
independence, so in 2003 the China Security Regulatory Commission and Ministry 
of Finance jointly issued a policy which requires that auditors who sign the audit 
report of a listed company should be rotated off after five years (The China 
Securities Regulatory Commission, 2003; Firth et al., 2012, p.115). The key 
requirements of mandatory audit partner rotation are summarized in Table 18. 
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Table 18: The key requirements of mandatory audit partner rotation (Firth et al., 2012, p.116) 
 
No. of article Article contents 
Article 3 Signing auditors must not provide audit services for the same entity for 
more than five consecutive years, except under the circumstances specified 
in Article 7. 
Article 5 Signing auditors must not provide audit services for the same initial public 
offering (IPO) entity for more than two consecutive years after the IPO. 
Article 7 If both of the signing auditors have provided audit services for the same 
entity for five consecutive years during the same period, one of them is 
allowed to extend to a maximum of one more year their position as a 
signing auditor of the entity concerned. 
Article 8 After a signing auditor is rotated off due to having provided audit services 
for the same entity for five consecutive years, he should not provide audit 
services for this entity within two years. 
Article 13 This regulation takes effect on January 1, 2004. 
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Although the policy of mandatory audit partner rotation was issued in 2003, it did not 
reduce the impact of guanxi in the Green Land case in 2007. This is because Pang 
Mingxing used another way for the policy to lose effectiveness, because he was not 
one of the signing auditors of auditing reports. In China’s highly competitive CPA 
industry, public accounting firms are also happy to use personal guanxi to gain an 
audit engagement in order to increase business revenue, while auditors such as Pang 
Mingxing could also earn personal benefits from referral fees. Therefore, expecting 
the policy of audit partner rotation to be effective is a big risk because of the 
influence of Chinese culture - guanxi. 
 
8.5 The impact of government 
The analysis above discusses the effect of personal guanxi on auditor independence. 
However, according to Chinese auditing development history and enterprise reform, 
as described in the previous chapter, the government as a regulator and also 
participant may also risk damaging Chinese auditor independence in the context of 
guanxi.  
 
8.5.1 Government influence 
As mentioned in the previous chapter concerning Chinese auditing development 
history, financial auditing services really started in the People’s Republic of China in 
early 1983. CPA firms were established and sponsored by government bodies or 
government controlled institutions (Yang et al., 2001) until 1996. After the initiation 
of a program to disaffiliate CPA firms from their sponsoring bodies in 1997, the 
disaffiliated CPA firms needed to take higher market risks than affiliated firms, and 
therefore needed to act more independently. However, although after the 
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disaffiliation program the Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountant (CICPA) 
was seen as a private organization, it was essentially governed and regulated by the 
Ministry of Finance. Moreover, the government impacts the operation of the CICPA 
by allowing dual appointment of senior directors in the CICPA who also have a 
government position. Therefore, the government may still control the CICPA.  
 
8.5.2 The relationship with government 
As mentioned above, Chinese financial audits are impacted by the government and 
enterprise reform was derived from government influence. The enterprise reforms 
were completed in the 1990s and the adoption of the Company Law in December 
1993 provided a legal framework for SOEs to clarify property rights. Although a 
large number of listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges 
were carved out from SOEs, the state and parent SOEs still hold sufficient shares to 
control the dominant portion of listed companies (Kang and Kim, 2012, pp. 473-
474). By the end of 2013, in China’s 2460 listed companies, state-owned listed 
companies (including local state-controlled listed companies and the central state-
controlled listed companies) accounted for 83% of total net assets, and their market 
value accounted for 69.8% of A-share market value (ifeng, 2014; sohu, 2013).  
 
Due to historical reasons the relationship between public accounting firms and the 
government and the relationship between listed companies and the government, as 
well as the relationship between listed companies and public accounting firms are 
complex. Whether or not the government mediated between auditor and audited 
companies when financial issues disclosed could a potentially decrease auditor 
independence. Empirical findings from existing studies are mixed. Gul et al. (2009) 
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found that after the disaffiliation program, qualified audit opinions for listed 
companies in China significantly increased, and Chinese government improved 
auditor independence, especially in small public accounting firms. However, Lin and 
Fraser (2008) found that Chinese government agencies impacted on the difficulty of 
assessing risk in an audit engagement. In addition, Wu and Patel (2015) showed that 
the government could have influence over the appointment of an auditor. 
 
This study considers that the relationship with government has the potential to 
decrease auditor independence. In the process of corporatization of traditional state-
managed SOEs, the state still holds shares of companies, but the state is an abstract 
entity, not a natural person. China was trying to materialise the state shareholders to 
appoint a legal person as the state shareholder, which resulted in a complicated 
relationship between the government and companies. In addition, according to 
differences in affiliation, SOEs or state-holding shares companies can be divided into 
SOEs by supervision of the central state assets management bureau, SOEs by 
supervision of local state assets management bureau, and SOEs by supervision of the 
MOF (central administrative institutions owned enterprises, financial companies such 
as banks, and companies having financial relations with MOF). MOF also supervises 
and governs CICPA as mentioned before. Although legal persons in the SOEs, 
persons who supervise state assets in SOEs, and persons who supervise CICPA are 
not the same person, all of them work for government. The government is both 
regulator and participant. The present government has been a one-party dictatorship 
of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) since the founding of the People’s Republic 
of China in 1949. The CCP is the highest leadership in the whole country. Therefore, 
there could be a potential risk of the government impacting CPAs’ opinions on 
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financial reports of SOEs. They might wish to do this in order to protect state-owned 
benefits, which might be protecting the value of state-owned assets against loss, or 
guaranteeing tax collection to accomplish political goals. Moreover, from the global 
view, with more and more foreign companies entering China, whether or not the 
government decreases auditor independence is a potentially big risk for foreign 
investors, because the government is both regulator and participant.  
 
8.5.3 Comparing the inspection system of CPA in China with the United States 
However, some Chinese scholars argued that self-regulation in Western countries, 
such as America, may be not a good choice for China. Liu and Chen (2004) 
compared the Chinese system with the American accounting inspection system. They 
stated that the Public Oversight Board (POB) was the self-regulatory system that 
oversaw the accounting profession in the United States. The POB was created by the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) in 1977 as an 
independent private sector body charged with overseeing and reporting on the 
programs of the Securities and Exchange Commission Practice Section (POB, 2003). 
However, due to high profile corporate scandals, such as Enron, the POB lost public 
trust. The POB was terminated by Section IX of the Charter in 2002 (POB, 2003). In 
the same year, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) was 
established by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 which required that auditors of 
American public companies be subject to external and independent oversight 
(PCAOB, 2016). Liu and Chen (2004) argued that the American inspection system 
for CPAs changed from self-regulation to external oversight.  
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In contrast, the Chinese supervision system of CPA can be divided into government 
supervision (the external inspection) and self-supervision. Chinese public accounting 
firms have been supervised and governed by government institutions and CICPA 
(See Figure 15). The MOF is the main government institution that supervises public 
accounting firms. Its duties are mainly to develop CPA regulations and registrations, 
the approval of the establishment of public accounting firms and penalising of 
accounting violations. In addition, the National Audit Office also acts as a supervisor 
of government institutions, but it only governs public accounting firms that are 
qualified to conduct security and future-related business. 
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Public accounting firms qualified  
to conduct security and future-related business 
 
All public accounting firms 
Figure 15: The Chinese supervision system of public accounting firms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: CSRC is Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission; NAO is the National Auditor Office; MOF is Ministry of Finance; CICPA is the Chinese Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants. 
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However, the National Audit Office has no authority to revoke a CPA’s registration 
and deregister a public accounting firm’s qualification, but it does have the right to 
refer violation cases to the MOF. Another government supervision institution is the 
Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). It inspects listed companies’ 
audited financial reports. If CPAs commit violations leading to a misleading 
financial report, CSRC has the authority to suspend the qualification of conduct of 
listed companies audits and fine accounting firms. As mentioned before, after the 
disaffiliation in 1997, the CICPA was deemed a private organization, but it is 
essentially governed and regulated by the MOF. The government influences the 
operation of CICPA in various ways such as allowing dual appointment of senior 
directors in CICPA who also have government positions. As mentioned before, the 
government is both regulator and also participant; it is also an inspector of CPAs. 
This is very different to the situation with the PCAOB which is an external and 
independent inspective organization. Considering, in China, the present government 
is a one-party dictatorship of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) which is the 
highest leadership in the whole country. Thus, in China’s relationship-oriented 
society, there is a high risk of decreasing auditor independence and the government 
oversight may contribute to this risk.  
 
8.6 Local government’s protectionism 
When a company becomes a listed company, beneficiaries are not only the company 
and agencies, but also local governments, especially in underdeveloped regions. For 
example, in this case, another interesting issue is in the first quarter financial report 
of Green Land in 2010 (2010, p.6), Green Land’s sale revenue was 161,120,638.27 
yuan and cash flow from sales of goods and rendering of services was 537,281.28 
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yuan, while cash paid for various taxes was 302,041,225.95 yuan (The first quarter 
financial report of Green Land in 2010, 2010, p.8). However, according to the 
supplements and correction notice for the first quarter financial report of Green Land 
in 2010 (2010, pp.5-6), after the adjustment and correction, cash flow from sales of 
goods and rendering of services was 59,893,483.44 yuan and cash paid for various 
taxes was 1,009,021.68 yuan. Green Land paid so much in tax to governments. This 
could explain why local governments encourage local companies to list, i.e. it can 
greatly increase taxes and increasing tax is a political achievement for local 
government. As such, local governments not only wish local companies to list but 
also help companies cover up certain issues so they can gain more benefits from 
local listed companies. When the Green Land scandal was exposed, Yunnan local 
government interceded with the CSRC for Green Land, and obstructed the execution 
of the arrest of Xuekui He several times. According to news from Chinese economic 
observation (Huang, 2011), in December 2010, Green Land contacted the Yunnan 
Finance Office and China Securities Regulatory Commission Yunnan Authority in 
order to get help with the investigation by CSRC which had started to investigate 
fraud operations in Green Land in March 2010. To protect Green Land, the vice 
governor of Yunnan province who was in charge of this case went to Beijing twice, 
and the provincial deputy secretary-general went to Beijing at least 10 times. Both of 
them were trying to negotiate with CSRC on behalf of Green Land. Thus, this kind of 
regional protectionism may encourage deliberate fraud to some degree, at least in the 
Green Land case. Of course, local governments also get benefits from local 
companies.  
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8.7 Accountability of Chinese CPAs 
As discussed above, although auditor independence is a core value for auditors, there 
is no such thing as pure independence because human beings are also social beings 
who are heavily influenced by their cultural environment. This is especially true in 
China because it is a relationship-oriented society that values guanxi. Auditing is 
recognized as a social activity that involves both social and cultural activities. 
Therefore, it is difficult to avoid other influences and keep ‘objective’ opinions. In 
fact, when an opinion is expressed, it is already mixed with personal opinion. 
Therefore, this section discusses Chinese auditors’ expected accountability – to 
whom, and for what, and whether this conflicts with the spirit of auditor 
independence. 
 
The process of inspections should iron out irregularities and errors. According to 
Article 33 of the Accounting Law of the People’s Republic of China, financial 
bureaus, government auditing bureaus, tax bureaus, the People’s Bank, securities 
regulatory bureaus and insurance supervision departments should be in accordance 
with relevant laws and administrative regulations duties when they supervise and 
inspect companies’ accounting information. After supervision and inspection, 
inspection conclusions should be issued. However, if supervision and inspection 
results have been made by prior supervision departments to meet posterior 
supervision departments in performing their duties required, posterior supervision 
departments should use the supervision results made by prior supervision 
departments in order to avoid repeated audit (Ministry of Finance of the People’s 
Republic of China, 2000). This raises the question as to whether the accounting 
information audited by CPAs is accurate enough to meet the requirements of other 
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supervision departments. If it meets other supervision departments’ requirements, 
these departments do not need to repeatedly audit this information. As such, the 
functions of different supervision departments may be overlapping or not carried out. 
 
In the listing process of Green Land, if CSRC carried out its duty, it would have 
found false accounting entries, and Green Land would not have passed its listing 
application. Moreover, after becoming a listed company, Green Land was continuing 
to conduct fraud accounting operations, and the auditing reports for the 2007 and 
2008 financial reports were issued with unqualified opinions. If any of the 
supervision institutions for CPA had met their responsibilities, Green Land’s 
financial scandal would have been exposed earlier. Therefore, Chinese CPAs may 
lack supervision and regulations because of the impact of Chinese culture in which 
everyone would like to keep a harmonious guanxi.  
 
CPA’s accountability is expected to protect the public interests. However, due to 
high competition in the industry and a low degree of regulation, the accountability 
may shift to majority shareholders in order to keep the loyalty of customers.  
 
Moreover, after more than three decades of Chinese economic reforms, relative laws 
and regulations, such as the Chinese auditing standards and the Chinese company 
laws, have been established and converged to corresponding international laws and 
regulations. However, according to the case of Green Land, these laws and 
regulations did not achieve expected effectiveness because people attach more 
importance to guanxi. Actually, in ancient Chinese society, people were regulated by 
governors and it was not until the modern era that Sun Yat-sen, the first president of 
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the Republic of China, generated the concept of governing the state by laws. As 
mentioned before, people referred to governors as ‘parent governors’ and societies 
were constructed by relationships. When an issue occurred between two people, the 
first response was to find someone who could solve the issue, rather than find 
relative laws to defend themselves. Thus, it is often observed in China that 
bureaucrats shield one another. Although in ancient Chinese society governors 
proposed that ‘all men are equal in the eyes of the law; even the king must be subject 
to the law’ (in Chinese: 王子犯法与庶民同罪), there was never a king or emperor 
who was punished. In fact, the saying that all men were equal was ideological only. 
In reality, as another old saying expresses it, ‘punishments are not for nobles; 
ceremony is not for the common people’ (刑不上大夫，礼不下庶人 ), which 
reflects the fact that there was a strict hierarchy in ancient Chinese societies.  
 
However, for the historical reasons, in current Chinese society, although governing 
the state by laws is a fundamental policy, people still attach importance to guanxi. 
For example, there was a famous scandal in China referred to as ‘My Dad is Gang 
Li’. On 16
th
 April 2010, there was a traffic accident causing one death and one injury 
in Hebei University. The driver, Qiming Li, was driving drunk and after the accident, 
he continued to drive. When he was arrested, he called out “my dad is Gang Li; I 
don’t care if you sue me”. His father (Gang Li) was the deputy chief in Baoding 
Bureau of Public Security in Hebei province. After this scandal was exposed by the 
media, “my dad is Gang Li” become Chinese catchwords. This scandal shows that in 
current society some people who have guanxi with important people have relatively 
little sense of laws.  
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Therefore, in the Green Land case, it can be understand why Pang Mingxing (庞明星
), as the financial consultant of Green Land, was sentenced, while the Shenzhen Peng 
Cheng public accounting firm which had reported unqualified opinion to Green 
Land’s financial report in 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007 was not punished, according 
to the sentence of the Kunming Intermediate People’s Court in 2013 (Haitong, 2013). 
This might be because the Shenzhen Peng Cheng public accounting firm had a better 
guanxi than Pang Mingxing and so could avoid punishments.  This kind of 
dependence on guanxi as more important than laws could significantly damage 
auditor independence. Although the Chinese legal system environment has been 
much improved, the strong group form of society still impacts auditors as they try to 
reach inside a group to get more benefits. As such, auditor independence would be 
damaged because auditors’ accountabilities shift to the inside group rather than 
outside the group.   
 
8.8 Conclusion 
This chapter uses the Green Land case to analyse what factors might cause problems 
for Chinese auditor independence. It provides insights into how Chinese culture 
(especially guanxi) and the government impact auditor independence, causing 
auditors’ accountability to change. After analysing this case, it appears that the 
current supervision system of CPA does not take effect as expected. The reason may 
be that Chinese culture, such as guanxi, significantly impacts the supervision 
function. In addition, Chinese culture may also decrease auditor independence, and 
induce auditors to use guanxi to keep the loyalty of customers in a highly 
competitive CPA industry.  
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Although the Chinese government transplanted the International auditing standards 
and other regulations such as the policy of mandatory audit partner rotation, it can be 
noted that in the Green Land case these regulations did not take effect as expected. 
Due to the effect of Chinese culture and a low degree of regulation, Chinese auditors 
may account to majority shareholders for their own benefits.  
 
Therefore, although the motivation behind the convergence to the International 
auditing standards and other regulations is to assist in adapting to the global market, 
it is also necessary to consider the unique Chinese context, arising from Chinese 
culture. Otherwise, it may mean the transplanted regulations are superficial and lack 
substance to impact on auditors. 
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CHAPTER 9 CASE STUDY 3 – AMOI ELECTRONIC 
9.1 Introduction 
This is a case study of accounting fraud in Amoi Electronics Co., Ltd., a company 
limited by shares (stock code: 600057, hereinafter referred to as Amoi Electronics), 
and a nationally renowned mobile phone company. Amoi Electronics committed the 
profit frauds between 2006 and 2007.  The case provides insights into how a listed 
company conducted accounting fraud, and examines the reasons that motivated the 
listed company to forge accounting information.  
 
Amoi Electronics was engaged in the production of televisions when the company 
first started. In 1993, Amoi Electronics also entered the booming video cassette 
recorder market and subsequently entered the mobile phone market in 2000. In 2002 
Amoi Electronics achieved a net profit of 610 million Chinese yuan. Since then, 
Amoi Electronics started to diversify its production. It had invested heavily in 
research and development of 3G mobile phones. The company also manufactured 
LCD televisions, laptop computers and other products. However, after 2004, the 
financial performance of Amoi Electronics began to decline. By the end of 2006, 
Amoi Electronics was forced to withdraw from the computer laptop market and also 
the LCD television market. With the failure of its diversified development, in 2005 
Amoi Electronics suffered a loss of 658 million yuan (Zhu, 2012). 
 
Amoi Electronics was established by public offering on the 24
th
 April, 1997 after 
approval by the China Securities Regulatory Commission and on the 4
th
 June 1997, 
the company’s stock traded on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (The financial report of 
Amoi Electronics, 2006). Amoi Electronics’ parent company was Amoi Electronics 
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Co., Ltd. with limit by liability which held a 43.09% share in Amoi Electronics (The 
financial report of Amoi Electronics, 2006). China Electronics Corporation (CEC) 
was the biggest shareholder in Amoi Electronics’ parent company, and held 51% of 
shares in the parent company, as well as indirectly holding a 21.98% share of Amoi 
Electronics (The financial report of Amoi Electronics, 2006). As such, Amoi 
Electronics was predominantly controlled by CEC, a company, which was 
established in May 1989 (The relationship can be seen in Figure 16) (The financial 
report of Amoi Electronics, 2006). CEC is a State-owned Enterprise (SOE), directly 
managed by central government and has remained China’s largest state-owned 
information technology (IT) corporation since its establishment. CEC has nearly 23 
member companies, of which 15 companies are listed companies (China Electronics 
Corporation, 2016).  
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Figure 16: The relationship between the Amoi Electronics and the predominant controlling companies 
(The financial report of Amoi Electronics, 2006, p.9) 
 
  
The China Electronics Corporation 
Amoi Electronics Co., Ltd. limited by liability 
Amoi Electronics Co., Ltd. limited by shares 
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As mentioned above, Amoi Electronics Co., Ltd. limited by liability was the parent 
company of Amoi Electronics Co., Ltd. limited by shares. According to Companies 
Law of the People’s Republic of China, Article 3 “shareholders of a company with 
limited liability shall assume liability towards the company to the extent of the 
capital contributions subscribed respectively by them; and the shareholders of a 
company limited by shares shall assume liability towards the company to the extent 
of the shares subscribed respectively by them” (Companies Law of the People’s 
Republic of China, 2006, pp. 2-3). The differences between the two kinds of 
companies have been discussed in Chapter 6. In this case, the parent company and 
the subsidiary company had similar names, but the difference was “limited by 
liability” and “limited by shares”. According to Article 24, “a company with limited 
liability shall be jointly invested in and incorporated by not more than 50 
shareholders” (Companies Law of the People’s Republic of China, 2006, p.6). 
However, Article 79 requires “to incorporate a company limited by shares, there 
shall be not less than 2 but not more than 200 promoters, more than half of whom 
shall have their domiciles with the territory of the People’s Republic of China” 
(Companies Law of the People’s Republic of China, 2006, p.18). After the company 
is established, the number of shareholders is not limited.  
 
In addition, establishment is different between the two kinds of companies. In a 
company with limited liability, the amount of capital contributions can only be 
subscribed by its initial shareholders. According to Article 26, “the registered capital 
of a company with limited liability shall be the amount of capital contributions 
subscribed for by all of its shareholders, as is registered with the company 
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registration authority” (Companies Law of the People’s Republic of China, 2006, 
p.7). However, according to Article 78 and Article 85:  
“a company limited by shares may be incorporated by means of promotion or by means of 
share offer. A company incorporated by means of promotion is one incorporated by the 
promoters subscribing for all the shares to be issued by the company. A company incorporated 
by means of share offer is one incorporated by the promoters subscribing for a portion of the 
shares to be issued by the company, with the rest offered to the general public or to specific 
quarter … where a company limited by share is incorporated by means of share offer, the 
shares subscribed for by the promoters shall be not less than 35 percent of the total number of 
the shares issued by the company” (Companies Law of the People’s Republic of China, 2006, 
pp.18-19). 
 
Another important difference is that only a company limited by shares can be listed 
on a stock market in China.  
 
These two kinds of companies in China are similar to proprietary companies limited 
by shares and public companies limited by shares in Australia. According to the 
Corporation Act 2001 – SECT 112, within both proprietary companies and public 
companies, there are companies limited by shares, but the difference is as follows. A 
proprietary company needs at least one member and up to a maximum of 50 non-
employee shareholders. Conversely, a public company must have a minimum of one 
member and has no maximum limit. Secondly, proprietary companies are defined as 
unlisted, as they are not allowed to raise capital by selling shares to the public. 
However, public companies can be listed or unlisted, and allow raising capital from 
the public. The shares are listed on the Australian Stock Exchange. Due to the nature 
of their revenue raising capacity, public companies are also obliged to disclose 
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financial information and need to abide by stringent compliance rules, further 
distinguishing them from proprietary counterparts (Legalvision, 2016).   
 
This chapter analyses how Amoi Electronics conducted fraudulent accounting 
operations, and in section two how the auditing process failed. Section three dissects 
the financial reports of Amoi Electronics to detect financial issues. Section four 
describes the development of Chinese auditing standards. Section five discusses 
some possible reasons for the fraud, such as tunneling and delisting risk, that 
motivate listed companies to conduct fraudulent accounting operations. Section six 
contains comments on the Chinese accounting standards and accounting rules. 
Section seven covers the external supervision system of Chinese listed companies as 
discussed above. Section eight concludes this chapter. 
 
9.2 The fraud accounting operations and auditing failure 
9.2.1 The fraud accounting operations 
In 2006 Amoi Electronics disclosed a net profit of 25.176 million yuan in its 
financial statements. After the investigation by Xiamen Securities Regulatory Bureau 
in 2007, Amoi Electronics adjusted its 2006 annual financial statements. Amoi 
Electronics adjusted its 2006 net profit figure of 25.176 million yuan into a loss of 
105 million yuan, as well as a net loss of 802.9 million yuan in 2007 and a net loss of 
700 million yuan in 2008. On 19th May 2009, Amoi Electronics was ordered to 
suspend its listing.  
 
According to the penalty decision received from the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission on the 16
th
 November 2009 (Shanghai Stock Exchange, 2009), the main 
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fraudulent accounting operations conducted by Amoi Electronics are outlined in the 
following table.  
 
 
243 
 
 
Table 19: the main fraud accounting operations (Shanghai Stock Exchange, 2009) 
 
Fraud 1 Amoi Electronics disclosed that its bankers’ acceptances
27
 were 699,833,498.04 Yuan and bill receivable
28
 was 10,682,440.00 Yuan, which totalled 
approximately 710,515,938.04 Yuan on the 31
st
 December, 2006. With the exception of the above bill receivable being disclosed, there were also 280,878,100 
yuan bill receivables that were issued in bankers’ acceptances at the 31
st
 December, 2006. 
Fraud 2 Amoi Electronics did not adjust their balance sheet based on events after the balance sheet data. Amoi did not use returns of products in 2006 and the first 
quarter in 2007 to offset the 2006 revenue and cost of sales which were 31,424,138.89 and 18,212,444.77 yuan, respectively, resulting in an inflated profit of 
13,211,694.12 yuan in 2006. 
Fraud 3 In the 2006 financial report, except for the accrued discount and price guarantee
29
, there was still the amount of 27,561,924.77 yuan of discount and price 
guarantee which had been confirmed with customers, but such amount of discount and price guarantee were not accrued, resulting in an inflation of profit by 
276,124.77 yuan. 
                                                 
27
 The definition of banker’s acceptance: “a short-term instrument issued by a firm that is guaranteed by a commercial bank. Banker’s acceptances are issued by firms as part 
of a commercial transaction” (Investopedia, 2016). 
28
 “A bill receivable is a document that the customer formally agrees to pay at some future date. The bill receivable document effectively replaces, for the related amount, the 
open debt exchanged for the bill. Bill receivables are often remitted for collection and used to secure short term funding” (Oracle receivables user guide, 2016). 
29
 Price by discounts is a strategy of sale that manufacturers (wholesalers) give some percentage of sales of profit to wholesalers (retailers) in order to stimulate their sales. 
The price by discounts should be recorded into the account of cost of sales. Price guarantees given means that there is a contract between manufacturers and wholesalers, in 
which during a period of time manufacturers would make up loss to wholesalers when the price of productions goes down. The price guarantees given is also recorded into the 
account of cost of sales. 
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9.2.2 Auditing failure 
Xiamen Tianjian Huatian public accounting firm (厦门天健华天有限责任会计师事
务所) had audited Amoi Electronics’ financial reports since 2000. This study found 
financial reports from 1999 on the Shanghai Stock Exchange website (The financial 
report of Amoi Electronics, 1999). Between 2003 and 2005, Xiamen Tianjian 
Huatian public accounting firm issued unqualified opinion reports. In 2006, Xiamen 
Tianjian public accounting firm, Huazheng public accounting firm (华证有限责任会
计师事务所), and Beijing Zhongzhou Guanghua public accounting firm (北京中洲
光华有限责任会计师事务所 ) were amalgamated into the Tianjian Huazheng 
Zhongzhou (Beijing) public accounting firm (天健华证中洲 (北京)有限责任会计
师事务所 ). Tianjian Huazheng Zhongzhou (Beijing) public accounting firm 
(hereinafter referred to as Tianjian public accounting firm) audited Amoi Electronics 
in 2006 and 2007. In 2006, Tinajian issued an unqualified opinion report, and in 
2007, Tianjian issued a qualified opinion report. The rest of this section describes the 
auditing failure of 2006 in detail.  
 
There are significant differences between banker’s acceptances and bill receivables 
in the level of credit risk and receivable risk. A bill receivable is pledged by other 
companies except for banks, while banker’s acceptances are pledged by banks. Thus, 
banker’s acceptances have less receivable risk than bills receivable. As such, if a bill 
receivable was disclosed as a bankers’ acceptance, Amoi Electronics would have a 
lower risk profile and so a more favourable prospect of obtaining financing in the 
future. Moreover, in 2006, the beginning balance of accounts receivable was 445 
million yuan and the closing balance of accounts receivable was 738 million yuan, an 
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increase of 65.52%. According to Amoi Electronics’ financial report, the reason for 
the increase in accounts receivable was an increase of sales. Sales in 2005 were 480 
million yuan while in 2006 they were 550 million yuan, an increase of 15%.  The 
increase in accounts receivable was much higher than the increase in sales. Amoi 
Electronics took high levels of risk with their uncollectible accounts receivable, in 
order to expand their sales. Thus, an improper disclosure by Amoi Electronics of the 
classification of bills receivable might mislead in the assessment of financial 
information users. Financial information users might potentially underestimate the 
company’s operational risk.  
 
In addition, there was another motivation for the improperly disclosed classification 
of bills receivable. When the bills receivable were due, the company could directly 
convert them into accounts receivable. In contrast, bankers’ acceptances are pledged 
by banks, and so there is a greater possibility of receiving money. Thus, normally, 
the possibility of fraud in bankers’ acceptances is much less than in bills receivable. 
Thus, Amoi Electronics could forge sales and deliberately disclose them as bankers’ 
acceptances to reduce the appearance of risk and also conceal their fraud, because 
bankers’ acceptances would draw less attention from auditors compared to bills 
receivable.  
 
In 2006, Amoi Electronics improperly disclosed bills receivable as bankers’ 
acceptances, which were valued as 280 million yuan, accounting for 40% of the total 
bills receivable (Zhu, 2012). Also when the due dates of these acceptances came, all 
of them were converted into accounts receivable (Zhu, 2012). When Tianjian public 
accounting firm was carrying out the auditing observing and confirmation procedure, 
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it only randomly selected and checked three bankers’ acceptances, which were 
valued as 50 million yuan, 40 million yuan, and 20 million yuan, respectively, but 
these three bankers’ acceptances were actually bills receivable (Zhu, 2012). As such, 
Tianjian public accounting firm did not exhibit competence in this aspect of the 
audit, resulting in Amoi Electronics’ misleading bills receivable where they appeared 
as banker’s acceptances.  
 
Tianjian public accounting firm did not conduct proper auditing procedures in Amoi 
Electronics’ sales returns. Firstly, Tianjian public accounting firm only conducted 
auditing procedures for sales return from January to February 2007 belonging to 
Amoi Electronics’ subsidiaries. As such, the audited sales returns were only a part of 
the entire sales return (Zhu, 2012). Thus, the auditing procedures were not adequate 
to discover the issue of sales returns. Secondly, the confirmation letters of account 
receivable did not specifically note the date of the account receivable that should be 
checked. Customers normally respond to the closing balance of accounts payable on 
the 31
st
 December in 2006 (Zhu, 2012). Therefore, Tianjian public accounting firm 
could not use such confirmation letters as auditing evidence to find sales returns 
issues after the balance sheet date. 
 
Looking at changes in sales in 2005 and 2006 (Table 2) it is easy to see that Amoi 
Electronics’ sales in the fourth quarter appeared abnormal. The sales in the fourth 
quarter of 2005 had increased by 40.74%, compared to sales in the third quarter. And 
sales in the fourth quarter in 2006 were further increased by 55.28%, compared to 
sales in the third quarter. Amoi Electronics’ explanation seemed reasonable because 
of the seasonal characteristic of mobile phone sales, especially during the period 
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between New Year’s Day and Chinese Spring Festival (Zhu, 2012). However, this 
period always occurs in the first quarter of each year. Thus, annual reports showed 
sales typically peaking in the first quarter. Interestingly though, in 2007 sales 
significantly declined in the first quarter, compared to sales in the fourth quarter of 
the previous year (Table 20). This strange phenomenon should have drawn auditors’ 
attention to the possibility that Amoi Electronics might have forged sales at the end 
of year and conducted sales returns in the following year in order to cover up its loss. 
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Table 20: Changes in sales between 2005 and 2007 in Amoi Electronics (Zhu, 2012) 
 
Quarter Sales (Yuan) Increasing rate (%) 
The first quarter in 2005 1,211,302,729.53  
The second quarter in 2005 1,107,781,761.51 -8.55 
The third quarter in 2005 1,034,390,335.82 -6.63 
The fourth quarter in 2005 1,455,808,587.20 40.74 
The first quarter in 2006 1,446,545,160.40 -0.64 
The second quarter in 2006 1,184,190,457.81 -18.14 
The third quarter in 2006 1,129,080,008.19 -4.65 
The fourth quarter in 2006 1,753,197,370.91 55.28 
The first quarter in 2007 892,474,413.57 -49.09 
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Thirdly, Tianjian public accounting firm only performed auditing procedures and 
confirmations on the Amoi Electronics’ discount and price guarantee before the 31
st
 
December 2006, according to Amoi Electronics’ accounting system. However, the 
amount of 20.43 million yuan of discount and price guarantees which was attributed 
to 2006 had not been confirmed by auditors, because it was later recorded in the 
accounting system between January and March in 2007 (Zhu, 2012). Thus, Tianjian 
public accounting firm could hardly have found this undisclosed discount and price 
guarantee by using the confirmation auditing procedures.  
 
Moreover, according to audit working papers and auditing evidence, Tianjian public 
accounting firm did not mark the index number corresponding to the label content, 
while simplifying the statement of audit working paper in rebate and price guarantees 
(Zhu, 2012). This auditing behaviour violated the requirement of the Article 22 of 
Chinese CPA Implementation Standards (CCIS) (中国注册会计师职业准则) No. 
1101 – auditing objectives and general principles: CPAs should obtain sufficient 
auditing evidence and also need to assess levels of reliable evidences in order to 
reduce auditing risk. In addition, CPAs should publish audit opinions, based on the 
assessment of auditing evidence.  
 
9.3 A dissection of financial reports of Amoi Electronics 
The financial report consists of three financial statements including the balance 
sheet, the income statement, and the statement of cash flows. However, the three 
statements reflect different financial information. The balance sheet reports the 
financial position at a specific point in time, which is reflected by the assets, 
liabilities, and the equity of the company. However, the income statement and the 
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statement of cash flows report the financial performance for a series of flows over a 
specific time period. The income statement reports the result of the company’s 
financial performance, such as profit and loss, while the statement of cash flow 
reports financial information about the changes to a company’s cash and cash 
equivalents during a particular period of time. Thus, these three statements provide 
different financial information to interested users for making economic decisions.  
 
Cash flow is important for a company because it is related to the payment of 
dividends and the ability to repay debts, and it is also related to the company’s 
survival and development. A company’s cash flow could present as different types 
when it is in different life stages. According to Hribar and Yehuda (2015), the life-
cycle concept identifies four critical stages in a company’s life: start-up, growth, 
maturity, and decline (Quinn and Cameron, 1983; Smith et al., 1985; cited from 
Hribar and Yehuda, 2015). At the start-up stage of a company, earnings are low and 
cash flows from operating activities are normally negative or low. In addition, due to 
the company investment in production, cash flows from investing activities are 
negative at this stage. At this stage, cash mostly comes from financing activities 
(positive). During the growth stage, cash flows from operating activities are normally 
positive because revenues grow rapidly. Meanwhile, to continue to extend its market 
share, the company needs to continue to invest in production. Thus, cash flows from 
investing activities are negative. However, the cash from operating activities may not 
satisfy the company’s demand. Therefore, cash flows from financing activities may 
be positive. When the company moves through to the maturity stage, the company’s 
products begin to saturate the market; thus investment opportunities diminish. Cash 
flows from operating and investing activities are positive. However, cash may be 
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used to pay debts, so cash flows from financing activities may become negative. 
After entering the stage of decline, a company experiences market shrinkage and 
falling sales, and cash flows from operating activities is negative. In addition, the 
company largely collects from its investments to repay debts. As such, cash flows 
from investing activities may be positive, while cash flows from financing activities 
may be negative (Hribar and Yehuda, 2015). 
 
According to financial reports of Amoi Electronics from 2002 to 2006 (see Table 
20), cash flows from operating activities from 2002 to 2003 were positive. In 2002, 
cash flows from investing activities were negative due to the launch of two new 
types of mobile phones, the A8 and A6, which significantly improved sales revenue. 
According to the income statement of 2002, Amoi Electronics achieved a net profit 
of 606,938,466.53 yuan (See Table 22). Compared to the net loss of 2001 which was 
78,249,478.53, the profit turnaround was remarkable in 2002. In addition, in 2002, 
due to the transformation of the main business to mobile phones, Amoi Electronics 
invested in mobile phone research to establish the ‘Shanghai Xiaxin Mobile 
Communication Technology Co., Ltd.’ (上海厦新移动通信技术有限公司 ) in 
Shanghai. To improve mobile phone research, cash flows from investing activities 
were negative. In 2002, Amoi Electronics did not finance any money and repaid 
debts occurring in prior financial years. As such, cash flows from financing activities 
were negative. 
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Table 21: Select figures from Amoi Electronics’ cash flow statement from 2002 to 2006 
 
                      Year 
 
Cash flows 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Cash flows from 
operating activities 
972,159,531.84 500,968,163.14 -660,344,359.45 154,837,425.25 165,709,220.89 
Cash flows from 
investing activities 
-87,240,224.80 -299,579,621.26 -291,415,095.30 -155,337,059.22 20,701,872.46 
Cash flows from 
financing activities 
-537,294,116.48 253,899,630.06 364,151,729.33 67,146,690.78 -173,843,113.31 
The impact of exchange 
rate on cash 
-260,243.18 -2,820,237.70 -1,722,171.21 -904,317.00 248,026.36 
Net increase in cash & 
cash equivalents 
347,364,947.38 452,467,934.24 -589,329,896.63 65,742,739.81 12,816,006.40 
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Cash flows from
operating activites
Cash flows from investing
activites
Cash flows from financing
activities
The impact of exchange
rate on cash
Net increase in cash &
cash equivalents
2002 972,159,531.84 -87,240,224.80 -537,294,116.48 -260,243.18 347,364,947.38
2003 500,968,163.14 -299,579,621.26 253,899,630.06 -2,820,237.70 452,467,934.24
2004 -660,344,359.45 -291,415,095.30 364,151,729.33 -1,722,171.21 -589,329,896.63
2005 154,837,425.25 -155,337,059.22 67,146,690.78 -904,317.00 65,742,739.81
2006 165,709,220.89 20,701,872.46 -173,843,113.31 248,026.36 12,816,006.40
-800,000,000.00
-600,000,000.00
-400,000,000.00
-200,000,000.00
0.00
200,000,000.00
400,000,000.00
600,000,000.00
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1,000,000,000.00
1,200,000,000.00
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Select figures from Amoi Electronics’ cash flow statement from 2002 to 2006 
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Table 22: Net profit of Amoi Electronics from 2002 to 2006 
Year The net profit (yuan) Increase amount (yuan) Increase percentage (%) 
2002 606,938,466.53   
2003 590,412,476.20 -16,525,990.33 -2.72% 
2004 15,854,315.52 -574,558,160.68 -97.31% 
2005 -658,050,491.18 -673,904,806.70 -4250.61% 
2006 24,212,631.18 682,263,122.36 103.68% 
  
  
-800,000,000.00
-600,000,000.00
-400,000,000.00
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The net profit
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In 2003, the reason for the decline in cash flows from operating activities was that a 
large number of revenues were recorded by bankers’ acceptances that did not result 
in increased cash. However, Amoi Electronics paid for materials purchased by cash, 
causing the decrease in cash. In addition, Amoi Electronics in 2003 continued to 
extend technical research and buy capital assets, which further decreased cash flows 
from investing activities. Moreover, Amoi Electronics used bank financing to 
increase cash flows from financing activities.  
 
Amoi Electronics began to decline in 2004. Compared to the net profit in 2003 which 
was 590,412,476.20 yuan, the net profit in 2004 was only 15,854,315.52 yuan, which 
represented a drastic decrease of 97.31%, because of high competition in the mobile 
phone market, clean-up inventory, and continued decrease in mobile phone prices 
(Table 22). The reason for declining cash flows from operating activities was not 
only due to the decrease in profitability but also the decrease in receivables turnover. 
In 2004, Amoi Electronics also used bank financing to increase cash flows from 
financing activities. 
 
In 2005, Amoi Electronics suffered a loss of 658,050,491.18 yuan. Compared to the 
net profit of 2004, horizontal change of the net profit during 2005 was the amount of 
673,904,806.70 yuan, which represented a decrease of 4250.61% (Table 22). The 
reason given was the same as for 2004: high competition in the mobile phone market 
causing a decrease in profitability. However, cash flows from operating activities 
were positive, because of the clean-up of inventory and the extension of accounts 
payable. Although cash flows from operating activities were positive, these cash 
flows were not entirely due to the growth of revenues. Cash flows from investing 
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activities were negative, because of continuing to invest in technical research. 
Moreover, in 2004, Amoi Electronics used bank financing to increase cash flows 
from financing activities (The financial report of Amoi Electronics, 2004). 
 
In 2006, the net profit turnaround was significant, an amount of 24,212,631.18 yuan, 
an increase of 103.68%. From 2002 to 2005, financial performance had presented a 
declining trend, but this significant profit turnaround did not attract the attention of 
the auditors. Amoi Electronics attributed the rapid growth of sales to lower sales 
price in the competitive mobile phone market. However, according to the statement 
of cash flow, Amoi Electronics did not make any investment outside the company 
while collecting earnings from prior investments. And also the company was not 
financing to increase cash flows from financing activities. As such, the profit in 2006 
was mostly from sales revenue. However, Amoi Electronics suddenly became 
profitable after a previous large loss and that should have signalled caution to the 
auditors because the company had not significantly changed its products nor made 
other changes. 
 
The income statement combined with the statement of cash flow can help detect 
financial issues. For example, the operations index ratio compares the company’s 
profit with cash flows from operating activities, which provides an index of the cash-
generating productivity of the company’s operations. The higher this ratio is, the 
better the company’s performance, since it means the company has a strong 
capability of receivables from operating and low pressure of a company’s finance. 
The operations index is calculated as in Formulae 1. 
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Formulae 1: 
Operations index =
cash flows from operating activities
the net profit
 
 
 
As shown in Table 23, the operations index of Amoi Electronics from 2002 to 2005 
indicated a fall from 1.60 in 2002 to -0.24 in 2005. Moreover, in 2004, the operations 
index fell as low as -41.65, which means that producing 1 (yuan) profit would cause 
41.65 (yuan) cash flowing out. Amoi Electronics explained that high competition in 
the market caused the decline in revenue from mobile phones. However, after Amoi 
Electronics suffered this decline, it made a miraculous turnaround in 2006. In 2006, 
the operations index was 6.84. A question raised is whether the mobile phone market 
fluctuation was consistent with Amoi Electronics’ explanations. This study compares 
Amoi Electronics with another company, Ningbo Bird Co., Ltd, which is another 
Chinese nationally renowned mobile phone company. The operations index in 
Ningbo Bird from 2002 to 2006 were all positive and tended to be stable from 2004 
to 2006, being 0.26, 0.84, and 0.50, respectively. However, the operations index of 
Amoi Electronics exhibits strong fluctuations from 2004 to 2006 (Figure 17). 
Although the operation index in both companies went down in 2004, the operation 
index in Amoi Electronics dramatically declined.  Auditors should have paid much 
more attention to whether Amoi Electronics presented a false income statement. 
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Table 23: The operations index of Amoi Electronics and Ningbo Bird from 2002 to 2006 
 
The table of operations index of Amoi Electronics 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Cash flows from operating activities (yuan) 972,159,531.84 500,968,163.14 -660,344,359.45 154,837,425.25 165,709,220.89 
The net profit (yuan) 606,938,466.53 590,412,476.20 15,854,315.52 -658,050,491.18 24,212,631.18 
The operations index 1.60 0.85 -41.65 -0.24 6.84 
 
 
The table of operations index of Ningbo Bird 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Cash flows from operating activities (yuan) 594,365,720.05 855,935,710.84 54,185,322.19 -396,583,409.33 15,444,212.04 
The net profit (yuan) 251,816,972.98 245,023,581.50 207,459,814.58 -471,202,679.59 30,584,774.17 
The operations index 2.36 3.49 0.26 0.84 0.50 
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Figure 17: The operations index of Amoi Electronics and Ningbo Bird from 2002 to 2006 
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To sum up, it is helpful and efficient to detect questionable issues by using 
information from the statement of cash flows in combination with other financial 
statements. However, the Tianjian public accounting firm issued unqualified reports 
in 2005 and 2006. Without reference to the influence of culture, did auditors pay 
attention to the information from the cash flow statement but not find any issue, or 
did they not even attach any importance to the cash flow statement?  
 
It may be that in China, statements of cash flow are not taken notice of, partly 
because the statement of cash flow was developed quite late, compared to 
international accounting standards. The International Accounting Standards 
Committee reissued the International Accounting Standards No.7 (IAS 7) – Cash 
Flow Statements in 1992 and it came into effect in 1994, replacing the IAS 7 – 
Statement of Changes in Financial Position in 1977 (Deloitte, 2016) (The history of 
IAS 7 can be seen in Table 24). However, in the Chinese Accounting Standards – the 
statement of cash flow was issued in 1998. In 2001, the revised Chinese Accounting 
Standards – the statement of cash flow started to be used for all companies, although 
this does not mean every company prepared statements of cash flow in 2001. In 
2006, Ministry of Finance revised and issued the Chinese Accounting Standards No. 
31 – the statement of cash flow, which converged to IAS 7 and required all listed 
companies to prepare a statement of cash flow. Although it converged to IAS 7, there 
were still some differences. Firstly, IAS 7 defines that “bank overdrafts are included 
as a component of cash and cash equivalents” (IAS 7, 2010, p.2), while bank 
overdrafts are not included as a component of cash and cash equivalents in China.  
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Table 24: History of IAS 7 (Deloitte, 2016) 
 
June 1976 Exposure Draft E 7 Statement of Source and Application of Funds 
October 1977 IAS 7 Statement of Changes in Financial Position 
July 1991 Exposure Draft E36 Cash Flow Statements 
December 1992 IAS 7 (1992) Cash Flow Statements 
1 January 1994 Effective date of IAS 7 (1992) 
6 September 2007 Retitled from Cash Flow Statements to Statement of Cash Flows as a 
consequential amendment resulting from revisions to IAS 1 
16 April 2009 IAS 7 Amended by Annual Improvements to IFRSs 2009 with respect to 
expenditures that do not result in a recognized asset 
1 July 2009 Effective date for amendments from IAS 27 (2008) relating to changes in 
ownership of a subsidiary 
1 January 2010 Effective date of the April 2009 revisions to IAS 7 
29 January 2016 Amended by Disclosure Initiative (Amendments to IAS 7) 
1 January 2017 Effective date of the January 2016 revisions to IAS 7 
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Secondly, IAS 7 allows companies to report the statement of cash flow using either 
the direct method
30
 or the indirect method
31
, but encourages companies to report the 
statement of cash flow using the direct method (IAS 7, 2010). However, according to 
Chinese Accounting Standards No. 31 – the statement of cash flow, companies 
preparing a statement of cash flow are required to use the direct method, and 
meanwhile disclose cash flow information using the indirect method in financial 
notes.  
 
Thirdly, IAS 7 requires “cash flows arising from taxes on income” to “be separately 
disclosed and shall be classified as cash flows from operating activities unless they 
can be specifically identified with financing and investing activities” (IAS 7, 2010). 
However, the Chinese Accounting Standards require that cash flows arising from 
taxes on income shall be all disclosed in cash flow from operating activities (Chinese 
Accounting Standards, 2006). 
 
Fourthly, Article 6 in the Chinese Accounting Standards No. 31 – the statement of 
cash flow requires that losses from natural disasters, insurance claims and other 
special items should be, depending on their nature, integrated into cash flows from 
operating activities, investing activities, and financing activities, respectively. 
However, in IAS 7, there is not this requirement (Chinese Accounting Standards, 
2006).  
 
                                                 
30
 The direct method is preparing a statement of cash flow whereby “major classes of gross cash 
receipts and gross cash payments are disclosed” (IAS 7, 2010, p. 4). 
31
 The indirect method is preparing the statement of cash flow whereby “profit or loss is adjusted for 
the effects of transactions of a non-cash nature, any deferrals or accruals of past or future operating 
cash receipts or payments, and items of income or expense associated with investing or financing cash 
flows” (IAS 7, 2010, p. 4). 
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Moreover, IAS 7 requires that disclosing cash flows from interest received and paid 
shall be classified as cash flows from operating activities, investing activities, and 
financing activities, depending on their nature. However, in China, interest paid shall 
be classified as financing cash flow, while interest received shall be classified as 
three different activities cash flows depending on their nature.  
 
In reality, there is a problem for Chinese accountant to prepare the statement of cash 
flow. Financial statements are recorded on an accrual basis and then adjusted. 
However, the statement of cash flow is prepared on a cash basis, which reflects the 
information of cash inflows and outflows. When using the direct method to prepare 
the cash flow statement, Chinese accountants use an adjustment method by the 
working paper and the T-type accounts to transform financial statement balances 
from the accrual basis to the cash basis. However, the cash flow statement is 
prepared at the end of the accounting period. The adjustment of entries is very 
comprehensive, because the relationship between accounts is complex. As such, the 
process of adjustment is difficult, and there is a large possibility of making errors. In 
addition, in a company, the accountants’ division of functions are clear, and each 
accountant has their own details of the accounts. For example, account payable 
accountants provide processing of vendor invoices, check requests, and expense 
reports, including monthly credit card expenses. However, payroll accountants may 
need to evaluate payroll data, income statement accounts, and analyse payroll 
affiliated balance sheets. As such, the adjustment of the cash flow statement entries 
involves the accounting information from different accountants. Thus, the adjustment 
creates a lack of coherence between daily processing and period end processing, and 
makes it difficult to ensure the accuracy of the data.  
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In theory, if financial statements are recorded by the cash basis, the cash flow 
statement is not difficult to prepare. However, in reality accountants translate the 
cash flow statement after using the accrual basis for the other financial statements, 
which needs a complex adjustment and is difficult to understand, and may also mean 
the cash flow statement does not function as expected.  
 
9.4 Conclusion 
This chapter used the Amoi Electronics case to analyse how a listed company made a 
series of accounting frauds. It provides insights in to how to analyse financial reports 
to detect financial issues. Due to the balance sheet and the income statement being 
prepared on an accrual basis while the statement of cash flow is prepared on a cash 
basis, reviewing three statements may be more helpful to detect companies’ financial 
issues. However, in China, the statement of cash flow was developed quite late, 
compared to international accounting standards. The adjustment of transactions 
recording from the accrual basis to cash basis is much more complicated for the 
preparation of cash flow statements because of the need to adjust the accrual-based 
number in the other financial statements. This may explain why in reality auditors do 
not pay more attention to the statement of cash flow. 
 
According to the analysis of financial reports of Amoi Electronics, this chapter 
provides some examples of how companies make accounting frauds, and finds that 
the motivation for a listed company to forge accounting information is to avoid 
delisting risk. 
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From these three case studies, some potential risks in the Chinese auditing industry 
and corporate governance in China can be perceived. In the case of Yin Guang Xia, 
after the enterprise reform, China transplanted western corporate structures, but 
China only adopted the naming protocol of these structures, leaving a company 
strongly controlled by majority shareholders, and remaining in traditional 
hierarchical management. Moreover, SOEs did not clarify the relationship with the 
government after the enterprise reform because of the embedded party secretaries in 
corporate structures. In the context of Chinese culture, guanxi and hierarchical 
management might cause the transplanted corporate governance to be not effective. 
In addition, after the program of disaffiliation, the MOF continues to govern the 
CICPA. The government, as a majority shareholder in some SOEs, also governs the 
CICPA operations, which may risk decreasing auditor independence, because the 
government is both regulator and participant which may use guanxi to gain its 
favourite benefits. 
 
The case of Green Land also provided insights into how Chinese culture (especially 
guanxi) and the government impact auditor independence. Although the Chinese 
government transplanted the international auditing standards and other regulations, 
these regulations did not take effect as expected, because of the influence of Chinese 
culture and a low degree of regulation. 
 
The case of Amoi Electronics explained how professionals interpreted and 
challenged new institutions within the limitation of cultural and social environments. 
Listed companies used connected transactions, inflated income, and intentionally 
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decreased costs to make fraudulent profit, and conduct false operations of cash flow 
in order to become a listed company, conduct tunnelling and prevent delisting.  
 
Therefore, from the three case studies, although China is converging to the 
international auditing standards and other regulations to assist in adapting to the 
global market, these regulations may not take effect as expected, because of the 
effect of Chinese culture.  
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CHAPTER 10 THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHINESE AUDITING 
STANDARDS AND THE EXTERNAL SUPERVISION SYSTEM OF LISTED 
COMPANIES 
In the Chinese Auditing Standards, there is no specific standard to guide the auditing 
of the cash flow statement, and this can be seen in the development of Chinese 
auditing standards. Chinese auditing standards experienced four stages up to 2012.  
 
The first stage (from 1991 to 1993) was developing and designing Chinese CPA’s 
implementation guidance. In this period, the CICPA was continuing to issue 7 
implementation guides, which was important to promote CPA to become 
professional and legalised.  
 
The second stage (from 1994 to 2003) was establishing Chinese auditing standards. 
On 31th October 1993, the Chinese CPA’s Law (中国注册会计师法) was passed in 
the fourth meeting of the Standing Committee of the Eighth National People’s 
Congress. After approval by the MOF, the CICPA started to draft the Chinese 
Independent Auditing Standards (中国独立审计准则) from May 1994. By the 
middle of 2003, the CICPA had developed a preamble to the standards, a general 
standard, 28 independent auditing standards, 10 independent audit announcements, 5 
practical guides, and 3 relevant standards (which include the professional ethical 
standards, the auditing quality control standards, and the further education standards) 
(Figure 18), to a total of 48 standards.  
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Figure 18: The system of Chinese Independent Auditing Standards in 2003 
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The third stage (from 2004 to 2006) was improving and developing Chinese auditing 
standards. The global trend of convergence in the international auditing standards has 
gained increasing momentum in the past decades. For example, Hong Kong totally 
adopted the international auditing standards, India and Singapore partly adopted the 
international auditing standards and England and Australia developed their new 
national auditing standards based on the international auditing standards and their 
existing standards. By the end of 2003, the International Auditing and Assurance 
Standards Board (IAASB) issued 4 auditing standards that related to auditing risk 
testing: the International Standards on Auditing (ISA) No. 200 – overall objectives of 
the independent auditor and the conduct of an audit in accordance with international 
standards on auditing, the ISA No. 315 – identifying and assessing the risks of 
material misstatement through understanding the entity and its environment, the ISA 
330 – the auditor’s responses to assessed risks, and the ISA 500 – audit evidence. 
These four international auditing standards are used to guide CPAs to identify, assess 
and respond to the risks of material misstatement in financial reports, and they are 
also called audit risk standards. In order to converge to the international auditing 
standards, Chinese financial auditing standards also need to be revised and improved. 
At the end of 2004, there were significant differences between Chinese auditing 
standards and the international auditing standards. For 24 auditing standards in the 
international auditing standards there were no significant differences in Chinese 
auditing standards but 9 auditing standards did have significant differences. Thirteen 
auditing standards in the international auditing standards did not exist in Chinese 
auditing standards. Moreover, there were 3 auditing standards still in use in Chinese 
auditing standards that were abolished in the international standards. There were 4 
auditing standards which were peculiar to Chinese, with no corresponding equivalent 
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in the international auditing standards. The reasons for these differences are mainly 
as follows: first, in the development of standards, some standards were transplanted 
from American auditing standards, resulting in a mismatch with the international 
auditing standards system. Second, the revision of Chinese auditing standards lags 
behind ISAs. Third, the development of Chinese auditing standards started late. 
Some standards had not even been developed yet. Fourth, some international auditing 
standards were not suitable for the Chinese auditing situation.   
 
By the end of 2005, CICPA had developed and issued 17 new auditing standards and 
5 exposure drafts, as well as revised 26 published standards. In 2006, CICPA 
formally published 5 auditing standards which were drafted in 2005. By the end of 
2006, there were 48 Chinese auditing standards (including 2 Chinese peculiar 
standards), that corresponded to 46 international auditing standards (Table 25).  
 
The fourth stage (from 2007 to 2012) was the continuing convergence to the 
International Standards on Auditing (ISA). Chinese auditing standards (CSA) (中国
注册会计师审计准则 ) were officially issued in November 2010, including 38 
standards, and were effective from 1
st
 January 2012 (The Chinese Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants, 2010). Since the new CSA were effective, the Chinese 
CPA Implementation Standards (中国注册会计师执业准则) (CCIS) issued in 2006 
were abolished. The new CSA are more converged to the International Standards on 
Auditing (ISA). Compared to the CCIS, there are 21 redrafted standards, 16 revised 
standards, and 1 added standard (Table 26) (Riva and Provasi, 2014). The added 
standard is the CSA 1152 – Communicating deficiencies in internal control to those 
charged with governance and management, which aims to design a suitable auditing 
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procedure rather than disclose an effective opinion for the internal control, when 
auditors engage in risk assessment. Compared to CSA 1152, CSA 1211 and CSA 
1231
32
 which require auditors to know audited companies’ internal control and 
implement auditing risk testing. 
  
                                                 
32
 CSA 1211 is identifying and assessing the risks of material misstatement through understanding the 
entity and its environment. 
CSA 1231 is the auditor’s responses to assessed risks. 
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Table 25-1: The comparison of auditing standards between the Chinese CPA Implementation Standards (CCIS) and the International Standards on Auditing (ISA) in 2006(Wang and 
Liu, 2005) 
Chinese CPA Implementation Standards (CCIS) in 2006 Corresponding to the 
ISAs 
Continuing effectively 
published standards 
Revised auditing standards Added auditing standards 
Yes No  Released time Released time 
    2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007 
CCIS 1101 - overall objectives of the independent auditor 
and the conduct of an audit in accordance with Chinese 
standards on auditing 
√   √      
CCIS 1111 – agreeing the terms of audit engagements √   √      
CCIS 1121 – quality control for an audit of financial 
statements 
√   √      
CCIS 1131 – audit documentation √   √      
CCIS 1141 – the auditor’s responsibilities relating to fraud 
in an audit of financial statements 
√   √      
CCIS 1142 – consideration of laws and regulations in an 
audit of financial statements 
√  √       
CCIS 1151 – communication with those charged with 
governance 
√   √      
CCIS 1152 – communications between the auditor and 
his/her predecessor 
 √ √       
CCIS 1201 – planning and audit of financial statements √   √      
CCIS 1211 – identifying and assessing the risks of material 
misstatement through understanding the entity and its 
environment 
√      √   
CCIS 1212 – audit considerations relating to an entity 
using a service organization 
√      √   
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Table 25-2: The comparison of auditing standards between the Chinese CPA Implementation Standards (CCIS) and the International Standards on Auditing (ISA) in 2006 (Wang and 
Liu, 2005) 
Chinese CPA Implementation Standards (CCIS) in 2006 Corresponding to the 
ISAs 
Continuing effectively 
published standards 
Revised auditing standards Added auditing standards 
Yes No  Released time Released time 
    2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007 
CCIS 1221 – materiality in planning and performing an 
audit 
√  √       
CCIS 1231 – the auditor’s responses to assessed risks √      √   
CCIS 1301 – audit evidence √   √      
CCIS 1311 - the goods in stock scrutinizing stocktaking √  √       
CCIS 1312 – external confirmations √  √       
CCIS 1313 – analytical procedures √  √       
CCIS 1314 – audit sampling √  √       
CCIS 1321 – audit accounting estimates √  √       
CCIS 1322 – audit fair value accounting estimate and 
related disclosures 
√       √  
CCIS 1323 – related parties √  √       
CCIS 1324 – going concern √  √       
CCIS 1331 – initial audit engagements – opening balances √  √       
CCIS 1332 – subsequent events √  √       
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Table 25-3: The comparison of auditing standards between the Chinese CPA Implementation Standards (CCIS) and the International Standards on Auditing (ISA) in 2006 (Wang and 
Liu, 2005) 
Chinese CPA Implementation Standards (CCIS) in 2006 Corresponding to the 
ISAs 
Continuing effectively 
published standards 
Revised auditing standards Added auditing standards 
Yes No  Released time Released time 
    2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007 
CCIS 1341 – written representations  √  √       
CCIS 1401 – using the work of other CPAs √  √       
CCIS 1411 – considering the work of internal auditors √  √       
CCIS 1421 – using the work of an auditor’s expert √  √       
CCIS 1501 – forming on opinion and reporting on financial 
statements 
√  √       
CCIS 1502 – non-standard audit report √      √   
CCIS 1511 – comparative information  √      √   
CCIS 1521 – the auditor’s responsibilities relating other 
information in documents containing audited financial 
statements 
√  √       
CCIS 1601 – auditing report for specific elements, 
accounts or items 
√  √       
CCIS 1602 – capital verification  √ √       
CCIS 1611 – audit of commercial bank’s financial 
statement 
√  √       
CCIS 1612 - external confirmations during the audit of 
commercial bank’s financial statement 
√  √       
CCIS 1613 – the relationship between bank supervision 
departments 
√       √  
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Table 25-4: The comparison of auditing standards between the Chinese CPA Implementation Standards (CCIS) and the International Standards on Auditing (ISA) in 2006 (Wang and 
Liu, 2005) 
Chinese CPA Implementation Standards (CCIS) in 2006 Corresponding to the 
ISAs 
Continuing effectively 
published standards 
Revised auditing standards Added auditing standards 
Yes No  Released time Released time 
    2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007 
CCIS 1621 – special considerations – audit of small 
audited entities 
√  √       
CCIS 1631 – special considerations – audit of 
environmental events or items in financial statements 
√       √  
CCIS 1632 – audits of derivative financial instruments √       √  
CCIS 1633 – special considerations – audit of E-commerce √       √  
CCIS 2101 – review the financial statements √  √       
CCIS 3101 – audit or review historical financial 
information or other certified information 
√      √   
CCIS 3111 – audit of predictive financial information √  √       
CCIS 4101 – the implementation of the agreed procedure 
to financial information 
√  √       
CCIS 4111 – substituting the preparation of financial 
statements 
√      √   
CCIS 5101 – quality controls for firms that perform audits 
and reviews of financial statements and other assurance and 
related services engagements 
√      √   
CCIS – basic guidelines for CPA’s certified business √   √      
Sub Total Up  46 2 26 9 0 0 8 5 0 
TOTAL 48 48 
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Table 26: Clarified ISA and CSA (Riva and Provasi, 2014, P. 339) 
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10.1 The motivation of listed companies conducting fraud and some common 
examples of false accounting operations 
In China, there are continuing instances of unexpected corporate failures and 
scandals, but what is the motivation for listed companies to make false accounting 
operations alongside the problems of company failure? The reasons are various and 
include becoming a listed company (as shown in Chapter 8 – Green Land). The 
section introduces other techniques, such as tunneling and prevention of delisting, 
and also shows some common examples of false accounting operations.  
 
In the gradual process of Chinese enterprise reform, China has adopted corporate 
governance systems, such as independent directors and supervisors, from the USA 
and other western capitalist nations. The aim of enterprise reform was to separate the 
state from the management and limit the state to the role of controlling shareholder 
of the enterprise. This was in order to promote higher efficiency, enhance the profit-
making capability of companies, increase competitiveness and decrease the ability of 
bureaucracy to interfere in the lawful activities of corporations (Zhou, 2011). These 
changes gave managers more autonomy in daily management and control of strategic 
decisions. However, these changes also created several agency problems, such as 
control of the firm and majority shareholders expropriating minority shareholders’ 
interests (Huang, 2015) which is referred to as ‘tunneling’ (Huang, 2015). 
 
Tunneling is the transfer of assets and profits out of firms for the benefit of those 
who control them, and has drawn the attention of recent corporate finance scholars 
(Chen, et al., 2006; Liu and Lu, 2007; Chen, et al., 2009; Peng, et al., 2011; Wang 
and Xiao; 2011; Huang, 2015). Tunneling is prevalent among Chinese listed 
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companies because of “its relatively underdeveloped legal environment, absence of 
effective corporate governance, high concentration of corporate ownership, and high 
level of government intervention” (Huang, forthcoming, 2015). But the concept is 
not generally known in other developed countries. Previous studies have empirically 
investigated various forms of tunneling among Chinese listed companies. For 
example, Chen et al. (2006) examined the effect of ownership structure and 
boardroom characteristics on tunneling. Liu and Lu (2007) introduced tunneling to 
examine the relation between earnings management and corporate governance. Chen 
et al. (2009) reported that dividends might be used by controlling shareholders to 
engage in tunneling. Peng et al. (2011) developed Friedman et al.’s model to test 
Chinese listed companies. They found that when a company was in good financial 
condition controlling shareholders were more likely to use connected transactions to 
engage in tunneling, while in financial distress, they were more likely to use 
connected transactions to prop up the listed company. Wang and Xiao (2011) showed 
that controlling shareholders who engaged in tunneling for private benefits had a 
lower sensitivity to the relationship between executive pay and companies’ 
performance. Huang (2015) investigated the balance of outstanding related-party 
loan guarantees (RPLG) of Chinese listed companies to illustrate that both the 
intensity and the propensity of tunneling though RPLG had increased after the 2008 
enterprise income tax reform.  
 
Although prior studies have documented various forms of tunneling in Chinese listed 
companies, here a question is raised when companies continue tunneling, how do 
listed companies inflate profit to avoid delisting and keep their right to issue new 
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shares? Answering this question may help auditors to detect tunneling in future 
auditing work to protect minority shareholders’ interests. 
 
According to Rules Governing the Listing of Stocks on Shanghai Stock Exchange, if 
“the company has been in the red in the most recent two consecutive years (based on 
the audited net profits disclosed in the latest two annual reports)” (Shanghai Stock 
Exchange, 2012, p. 860), the Exchange will issue a delisting risk warning on the 
stocks of the listed company. If the company continues to make losses in the third 
year, it will be issued as a particular transfer company which means suspension of 
trading (Peng et al., 2011). That is one of the reasons that listed companies may 
engage in creative accounting after losses so that they suddenly become profitable in 
order to keep their listing.  
 
In order to keep their listing, companies make false profits in the following ways. 
Firstly, listed companies use connected transactions to inflate profit. In China, to 
become a listed company is not easy. Normally, companies need to have at least 30 
million yuan in share capital and no record of accounting fraud in the last three 
consecutive years, according to Chinese Company Law. Some companies start to 
conduct fraud before becoming listed companies. For example, Company B would 
separate its assets and liabilities; it would invest good assets in Company A, while 
Company B retains the liabilities. To avoid stock supervisory committee inspections 
of parent company B, company B would also establish another non-listed company 
C. Company B would separate all bad assets and liabilities to the company C. After 
these operations, company A becomes a ‘fresh and healthy’ company. After 
company A becomes a listed company, it would start to help the parent company B. 
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That is one of the reasons why after becoming a listed company, controlling 
shareholders start to divert funds. 
 
After becoming a listed company, company A can issue new shares for financing as 
long as its return on equity is not less than 10% over three consecutive years before 
issuing new shares (Peng et al., 2011). To meet this requirement, the listed company 
A also can use connected transactions to inflate profit. For example, if the related 
company C purchases products from company A, with a market value of 10 million 
yuan, but company A sells these products for 20 million yuan that inflates the 
revenue by 10 million yuan. However, this kind of connected transaction was too 
easily recognized by the stock supervisory committee. For this reason the Ministry of 
Finance and the Chinese Securities Regulatory Committee issued several rules about 
connected transactions. For example, “the connected transactions of a total value of 
greater than 30 million or 5% of net assets, which is higher, the transaction price 
must be appraised or audited by professionals and approved in the general meeting of 
shareholders” (Peng et al., 2011, p. 310). Thus, this kind of connected transaction is 
improved. For example, in the situation above, a non-related company D could be 
asked to purchase products from the company A at 20 million yuan, when their 
market value was 10 million yuan, and then company C could purchase these 
products from company D. In this example, the market value of products is easy to 
identify. However, sometimes, this kind of connected transaction presents as 
consulting services and in these cases it is difficult to recognize the real value of 
services.  
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Secondly, a listed company may also make false income statements by inflating 
income and apparently decreasing costs. Inflating income can be illustrated in the 
following ways. A listed company creates a fictitious customer to inflate income. For 
example, the listed company A sells products to the fictitious customer F, taking the 
normal procedures to simulate the operation, including fake orders, fake sales 
contracts, falsified shipping documents, and real sales invoices approved by the tax 
department.  
 
Listed companies inflate income in real transactions. For example, a listed company 
A sells products to company G, in a real sales transaction. However, when company 
A records this transaction, company A intentionally expands the amount of products 
in order to inflate the income. In some cases, the company forges this kind of 
transaction with many customer companies. It is difficult for auditors to detect this 
kind of fraud.  
 
Listed companies can also intentionally record accounts received in advance as 
revenue in this accounting period in order to adjust profits.  
 
In addition, a listed company can use accounts receivable to adjust income. For 
example, the listed company A falsifies a transaction which is valued at 10 million 
yuan recorded in the accounts receivable. When this transaction is over 1 year, the 
company A transfers this record to long-term accounts receivable or other receivable.  
 
Moreover, listed companies use deficits to counteract invoices and inflate income. 
For example, at the end of the financial year, listed company A falsely writes out a 
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huge invoice to the buyer company H in order to inflate revenues. Early the next 
year, company A uses the RED number (reverse transaction) to write down the 
inflated number in accounts receivable.  
 
Apparently decreasing costs or expenses to inflate net income is normally through 
provisions. Provisions are used to prevent a future company’s value change risk, but 
the provision can be recorded in various ways which provide the opportunity for the 
company to inflate income. For example, the company may intentionally decrease 
allowance for doubtful debts and impairment for assets or may not record the 
decrease in order to intentionally decrease expenses. Deferred and prepaid expenses 
could be treated in the same way as above. Moreover, the company may also 
intentionally transfer administrative expenses and financial expenses to deferred 
assets, construction in progress, and assets awaiting a deal loss or income (unsettled 
assets profit and loss) in order to not only decrease expenses but also inflate assets.  
 
To sum up, listed companies can create false profits through transfer payments with 
connected transactions and entities, inflating income, and intentionally decreasing 
costs. These kinds of adjustments are according to accrual based accounting 
assumptions or fraud. However, the statement of cash flow is assumed to be prepared 
on the cash basis. The statement of cash flow is supposed to prevent the company 
inflating profit and help auditors detect false profits. However, in reality, listed 
companies also produce false cash flow statements.  
 
Listed companies use Accounts Receivable to inflate profit and to inflate cash flow. 
Listed companies directly give cash to customers, and then ask customers to use this 
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cash to purchase its products, which inflates income and cash flow. In the accounting 
general journal, it may present as the following entries: 
 
1. Dr:  Construction in Progress (prepaid for purchase or other receivable) 
Cr:  Cash in banks 
2. Dr: Cash in banks 
Cr: Sales  
      Taxes payable – output tax 
3. Dr: Cost of goods sold 
Cr: Inventories 
 
In addition, a listed company may also adjust the payment period of accounts 
payable in order to reduce cash flow out. A listed company may also intentionally 
record cash flow from investing activities into cash flow from operating activities. 
For example, listed company A invests some cash in securities. When company A 
needs cash, it then sells these securities, and the cash flow should be recorded as 
investing activities. However, listed company A may change customer contracts, or 
forge customers’ seals and fake contracts in order to forge sale transactions. Finally, 
company A engages in false sales transactions by using cash flow from investing 
activities in order to increase the cash flow from operating activities.  
 
10.2 Comments on the Chinese accounting standards and accounting rules 
As discussed above, listed companies may use connected transactions, inflate 
income, and intentionally decrease costs to make fraudulent profits, and also conduct 
false operations in the cash flow statement in order to make fraud more difficult to 
find.  
 
According to Mary Douglas’ grid-group analysis, individuals’ cognition might not 
be cultivated to cope with new and rapid institutional changes. However, it is 
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important to remember that Chinese accounting standards are still in transition. 
Before Chinese economic reforms, China’s enterprises had a single form of 
ownership and existed in a highly centralized planned economic system. Accounting 
standard systems were unchanged for years. After economic reform, the Chinese 
accounting standard system was changed. The development of Chinese accounting 
standards can be divided into four stages: introducing international accounting 
standards, studying international accounting standards, improving Chinese 
accounting standards, and converging to the international accounting standards, in 
which all was done in a very short time compared to that taken in Western countries.  
 
Firstly, between 1979 and 1992, China introduced the international accounting 
standards. The initiation of Chinese accounting standards development is the 
Regulations on Financial Issues of Sino-foreign Equity Joint Ventures (关于中外合
资工业企业财务会计问题的若干规定) promulgated in 1979. In addition, the 
Enterprise Accounting Standards (企业会计准则) and the Enterprise Financial 
Standards (企业财务通则) were promulgated in November 1992, as well as 13 
industry accounting rules (in Chinese: 行业会计制度) and 10 industries financial 
rules (行业财务制度) (referred to as ‘two standards’ and ‘two rules’). The main 
features of this stage were the Regulations on Financial Issues of Sino-foreign Equity 
Joint Ventures in 1979 and the Accounting Rules for Sino-foreign Equity Joint 
Ventures (中外合资企业会计制度) in 1985 for the first time with reference to 
international practices. 
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 Secondly, between 1993 and 2000, the ‘two standards’ and ‘two rules’ became 
effective on the 1
st
 July 1993, and in December 2000 the MOF promulgated the 
Enterprise Accounting Rules (企业会计制度). In this stage, China began to learn the 
international accounting standards, and also implemented the ‘two standards’ and 
‘two rules’ according to national conditions. During this period, following Chinese 
financial scandals, the first specific accounting standard, the Enterprise Accounting 
Standards – Disclosure of connected transactions (企业会计准则 – 关联方关系及
交易的披露) was issued in 1997 and took effect in 1998. By the end of 2001, China 
had promulgated 16 accounting standards, which indicated that China had quickly 
established a Chinese accounting system with reference to international accounting 
practices.  
 
Thirdly, on the 1
st
 January 2001, the Enterprise Accounting Rules (企业会计制度) 
took effect. To improve the Chinese accounting standard system, the Accounting 
Rules for Financial Enterprises (金融企业会计制度) was promulgated in 2001, as 
well as the Small Business Accounting Rules (小企业会计制度) in 2003 and the 
Nongovernmental Nonprofit Organization Accounting Rules (民间非营利组织会计
制度) in 2004.  
 
Fourthly, on the 15
th
 Feb 2006, the Ministry of Finance announced the Chinese 
Accounting Standards (中国会计准则) which became effective on the 1st January 
2007, and included 39 new accounting standards. The most prominent feature of the 
new Chinese Accounting standards was the adoption of principles based accounting 
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standards, which are converged to the International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRSs). 
 
As described above, China has both accounting rules and accounting standards: 
Enterprise Accounting Rules (企业会计制度) in 2001 is the rules-based accounting 
approach, while the Chinese Accounting Standards (中国会计准则) in 2006 is the 
principles-based accounting approach.  Both accounting regulations were issued by 
the MOF. The Enterprise Accounting Rules were first implemented in joint stock 
companies. In 2002, all foreign invested companies started to use the Enterprise 
Accounting Rules, and meanwhile SOEs were also encouraged to use them. At the 
end of 2005, all central SOEs under the control of the State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission started to use the Enterprise 
Accounting Rules. The accounting rules include the Enterprise Accounting Rules, the 
Accounting Rules for Financial Enterprises, and the Small Business Accounting 
Rules, which provide respective operations of the set of accounting subjects, the 
specific accounting operations, and financial reports preparation for general business, 
financial and insurance companies, and small business.  
 
However, since the new Chinese Accounting Standards were implemented on the 1
st
 
January 2007, all listed companies have changed to use the Chinese Accounting 
Standards. Other non-listed companies can choose either the Chinese Accounting 
Standards or the Enterprise Accounting Rules, but companies have been encouraged 
to use the Chinese Accounting Standards in order to converge to international 
accounting standards. The Small Business Accounting Rules (小企业会计制度) of 
2003 were repealed on the 1
st
 January 2013, and meanwhile the Small Business 
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Accounting Standards were implemented. Since the new Chinese Accounting 
Standards were issued, the guidance and explanation for the standards continue to be 
promulgated. 
 
Although China gradually accepted the international accounting practice that took a 
principles-based accounting approach, accounting rules and accounting standards 
still coexist in China. This means that both principles-based and rules-based 
accounting approaches are taken in China. The Chinese unique accounting system 
may confuse accounting professionals and this may have potential risks when 
professionals conduct accounting practices. Firstly, most tertiary education 
institutions offer professional accounting courses, but the question is which 
accounting approach should be chosen. Some top ranked universities choose original 
foreign accounting teaching materials, such as Tsinghua University, in order to 
understand the principles-based international accounting standards. Moreover, “many 
universities have established cooperative relationships with international professional 
bodies and new majors in international accounting and professional CPA programs 
have been developed, including the integration of ACCA
33
 and CGA
34
 exam courses 
into Chinese university accounting curricula” (Zhang et al., 2014, pp. 837-838). This 
means Chinese accounting education pays more attention to the principles-based 
accounting standards. If this is true, why are rules-based accounting rules still used 
by the Chinese accounting industry, rather than completely using the principles based 
accounting standards? If only principles-based accounting standards are taught, how 
will students implement the accounting rules when they work in companies using the 
Enterprise Accounting Rules?  
                                                 
33
 ACCA: the UK’s Association of Chartered Certified Accountants 
34
 CGA: the Certified General Accountants Association of Canada 
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The situation of both the principles-based and the rules-based accounting approaches 
coexisting in China create difficulties in accounting education, and also in 
professional accounting practices. Although the MOF has issued the Announcement 
of the abolishment of several accounting rules (关于公布若干废止和失效的会计准
则制度类规范性文件目录的通知) (Ministry of Finance, 2015c) in 2015 to repeal 
the ‘two’ standards and ‘two’ rules (1993), the Accounting Rules for Financial 
Enterprises (金融企业会计制度) (2001), and the Small Business Accounting Rules (
小企业会计制度) (2003), the Enterprise Accounting Rules effected in 2001 were not 
on the list. This raises the question: when a parent company uses the Enterprise 
Accounting Rules and their subsidiaries use the Chinese Accounting Standards, how 
does the parent company consolidate financial statements? For example, in this case, 
the parent company was Amoi Electronics Co., Ltd. limited by liability, while the 
Amoi Electronics Co., Ltd. limited by shares was the subsidiary company which had 
been listed. If the parent company and the subsidiary used different accounting 
policies, how did Amoi Electronics’ parent company consolidate the financial 
statements? Before the Chinese Accounting Standards were implemented in 2007, 
the Enterprise Accounting Rules was implemented in 2001 in joint stock companies, 
while after the Chinese Accounting Standards took effect in 2007, all listed 
companies switched to the Chinese Accounting Standards. That means after 2007, 
Amoi Electronics started to use the Chinese Accounting Standards, but whether the 
parent company also switched to the new accounting standards and whether 
accounting professionals had been educated for them might present a potential risk to 
the effective implementation of the new accounting standards.  
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Although several policies can show that the MOF was trying to popularize the 
principles-based accounting standards to converge to the international accounting 
standards, why does it still keep the Enterprise Accounting Rules? With both the 
principle-based and the rules-based accounting approaches coexisting in China, 
Chinese accounting professionals could be confused and find it difficult to cultivate a 
new cognition for the principles-based accounting standards, especially since the new 
accounting standards were announced with explanations and guidance, which may 
limit and frame the exercise of professional judgment. Accounting professionals may 
still not understand the rationale behind accounting principles. For example, one of 
the features in the new Chinese Accounting Standards is how to calculate fair value. 
However, Nie et al. (2013) observed the difficulty of determining fair value in China 
was because “many assets did not exist in a ‘vibrant’ market” (p.286). They also 
argued that “the technical complexities involved in valuation in an emerging market 
economy could increase the difficulty of determining fair value and the lack of 
research and practice regarding fair value in China was an impediment to Chinese 
accountants in the implementation of fair value” (Nie et al., 2013, p.286). As such, 
Chinese accountants might only superficially accept the new accounting standards, 
while be deeply impacted by the guidance and explanations that provide more rules 
for accounting practices. Thus, some accounting frauds occur because accountants 
have just made the accounting equation equilibrium while they rarely cared about the 
substance of business transactions. The reason might be that accountants did not 
understand the rationale behind accounting principles or intentionally committed 
fraud under the cloak of principles-based accounting standards that required 
professional judgments.  
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10.3 The external supervision system of Chinese listed companies 
Another question is, as the last line of defence in ensuring accurate accounting 
information of listed companies, did the external supervision system play their roles 
as intended? 
 
The Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) is a ministerial level public 
institution directly under the State Council (Chinese Securities Regulatory 
Commission, 2016). Its function is to supervise and govern China’s securities and 
futures market and maintain the market’s order to ensure legal operation of the 
capital market. 
 
CSRC is located in Beijing, and has 21 functional departments, one inspection 
division, and three centres (Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission, 2016). 
CSRC has set up a public offering review committee and a punishment 
administrative committee (Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission, 2016). CSRC 
has also established 36 securities regulatory bureaus in different provinces, 
autonomous regions, municipalities, and cities specifically designated in the state 
plan, which fall directly under the Central Government (Chinese Securities 
Regulatory Commission, 2016). Moreover, CSRC has established the Shanghai 
Commissioner Office in Shanghai and the Shenzhen Commissioner Office in 
Shenzhen (Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission, 2016). The CSRC 
institutional system can be seen in Figure 19. In this case, Xiamen securities 
regulatory bureau is one of the subsidiary bureaus of CSRC in the city specifically 
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designated in the state plan
35
. The main responsibilities of Xiamen securities 
regulatory bureau is to “supervise the securities and futures activities of listed 
companies in this region, securities and futures operational institutions, securities 
investment consulting institutions, and the intermediaries dealing with securities 
business such as law firms, accounting firms, and assets appraisal institutions 
authorized by CSRC; investigate and prosecute violation of laws and rules within its 
jurisdiction” (Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission, 2008). 
  
                                                 
35
 Xiamen is a city specifically designated in the state plan which means that from a political point of 
view, it is the vice-provincial position governed by the affiliated provincial government, while 
economically speaking, it is in a provincial position directly controlled by central government. In 
China, there are 5 cities specifically designated in the state plan that are Dalian, Qingdao, Ningbo, 
Xiamen, and Shenzhen.  
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Figure 19: Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission and its system 
(Adopted in Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission, 2016) 
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The accounting information of listed companies is required to be supplied to 
different supervision government departments or other accounting institutes in order 
to disclose true and accurate accounting information to the public. In accordance 
with Chinese Company Law, listed companies need to submit the first half year 
financial report to regional securities regulatory bureaus within 60 days of the report 
being finished, and need to submit the annual report after CPAs’ audit to the regional 
securities regulatory bureau within 120 days after the end of the financial year 
(Shanghai Stock Exchange, 2012). Government auditing departments audit the 
accounting information of listed companies in order to guarantee the state assets 
inflation-proofing and appreciation. Tax bureaus inspect the accounting information 
of listed companies in order to make sure companies pay enough taxes. Public 
accounting firms audit financial reports of listed companies because shareholders 
engage CPAs to perform auditing services on shareholders’ behalf in order to know 
the company’s true operational performance. The supervision system of Chinese 
listed companies can be seen in Figure 20. 
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Figure 20: The external supervision system of Chinese listed companies 
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In this case, according to the 2005 financial report of Amoi Electronics, the net profit 
was in deficit by -658,050,491.18 yuan (The financial report of Amoi Electronics, 
2005). However, according to Rules Governing the Listing of Stocks on Shanghai 
Stock Exchange, if “the company has been in the red in the most recent two 
consecutive years (based on the audited net profits disclosed in the latest two annual 
reports)” (Shanghai Stock Exchange, 2012, p. 860), the Exchange will issue a 
delisting risk warning on the stocks of the listed company. This is why Amoi 
Electronics committed profit fraud in 2006. According to the 2006 financial report of 
Amoi Electronics, the net profit suddenly went up to 24,212,631.18 yuan. 
 
Moreover, supervision departments, such as financial bureaus, auditing bureaus, tax 
bureaus, the People’s Bank, securities regulatory bureaus, and insurance supervision 
departments, are government institutions. Compared to public accounting firms, 
there is no direct interest relationship between listed companies and supervision 
departments, because supervision and inspection from supervision departments is 
compulsory and gratis. However, auditing services from public accounting firms are 
not free and is also a fiduciary duty to shareholders. As such, keeping the loyalty of 
customers is the anchor of a public accounting firm’s survival in the highly 
competitive Chinese CPA industry. In reality, some CPAs do not inspect, and also 
help audited companies make false accounting information to satisfy other 
supervision departments’ requirements in order to keep the engagement. Listed 
companies also use guanxi to negotiate with supervision departments in order to ask 
them not to do a real inspection. This may be another reason why the fraud of 
corporate scandals seemed obvious, but was not detected immediately.  
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10.4 Conclusion 
The external supervision system of listed companies may not reduce the risk of 
fraudulent accounting information, but trigger the accounting fraud, because the 
supervision departments can use results made by prior supervision departments to 
avoid repeated inspection, according to Article 33 of the Accounting Law of the 
People’s Republic of China. Thus, the quality of auditing reports is important for 
other supervision departments. Chinese CPAs are required to improve the quality of 
financial information and use auditing techniques and auditing methods to promote 
Chinese auditing standards converging to the international auditing standards.  
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CHAPTER 11 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENTDATIONS 
11.1 Conclusion 
Understanding of auditor independence in socio-political struggles must be explored 
within cultural and institutional contexts. China was selected as an area of study 
because of its unique institutional and cultural environments. In the process of 
transforming China’s planned economy to be more market oriented, China completed 
enterprise reforms and a disaffiliation program of public accounting firms from their 
government sponsoring body in the 1990s. Since then, there has been an exponential 
growth in the number of multinational corporations establishing subsidiary 
companies in China. With China entering the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 
2001, the Chinese economy was increasingly integrated into the international 
economy. With the development of information technology and the complexity of 
economic activities, Chinese CPAs are required to improve the quality of financial 
information and to deal with auditing market risks to maintain market stability and 
auditing trust. These requirements ask Chinese CPAs to improve their auditing 
techniques and auditing methods so that Chinese auditing standards can successfully 
converge with international auditing standards. 
 
This study selected three Chinese auditing failures and scandals, namely Yin Guang 
Xia (1999-2000), Green Land (2004-2010), and Amoi Electronics (2006-2007), each 
contextualized by a different timing in the process of Chinese economic reform.  
 
The case of Yin Guang Xia occurred during the period between 1999 and 2000, 
when China completed its enterprise reform and its disaffiliation program of public 
accounting firms. The aim of enterprise reform was to separate the state from the 
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management to promote corporate independence, decrease bureaucratic interference 
in corporate activities, and increase Chinese corporate competitiveness. Another aim 
of the disaffiliation program of public accounting firms from their government 
sponsoring bodies was also to improve auditor independence.  
 
At the early stage of Chinese economic reform, new concepts of corporate 
governance, such as supervisors and independent directors, and auditor independence 
were introduced to China. According to neo-Durheimian theory, when institutions 
have been changed, individuals need to cultivate new thought style to adapt to the 
new institutions. In the case of Yin Guang Xia, Chinese professionals need to 
cultivate the new thought style when they interpret and accept these new institutions, 
such as supervisors, independent directors, and auditor independence. This is because 
Chinese SOEs were controlled by either the central government or local governments 
before the enterprise reform and Chinese public accounting firms were sponsored by 
government and government controlled institutions before the disaffiliation program. 
However, in the process of cultivating individuals’ new thought style, culture as an 
informal institution limits individuals’ opinions and cognitions to adapt to 
institutional changes, especially guanxi and a sense of obedience may obstruct the 
adjustment process. Chinese economic reforms were trying to change hierarchical 
culture which was a strong grid – strong group form, but party secretaries are 
embedded in China’s corporate governance structure where they retain a strong 
group form, as well as the Ministry of Finance which continues to govern the 
CICPA. Thus, in the case of Yin Guang Xia, the cognition of these new concepts 
remained unchanged. The reason might be that the process of cultivating new 
thought style for newly introduced institutions needs a period of time.  
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However, in the second case study, Green Land conducted fraudulent accounting 
operations for the initial public offering process and after it was listed from 2004 to 
2010, in which auditor independence was significantly impacted by Chinese culture, 
especially the obligations derived from guanxi. Although the new concepts of 
corporate governance and auditor independence had been introduced in the 1900s, 
these regulations did not have the expected effect, as indicated by the case of Green 
Land. Auditor independence is a core value for auditors, but in the highly 
competitive auditing industry, auditors are trying to find and reach inside the group 
to get more benefits within a strong group form of society. The public accounting 
firms were happy to use personal guanxi to gain an audit engagement in order to 
increase business revenue. Therefore, whether the new policies could achieve 
expected effectiveness in the long run there remained a big risk because of the 
influence of Chinese culture. 
 
The case of Amoi Electronics examined how professionals interpreted and 
challenged new institutions within the limitation of cultural and social environments. 
In this case, it provides insights into how a listed company conducted accounting 
fraud, and investigated the reasons that motivated this company to forge accounting 
information. The reason for fraud was found to be driven by avoiding the risk of 
being delisted. In order to keep their listing, listed companies create false profits 
through connected transactions, inflating income, and intentionally decreasing cost. 
In this case, we see that a listed company may be prepared to produce a false cash 
flow statement to make a false profit seem reasonable.   
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Moreover, the accounting information of listed companies is required to be supplied 
to different government supervising departments or other accounting institutes as 
part of their obligation to disclose true and accurate accounting information to the 
public. However, the fact of an external supervision system for listed companies may 
not reduce the risk of inaccurate accounting information, and in a sense its diversity 
enabled this accounting fraud, because the supervision department can use results 
made by prior supervision departments to avoid repeated inspection if the results 
meet the posterior supervision department needs in performing its required duties, 
according to Article 33 of the Accounting Law of the People’s Republic of China. 
Therefore, the external supervision system for listed companies may not reduce the 
risk of inaccurate accounting information because of its complexity. However, in 
context of the Chinese CPA industry, auditors may help companies to create false 
accounting information to satisfy supervision departments’ requirements in order to 
keep the engagement. Companies may also use guanxi to negotiate with supervision 
departments in order to avoid a real inspection. That may be a reason why the fraud 
in this corporate scandal which seems so obvious but was not disclosed immediately.   
 
The risks of auditor independence from the three case studies have explained the 
results of Liu et al (2011) that state-ownership and management connections with 
auditors increased the probability of receiving unqualified audit opinions, and firm-
level and personal connections with auditors were more important to non-state-
owned enterprises than to SOEs. That is, in the context of the low degree of Chinese 
external supervision and a low risk of punishment (a weak grid form), the strong 
group form of society in which individuals use guanxi to conduct their business 
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activities may significantly impact auditor independence, resulting in a reduction in 
the quality of auditing reports.  
 
11.2 Recommendations 
From these three case studies, some potential risks in the Chinese auditing industry 
can be perceived. According to the context of the Chinese relationship-oriented 
society, the observations show that some senior directors in CICPA also have 
government positions, while the government also holds shares in SOEs. There may 
be a potential risk of damage to auditor independence, because of the government 
being both regulator and the participant. It is possible to reduce this kind of risk by 
making a clearly separate relationship between the government and public 
accounting firms, which would mean cancelling dual appointment of senior directors 
in CICPA who also have government positions and not allowing someone to take a 
senior director position in CICPA if they had government working experience 
immediately before they took up their position on the CICPA. In addition, to reduce 
the risk of public accounting firms compromising their independence with audited 
companies in order to maintain their customers, one possible solution may be to set 
up credit files for CPAs to record their dishonesty and keep a history of penalties. 
Moreover, public accounting firms may also be classified by ranks that are evaluated 
by CICPA through credit files of CPAs. This suggestion may also make it easier to 
punish public accounting firms who merge with other public accounting firms after 
their qualifications are revoked.  
 
Furthermore, the government auditing system should make clear its relationship with 
the government, and take actions such as cancelling the joint leadership. For 
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example, local governments should not provide operational funds and exercise their 
control over local audit offices, which may reduce the impact of culture and keep 
government auditors independent. Audit committees in companies should also 
operate independently using their own funds and personal control. Otherwise, the 
function of the audit committee would not be as expected in the context of Chinese 
culture (the strong group form).  
 
Although Chinese corporate governance introduced some ideas from western 
corporate governance, people in companies might not know much about the nature of 
newly introduced roles such as independent directors and audit committee members. 
According to observations in the Green Land case, the chairman of directors also 
held the position of secretary of the board, which indicates that functions and 
responsibilities of newly introduced positions might be not fully understood or 
accepted within Chinese corporate governance, possibly because of Chinese 
hierarchical culture.  
 
Therefore, although international auditing standards and the western corporate 
governance system were transplanted to China, the resistance of culture may mean 
that auditors do not function as they were intended to. In other words, the 
effectiveness of the adoption of international standards or regulations is determined 
by the institutional environment and also the cultural environment. The institutional 
pressures forced on people and organizations to adopt new concepts and standards 
seems, in metaphorical terms, to be like installing parts from different factories into a 
machine, while culture determines whether these parts can work properly.  
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The identified risks in these case studies have implications for policy makers, 
professional practitioners, investors, and researchers. Firstly, these observations 
suggest that Chinese corporate governance, its external supervision system, and 
auditing standards may not be functioning as intended, because of China’s unique 
cultural and institutional environment. It will be essential for foreign investors to 
assess Chinese corporate governance and consider the quality of Chinese auditing 
reports in any investment decision.  
 
Secondly, policy makers and regulators may consider the Chinese cultural 
environment, especially guanxi, when making effective regulations and standards. In 
a relationship-oriented society, it is difficult to make policy to cut off relationships. 
This is especially true in China, seeing that guanxi is a significant part of the culture. 
The imposition of high-risk penalties, such as permanent disqualification, criminal 
charges and jail, may be an option to increase the independence of auditors by 
making it very costly to compromise the auditing standards required to express an 
authoritative opinion on the quality of the financial statements. In the balance of 
costs and risks, if the price of fraud is high, this may draw more attention to the risk 
of committing it.  
 
Furthermore, external supervision departments should also review auditing reports 
carefully and use all three financial statements to analyse potential accounting frauds. 
With respect to the process of listing, the relations among companies, auditors, and 
issuance examination committee members should receive close attention because of 
the Chinese cultural context. 
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11.3 Limitations and suggestions for future research 
The limitations of this study relate to limited sources of data available. As a set of 
case studies, while general themes are drawn, the specific findings are not 
generalizable beyond each case’s locations and periods investigated.  This study was 
only able to observe cases spanning the short period of the introduction of new 
institutions and their regulations. Future studies could provide interviews and other 
research approaches to enhance the understanding of corporate governance and 
auditor independence in the Chinese context. The findings of this study reveal that 
while new policies could achieve expected effectiveness in the long run, there 
remains a risk to auditor independence and good corporate governance because of 
the influence of Chinese culture. Future research could investigate whether or not 
new Chinese institutions do successfully embed independent auditor practices over 
time.  
 
This study adopted of Neo-Durkheimian theory by using grid – group method to 
contextualize the situation in China and provide an understanding of how auditing 
and corporate governance has evolved in China after the economic reforms. Future 
research could also use this theoretical framework to examine corporate governance 
evolutions and auditing practices in other developing and emerging economies.  
 
 
This study found the culture as an informal institution limited individuals’ cognitions 
to interpret new institutions when institutions changed. Future research could test 
whether the culture limits other professionals’ cognition to interpret new institutions. 
With the opening up of the Chinese market after the economic reforms, there is a 
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large amount of foreign investment flowing into China, but most foreign investment is 
injected into coastal provinces. For example, “over 40 of the World’s largest 
multinationals have invested in Shanghai, and a total of $35 billion in direct foreign 
investment has been made in the area” (Deshpande and Farley, 2008). Thus, due to the 
inequality of economic development in varying geographical environments as mentioned 
in Chapter 4, coastal regions interact more frequently compared to interior regions. 
Future research could compare whether there are differences of the effect of culture 
on individuals’ cognition to interpret new institutions in different regions in large-
sample empirical studies. Moreover, this study only observed financial auditing 
practice from the three case studies in China. Future research could also investigate 
the influence of culture on internal and government audit.  
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ABBREVIATIONS 
1. ACCA: the UK’s Association of Chartered Certified Accountants  
2. AICPA: American Institute of Certified Public Accountants  
3. Amoi Electronics: Amoi Electronics Co., Ltd. limited by shares 
4. ANAO: Australian National Audit Office  
5. CACPA: Chinese Association of Certified Public Auditors  
6. CAS: Chinese Auditing Standards  
7. CCISs: Chinese CPA Implementation Standards  
8. CCP: Chinese Communist Party  
9. CEC: China Electronics Corporation  
10. CEO: Chief Executive Officer  
11. CFO: Chief Financial Officer  
12. CGA: the Certified General Accountants Association of Canada 
13. CIASs: Chinese Independent Auditing Standards  
14. CICPA: Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants  
15. CPA: Certified Public Accountant  
16. CSRC: China Security Regulatory Commission  
17. Green Land: Yunnan Green Land Biological Technology Co., Ltd. by shares  
18. Guidelines: Guidelines for Introducing Independent Directors to the Board of 
Directors of Listed Companies  
19. HEIs: Higher education institutions  
20. IAA: Institute of Internal Auditors  
21. IAASB: International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board  
22. IAS: International Accounting Standards 
23. IASB: International Accounting Standards Board  
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24. IFRSs: International Financial Reporting Standards  
25. IIA: Institute of Internal Auditors  
26. IPO: Initial public offering  
27. ISA: International Standards on Auditing  
28. MOF: Ministry of Finance  
29. NAO: National Audit Office of the People’s Republic of China  
30. PCAOB: Public Company Accounting Oversight Board  
31. POB: Public Oversight Board  
32. RPLG: Related-party loan guarantees  
33. SAIC: State Administration for Industry and Commerce of P.R. China  
34. SME: a small and medium-sized enterprise 
35. SOEs: State-owned enterprises  
36. VAT: Value-added tax  
37. WTO: World Trade Organisation  
38. Yin Guang Xia: Guang Xia (Yinchuan) Industry Co., Ltd. limited by shares  
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APPENDIX 8.2: LISTING PROCESSES (SHENZHEN STOCK EXCHANGE, 
2016)  
(1) Restructuring and establishment: Drafting the restructuring plan; employing 
intermediaries such as sponsors (securities companies), accounting firms, asset 
appraisal agencies and law firms to study the feasibility of the plan, audit and 
appraise the assets of the enterprise to be restructured, sign the sponsors’ agreement 
and draft the articles of association and other corporate documents; setting up 
internal organizational structure; and establishing the company limited by shares by 
means of promotion. Unless there are specific provisions in laws and regulations, the 
approval of the provincial government is canceled. 
  
(2) Due diligence: companies should invite sponsorship institutions (securities 
companies), accounting firms, law firms and other intermediaries to undertake due 
diligence inspections concerning the development history, operation condition and 
financial situations. The intermediaries mentioned above should also make a 
diagnosis of existing problems. 
  
(3) Pre-listing Tutoring and Tutoring Records: Sponsors and other intermediaries 
offer professional training and business guidance for the company, familiarize the 
company with the necessary knowledge for being a listed company, improve the 
organizational structure and internal management, standardize corporate conduct, 
define its business objectives and the purpose of the proceeds, rectify deficiencies 
according to listing requirements, prepare IPO application documents, and need to 
pass the inspection organized by local regulatory authority on their coaching 
activities. 
  
(4) Submission acceptance of application: Enterprises and intermediaries prepare 
application documents according to the CSRC’s requirements. Sponsors conduct 
internal review and make recommendations to the CSRC. The CSRC will accept the 
application if it meets relevant conditions. 
  
(5) Preliminary review of application documents: After acceptance of the application, 
the CSRC will conduct a preliminary review. It will also consult with the provincial 
governments, the National Development and Reform Commission (for listing on the 
ChiNext
36
, there is no need for such consultation and the CSRC will only need to 
communicate with the province-level government on the share offer) and minister of 
commerce (for Sino-foreign joint ventures and foreign enterprises). Then the CSRC 
will provide its opinion to sponsors which will make arrangement for the issuer and 
intermediaries to respond to the opinion or remedy any deficiencies. Then pre-
disclosure will be made and the application documents will finally be submitted for 
review to the CSRC public offer review committee.  
  
(6) Review by the IPO Review Committee: After the preliminary review, the 
application documents will be summited to the IPO Review Committee. The IPO 
Review Committee comprises of both CSRC professionals and non-CSRC experts. 7 
                                                 
36
 ChiNext was launched in October 2009. The market primarily targets innovative growth enterprises 
with profitability. ChiNext reflects innovative efforts in both technology and business models in 
China’s enterprises (Shenzhen Stock Exchange, 2016). 
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committee members will be present for each IPO review meeting. They will conduct 
queries, issue review opinions and take a vote on the application documents. 
Companies with 5 or more consent votes will pass the IPO review. 
  
(7) Approval Granting: After the application documents pass the IPO Review, the 
company and relevant intermediaries will implement relevant issues raised by the 
review committee. Then they will reclassify the application documents and keep 
them in archives for future reference. After the documents are sealed and internal 
procedures are fulfilled, the CSRC will grant approval to the company for IPO. 
  
(8) Road show: Before the IPO, the company must perform the required disclosure 
obligations. Main Board listing candidates should publish the summary prospectus 
and IPO announcement in the newspapers designated by the CSRC. They should also 
publish the full prospectus and relevant documents on the websites designated by the 
CSRC. ChiNext listing candidates should publish the full prospectus and IPO 
announcement on the websites designated by the CSRC as well as on their corporate 
websites. Moreover, they should publish an IPO and ChiNext listing announcement 
in the newspapers designated by the CSRC, informing investors of such websites and 
how to access the relevant documents. Then the lead underwriters (securities firms) 
and issuers will conduct road show, promotion and book-building and determine the 
issue price based on book-building results. 
  
(9) Listing: The issuer will launch its IPO according to the method prescribed by the 
CSRC. Then it will apply to the stock exchange for listing, complete custody and 
registration procedures at the registration and settlement company, and get listed. 
After listing, the sponsor will be responsible for continuous supervision and 
guidance. 
  
The time that an enterprise takes from restructuring to listing varies depending on 
circumstances is around one year. Normally, the time for various stages is roughly as 
follows: approximately six months from corporate restructuring to the establishment 
of a company limited by shares; approximately three to six months for sponsors and 
other intermediaries to conduct due diligence and prepare applications; 
approximately six to nine months from the CSRC review to public offering. 
  
